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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research is to explore the regulation of interconnection in Rwanda by 
investigating whether the current interconnection regime has ensured fair and reasonable 
interconnection rates that can enhance efficiency and effective competition. A qualitative 
research approach was used and the data were collected using semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis. The findings reveal that although RURA adopted a cost-based 
interconnection approach to ensure a fair and reasonable interconnection rate, its poor 
implementation resulted in an inefficient level of fixed and mobile interconnection rates. The 
study found an inconsistent application of the regime by incumbents, lack of sufficient 
regulatory capacity and lack of clear and comprehensive policy instruments. More recently, 
RURA is making efforts towards adopting a new regime to address the current 
interconnection rate issues in Rwanda. This study demonstrates that the current 
interconnection rate regime requires extensive rethinking about appropriate costing models 
and regulatory capacity, in order to enhance market efficiency and promote effective 
competition.   
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CHAPTER ONE: THE INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN 
RWANDA 
1.1 INTRODUCTION   
Interconnection determines the winners and the losers in a competitive environment. Jamison 
(1998) said that competition and efficiency in the telecommunication sector hinge on 
interconnection pricing regulation. However, Armstrong (2002) highlights that the main issue 
is to ensure that new entrants can access the incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms 
and conditions. In countries where operators buy inputs from each others’ network, the 
incumbent always has incentives to use high interconnection charges as a tool to drive small 
operators out of the market. Too high interconnection rates deter competition. On the other 
hand, too low interconnection charges discourage investment and delays facility-based 
competition. The main challenge to regulatory institutions is to determine fair and reasonable 
interconnection rates that can enhance efficiency and effective competition in the telecoms 
market.   
In an attempt to determine an appropriate level of interconnection rate that can enhance 
efficiency and effective level of competition, Rwandan interconnection policy advocates a 
cost-based pricing principle.  Proponents (Jamison, 1998 and Noumba et al.2004) of cost-
based pricing principles state that it never turns out to be impropriate in the light of actual 
costs and market conditions. They further say that it establishes the level playing field for a 
favorable environment that encourages greater participation by the private sector.   
Despite the commitments from Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) to grant new 
entrants access to incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms and conditions, 
Magonyozi (2008) argued that efficiency and competition are still far away from being 
effective in Rwanda. Salinger (1998:28) argues that “the use of LRIC is theoretically sound, 
but its implementation in practice is rather complex and could undermine the profitability of 
the incumbent’s investment if poorly executed”.   
It is this assertion that forms the basis of the present study which investigates the 
interconnection regulation in Rwanda. The main critical question of this study is: How has 
interconnection pricing regulation impacted the Rwandan telecommunication sector? Cave 
and Volsgang (2003) state that regulators can stop incumbents from delaying to invest if an 
appropriate backward or forward-looking cost-based approach is adopted.  This raises a few 
critical questions: What is the existing interconnection pricing regime in Rwanda? How has 
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the existing interconnection pricing regime affected the Rwandan telecommunications 
market? Laffont et al. (1998) argue that focusing on access pricing principles per se does not 
give a positive outcome. Consequently, scholars (Armstrong, 2002; Jamison, 1998; Jain, 
2003) strongly argue that an efficient level of interconnection rate can be determined only if 
the regulator has high degree of independence, skills and enough policy instruments at its 
disposal (Armstrong, 2002; Jamison, 1998; Jain 2003).  This raises the questions: What are 
the challenges the current interconnection pricing regime is facing in the Rwandan telecoms 
market? What can be done to improve interconnection pricing regulation in Rwanda? 
To answer these critical questions of the study, the researcher undertook a case study of 
interconnection regulation in Rwanda, exploring evidence collected from the regulator, 
RURA and the three operators MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda. Multiple 
source of evidence used in the case study included semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis methods. 
1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
The study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents an introduction to this study 
and the context in which it was carried out, the identification of the problem and the 
organization of the study. The review of literature on topics regarding the interconnection 
regulation and interconnection pricing regulation are contained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 4, the problem statement, the purpose of the study, research questions and the 
research methodology of the study are described. Presentation of the study findings forms the 
basis of Chapter 5. Chapter 6 deals with discussion of findings. In Chapter 7, the conclusions 
and recommendations are presented and suggestions are made regarding possible future 
research. 
1.3 RWANDAN TELECOM SECTOR AFTER GENOCIDE  
Rwanda’s recently history, which entails the genocide of 1994 and the loss of one million 
people, left the Rwandan economy devastated and much of its infrastructure destroyed. After 
1994, there was an urgent necessity to develop the country both economically and socially. 
Drawing from other countries’ experience that economic and social developments hinge on 
technology innovations, the telecommunication sector was given the first priority amongst all 
Rwandan sectors.  
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The era between 1994 and 2002 was marked with significant innovations in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. In 1995, Rwandatel was the sole fixed-line telephony operator in 
Rwanda offering voice, data and internet services. Later on after the separation of post and 
telephony unit, Rwandatel was changed to Rwandatel S.A (Nsegiyumva & Habumuremyi, 
2009). In a few years of working, Rwandatel S.A had increased its number of fixed-line 
subscribers and provided services such as integrated service digital networks (ISDN) 
1(RURA, 2004).    
However, Rwandatel being the only monopoly in the market, its subscribers were offered 
poor quality of services and there was wastage of scarce resources such as spectrum since 
there was no institution to impose obligations on it to upgrade its networks and to manage 
resources. After a long period of complaints from subscribers and little progress in telephony 
penetration, the Rwandan government started to anticipate mobile telephony as new trend to 
increase the telephony penetration to a substantial level in Rwanda (Nsegiyumva & 
Habumuremyi, 2009).    
In 1998, the Rwandan government granted the first license of mobile telephony to MTN-
Rwandacell. Tri-Star Investment (an indigenous Rwandan company that was established in 
1994 by a group of private Rwandans) is the major shareholder with 50% and MTN group 
based in South Africa with 50% (Magonyozi, 2008). MTN-Rwandacell started its operations 
in September 1998.  
The launch of MTN-Rwandacell mobile services in Rwanda was a very remarkable 
innovative step in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. The following year after its launch 
MTN-Rwandacell had obtained the number of mobile subscribers equal to that of fixed-line 
telephony. As a result the government of Rwanda started to put more emphasis on 
telecommunication sector growth as an enabler of social and economic growth in the country. 
For this to be embraced there was an urgent need to promote competition and efficiency in 
the telecommunication sector.  
To achieve the above objective, in 1999 the government of Rwanda approved a new policy 
for the reform of the Rwandan telecommunication sector. This included setting up a multi- 
sectoral regulatory institution, Rwanda utilities regulatory agency (RURA).  
                                                                 
1
 ISDN is a set of communication standards for simultaneous digital transmission of voice, video, data and other 
networks 
 
4 
 
1.3.1 TELECOMMUNICATION LIBERALIZATION IN RWANDA   
The telecommunication liberalization framework in Rwanda was established by the existing 
telecommunication law which was passed by the transitional national assembly in 2001 by 
Law No. 44/2001 and Law No.39/2001 (Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009).  Through 
this law, RURA was established and was granted authority to regulate telecommunications 
and to set up a regulatory board. In addition, it required all the operators in the sector to be 
licensed and creates individual and standard licences (RURA, 2006).  
The main aim of the telecommunication reform policy in Rwanda was to restructure the 
telecom sector so as to break the monopoly of Rwandatel, open the market to new entrants, 
introduce agencies to enforce fair competition between network operators and service 
operators and regulate prices where competition was limited (RURA,2004). 
Through its privatization strategy, the government of Rwanda sold all of its shares in the 
fixed-line operator to Rwandatel. In order to promote competition in the telecommunication 
sector, Rwandatel sold its 28% shares of fixed-line to MTN-Rwandacell in 
2004(Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009). In June 2005 Rwandatel was formally 
privatized and its ownership was transferred to Terracom, a US-based IT and communication 
provider, offering fixed-line services in Rwanda between 2005 and 2007. Furthermore, in 
2006 Terracom entered into a process to transfer its shares in Rwandatel to GV Telecom 
Company, which is based in South Africa. However the council of the regulatory body, 
RURA and the government of Rwanda cancelled the negotiations after the contract between 
these two companies had been deemed illegal and invalid. Consequently , RURA granted a 
licence authorizing the provision of the internet services to MTN-Rwandacell and it 
subsequently launched services of general packet radio services (GPRS) (RURA, 2006).      
Due to the above problems, Rwandatel has passed through several changes of ownership 
since 2006. In August 2007, the government took back ownership of the company when 
Terracom failed to fulfil its license obligations. The operator was then re-privatised and sold 
to LAP Green on 23 October 2007 (Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009). LAP Green is a 
subsidiary of the Libyan government-owned investment vehicle Libyan African Investment 
Portfolio (LAP). It owns 80% of the company, now again called Rwandatel, while Rwanda 
social security funds (CSR) owns the remaining 20%. Today, Rwandatel is a fixed-mobile 
operator, as well as a backbone Internet service provider (ISP) with over 900 kilometres of 
fibre at its disposal and more than 300 points of presence in the country. 
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In the broader telecoms sector, the dominant mobile cellular provider, MTN-Rwandacell is 
dominant in the mobile market with 2,394,364 (RURA, 2010) active mobile subscribers and 
currently it is covering 95% of the country (RURA, 2010). MTN-Rwandacell continued 
improving its network’s capacity in terms of coverage. The initial investment plan of MTN 
for the year 2010 was USD 60 millions for increasing the number of sites and modernizing its 
billing system. There is a significant improvement in its service coverage even though the 
company experienced great difficulties in terms of quality of service that compelled the 
Regulatory Board to take corrective measures by imposing financial penalties. For instance, 
in December 2008, RURA fined MTN-Rwandacell about USD 127,000 for providing poor 
quality of services since 2007(RURA, 2008).  To solve this problem, MTN-Rwandacell has 
continued upgrading its networks and currently has deployed 150km of fibre optics in Kigali 
City and 108.5 km of fibre optics within the country.    
In 2009, the licensing of TIGO Rwanda S.A as the third mobile operator marked the increase 
of mobile penetration to 24% of households (NISR, 2009). In 2010, TIGO-Rwanda was 
declared by the regulatory board as the second mobile operator, with 685,393 active mobile 
subscribers in the country. Rwandatel is the third mobile operator in the market with 535,710 
active mobile subscribers.  Table 1.1 below shows the operators in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market and the dates on which their licences were approved.  
Table 1.1: Operators in the Rwanda telecommunication sector 
Source: RURA, 2009 
The above three licensed companies have the licence commitment to provide service without 
any form of discrimination throughout the country. With these licensed operators, Rwandan’s 
lives have improved through access to voice and data.  For over a decade, telecommunication 
sector has proven to be the core contributor of social-economic development in Rwanda. The 
diagram below shows the key players in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  
Figure 1.1: Key players in the Rwandan telecommunication sector     
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Source: Adapted from RURA, 2008  
 
According to the Figure 1.1 above, the policy makers (Ministry of Infrastructure, Ministry of 
ICT and RDB) decide policy, then the government of Rwanda through the parliament makes 
ICT laws, following which the regulatory body (RURA) puts the policies and laws into 
operation. This separation of functions in Rwanda has facilitated the implementation of ICT 
policy with relative objectivity and impartiality. Through these policies and laws, the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector can be regarded as a driver of social and economic 
growth. The subsection below discusses the contribution of the telecommunication sector to 
the economic development of Rwanda.   
 
1.3.4 TELECOMS SECTOR’S CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
RWANDA 
 For more than 15 years, the telecommunication sector has been hailed as the main the driver 
in promoting social and economic growth in Rwanda. This has been evidenced in its 
substantial contribution to the Rwandan GDP growth. 
        Government  
        Policy makers           Regulatory Body  
        Mobile          Fixed   Internet services  
Rwandatel  
MTN-Rwandacell 
TIGORwanda S.A  
Rwandatel  
MTN-Rwandacell 
TIGORwanda S.A  
Rwandatel  
MTN-Rwandacell  
ISPA  
Altel international  
Altech  
Value Data  
Star Africa  
• Ministry of 
Infrastructure  
• Ministry of ICT 
• Rwanda 
Development 
Board   
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After the establishment of RURA, there was a tremendous increase in mobile penetration that 
led to a substantial increase in the annual GDP growth. An increase of mobile penetration 
from 2% in 2003 to 4% in 2006 contributed 0.24% on the Rwandan GDP growth (RRA, 
2007).  In 2004, the total contribution of MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel on GDP was 3%. 
Beyond 2004 the number of mobile subscribers increased substantially as a result of increase 
in the number of mobile operators in the country.  This means the GDP also increased beyond 
3%.   Therefore the table 1.2 below illustrates the evolution of GDP in ten years.  
 
Table 1. 2: GDP growth between 2003 and 2010 
Period GDP Real growth rate 
2003 4.00% 
2004 3.50% 
2005 .90% 
2006 5.20% 
2008 6.00% 
2009 11.20 % 
2010 4.50% 
 
Source : NISR, 2003-2010 
According to the table 1.2 above, it is very evident that GDP growth rate in Rwanda has been 
not stable since 2003.  It only increased substantially in 2009 by 5.2% but in 2010 it 
decreased by 6.7 % (NISR, 2010). The tremendous increase in GDP growth rate between 
2008 and 2009 can be attributed to the entry of the third operator, TIGO-Rwanda because of 
its new affordable communication packages such as “TIGO vuga” 2 and “e-Go”3 in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector (RURA, 2010).    
Despite this achievement, it is very clear that the GDP is still less compared to USD 900 GDP 
per capita as Rwanda’s Vision 2020 (NICI, 2010).  Against this background, it could be 
                                                                 
2
 Tigo vuga is a promotion package that allows customers to talk for 100 min with only Rwf 100 within one day  
3
 e-GO is an electronic system for selling airtime 
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argued that for the government of Rwanda to maintain an increase of 8% GDP growth rate 
per year (as the directives speculate) between 2011 to 2020 will have to invest substantially 
in new telecommunication infrastructures and put a great deal of effort in regulating 
telecommunication sector effectively so as to promote facility-based and service-based 
competition in the Rwandan telecommunication market.   
1.3.5 POLICY AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE IN RWANDA 
In Rwanda, the development of the telecommunication industry has been given the first 
priority over other sectors. This was evidenced in November 1999 when the government of 
Rwanda approved a new policy reform of the Rwandan telecommunication sector that 
included establishment of key public institutions in the telecommunication sector such as the 
Rwanda information and technology authority (RITA), a government body set up to 
implement the country’s national policy, and a multi-sector regulator, RURA. Rwanda also 
benefits from the membership of the Association of Regulators and Information and 
Communication for Eastern and Southern Africa (ARICEA) and from the COMESA’s ICT 
policy that was developed to serve as a policy model for the harmonious development and 
application of ICT across member states (RURA, 2008). The Rwandan telecommunication 
sector being under the control of the Ministry of Transportation between 1994 and 2001 
affected customers negatively. However, after the establishment of the utilities regulator, 
RURA, it was claimed that the quality of service and efficiency had improved in the 
Rwandan telecommunication market (RURA, 2004).     
1.4 THE ROLE OF RURA IN THE RWANDAN TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR  
Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA) was established by the Law N 39/2001 date 
the 13th September 2001 and is tasked with the responsibility of regulating the following 
utilities: telecommunications (networks and services), energy, water and sanitation and 
transportation (RURA, 2004). With these responsibilities, the improvement of services 
condition, the protection and promotion of consumers of these regulated sectors have been 
the key activities of RURA (RURA, 2004). These activities are manifested in issuing and 
administrating of licences. This is evidenced in the number of standard and individual 
licenses that have been granted with specific reference to TIGO Rwanda S.A (the third 
Operator) and the renewal of licence of both MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel S.A.  In 2008, 
the regulatory board issued 103 regulatory decisions relating to RURA’s administrative 
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matters, regulatory guidelines and standards, issuance of licences where applicable, tariffs, 
enforcement by ways of sanctions and the administration of the universal access funds.  
Furthermore, in 2008 RURA’s performance in the collection of internally generated revenues 
(License, frequency, fines and regulatory fees) was at 86% representing a sum of Rfw 1.8bn.  
In order to improve its performance, RURA increased the number of employees from 37 to 
105 employees in December 2008 (RURA, 2008) and the salary structure has been improved 
in order to attract more expertise in the field and to avoid the industry capture. Moreover, 
from 2008 RURA has sponsored more than 8 staff on master’s programs and series of in-
house training are conducted within Rwanda for a number of staff from RURA (RURA, 
2008).   
In order to achieve harmonization of both practices and internal policies of the regulatory 
agency with the best practices of the regional and international regulatory agency, the 
regulatory board has championed the cause of strengthening relations with the regional 
regulatory bodies and international organizations. RURA being a member of ARICEA has 
improved the regulatory environment in Rwanda. The main objective of RURA is to 
implement appropriate regulatory frameworks that comply with ARICEA regulatory 
framework. For instance, there have been frequent complaints among EAC operators and 
customers that Kenya and Rwanda interconnection rates are too high compared to Tanzania 
and Uganda.   With the help of ARICEA regulatory framework RURA is revising the current 
interconnection rate regime in order to bring the rates to a fair and reasonable level that will 
enable the harmonization of interconnection rates in EAC member countries. Despite 
ARICEA’s commitment to harmonize interconnection rates through RURA, Rwanda still 
charges too high mobile interconnection rates.  This shows that there is need to carry out a 
study on the existing regulation interconnection regime in Rwanda and highlight the 
challenges it is facing to determine fair and reasonable interconnection rates that can enhance 
efficiency and effective competition.   In general, RURA has been ranked among the best 
performing regulatory bodies in EAC and Central Africa. This was evidenced by African 
Telecoms people award 2008 that was received by RURA as the best regulator in 2008. 
However due to interconnection rate disputes aforementioned, the most challenging task for 
RURA has been promoting technology innovation in the telecommunication sector 
(Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009). 
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1.4.1 PROMOTION OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN THE RWANDAN TELECOMS 
MARKET   
In Rwanda, RURA also has been playing a significant role in providing regulatory and 
technical support to National Broadband Backbone Network Project (Fiber Optic Cables), the 
project that provide countrywide broadband connectivity to all Rwandan government 
departments and institutions for the provision of e-services(RURA, 2008).  RURA offered an 
implementation plan of the project with its related regulatory requirements including matters 
of rights-of-way authorization for cable trenching and cables lying were issued (RURA, 
2008).  
In fixed-line market, Rwandatel, under the supervision of RURA, introduced wireless 
phones, known as easy call and it is now a backbone ISP with over 500 Km of fibres and has 
more than 300 points of presence in the country (Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009). In 
2008, Rwandatel S.A launched its new GSM and UMTS systems for providing 2.5G services, 
3G services, NGN and MSAN for fixed networks services (RURA, 2008). MTN-Rwandacell 
is also a backbone ISP and the provider of Wi-Fi, WiMAX, wire line Internet, VoIP, IPTV 
and mobile Data (RURA,2008) and has deployed 150Km of fiber optics in Kigali City and 
108.5 km of fiber optics within up country.  Furthermore, MTN- Rwandacell has been ranked 
as the first to commercially deploy multimedia Telephony (MMTel) based on IMS in all of 
Africa (Nsengiyumva & Habumuremyi, 2009).  
Despite commitment from RURA to promote technology innovation in the Rwandan 
telecoms market, fixed line penetration continues to decline and MTN-Rwandacell is still 
enjoying its monopoly position, with a relatively little increase in the overall penetration. 
This shows that there is much required to be done if RURA is to achieve the target of 5.2 
million subscribers in 2012 (RURA, 2008). However, it has been argued that technology 
innovations and convergence raise policy and regulatory issues and has an impact on the 
interconnection regime (Bezzina, 2005). This shows that RURA is expected to take 
regulatory issues such as interconnection rates seriously and to implement effective 
interconnection regime that can enhance market efficiency in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.   
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1.5 INTERCONNECTION REGULATION IN RWANDA  
Interconnection regulation is essentially aimed at encouraging and the promoting orderly 
development of telecommunications networks in Rwanda by ensuring and maintaining any-
to-any connectivity and safeguard against any abuse of market power in the provisioning of 
telecommunication services (RURA, 2008).  In line with the aforementioned, according to 
RURA (2004) the existing interconnection regime with respect to the law no 44/2002 of 
30/11/2001 governing telecommunication in its article 39 stipulates that: 
i) All public telecommunications operators should, if requested in writing by other public 
telecommunication operators, interconnect their network with those of other operators.  
ii) Technical and commercial arrangements for interconnection must be concluded by written 
agreements between the relevant telecommunications operators.  
iii) Interconnection cannot be refused if the request is reasonable with regard to applicant’s 
requirements and public telecommunications operator’s capacity to satisfy them. The reasons 
which give rise to a refusal must be explained in detail to the applicant in writing. If 
agreement cannot be reached between telecommunications operators, any operators may refer 
the matter to the Regulatory Board.  
iv) If the Regulatory Board is unable to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, the Board may 
in the interest of all users in the Republic, impose interconnection terms on both parties 
which are as far as possible objective and reasonable and do not discriminate between the 
operators.  
v) The minister, by Ministerial decree, sets out the general conditions and pricing principles 
which interconnection agreement must satisfy.  
vi) A copy of each interconnection agreement is submitted to the Regulatory Board as soon as 
the agreement has been signed by the public telecommunication operators. The regulatory 
body notifies such agreements to the public. Copies may be supplied upon payment of the fee 
determined by the Regulatory Board.  
vii) Discrimination by public telecommunication operators in matters of interconnection is 
forbidden. Public telecommunications operators shall apply similar circumstances to 
organizations with which it is interconnected and which are providing similar services.  
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 All the above basic principles for standard interconnection offer were incorporated into 
individual licence to prevent interconnection disputes among the competitive operators. In 
order to determine fair and reasonable interconnection rates, Rwanda adopted cost-based 
interconnection approach.  As a result, dominant mobile and fixed operators were required by 
RURA to charge cost-based interconnection charges in the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector (RURA, 2004).  
However, Nsengiyumva and Habumuremyi (2009) argue that efficiency and competition are 
still far from effective in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. They further argue that this 
interconnection policy has been in principle but not in practice. Magonyozi (2008) 
highlighted that lack of effective interconnection framework has led to interconnection rate 
disputes between dominant operators and new entrants in the Rwandan telecommunication 
market.    
1.5.1 HISTORY OF INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES IN RWANDA  
Interconnection pricing has been the most controversial issue in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. In 2004 there was a dispute between MTN-Rwandacell and 
Rwandatel over an interconnection rate (Rfw.48) that they had amicably agreed to be paying 
each other.  This dispute was so intense that RURA had to intervene and impose an interim 
symmetric interconnection rate of Rfw.28 while the consultancy firm, Ingenieurs Conseil Et 
Economistes Associes (ICEA) was being commissioned to conduct a cost-based 
interconnection study (RURA, 2004). The purpose of the ICEA study was to support RURA 
in the calculation of the costs of interconnection for both fixed and mobile operators in 
Rwanda. In the course of solving this dispute, RURA had different alternatives of cost 
models such as COSITU, which is the model that was developed by ITU for developed and 
developing countries especially in calculating the costs, rates and taxes relating to telephony 
services. This model is based on the enhanced fully allocated costing (FAC) principle. 
Finally, the regulatory agency recommended using the bottom-up LRIC model (TELRIC) of 
the World Bank which is recommended by the economic theory. The study was completed in 
March 2006 and the two operators reached an agreement based on the interconnection rates 
that were determined by the ICEA.   
However, due to the rapid change of technology the sustainability of the current 
interconnection rate has been an intense debate among the stakeholders. In 2009, for 
example, MTN-Rwandacell took Rwandatel to court due to its failure to pay the pending 
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interconnection charges worth $ 3.4 since 2005. Rwandatel, however, argued that the mobile 
interconnection charge (Frw.40) that was determined by ICEA in 2006 was not fair and 
reasonable (Butera, 2010). Besides, in June 2010, the new entrant, TIGO-Rwanda and 
Rwandatel operators have argued that due to technological evolution, such as termination 
from fixed network to VoIP, from mobile network to VoIP or versa, the current 
interconnection rate is too high to make their business grow (Butera, 2010). 
After consideration of all the disputes and complaints from customers and stakeholders, in 
2010  RURA commissioned a second study to revise the existing interconnection rate regime 
among mobile and fixed operators. The offer was given to PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
consultancy firm based in UK.  PricewaterhouseCoopers will develop interconnection costing 
models, come up with reasonable and fair interconnection cap tariff and train RURA staff on 
how to use the model. This illustrates how the regulation of interconnection rates is a 
challenge to the regulator in Rwanda.  It also draws attention to the question of what has been 
the effectiveness of the current interconnection regime RURA is using to determine 
interconnection rates.  
1.6 IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM  
The UK telecoms regulator, OFTEL, asserted that liberalization per se is not enough, because 
interconnection has power to determine the winners and the losers in a competitive 
environment (OFTEL, 1997). In light of this, Jamison (1998) said that competition and 
efficiency in the telecommunication sector hinge on interconnection pricing regulation. 
However, Armstrong (2002) highlights that the main regulatory issue has been to ensure that 
new entrants can access the incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms and conditions.  
In an attempt to ensure a fair and reasonable level of interconnection rate that can enhance 
effective competition and efficiency in the telecoms market, RURA adopted a cost-based 
access pricing principle. However, Magonyozi (2008) in his study on interconnection 
harmonization in EAC argued that efficiency and competition are still far away from 
effective in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. Salinger (1998:28) argue that “the use of 
LRIC is theoretically sound, but its implementation in practice is rather complex and could 
undermine the profitability of the incumbent’s investment if poorly executed”.  In addition, a 
number of scholars (Armstrong, 2002; Wright et al., 2006; Jamison, 1998 and Jain 2003) 
argue that cost-based methodologies can only ensure an efficient level of interconnection rate 
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only if high degree of independence from the government and industries, detailed information 
from the incumbent, skills and enough policy instruments are at the regulator’s disposal.  
Since 1998 Rwanda through RURA has had a change of interconnection regime once, 
however, there is no research has ever been conducted to find out the whether the existing 
regulation of interconnection regime has ensured fair and reasonable interconnection rates 
that can enhance efficiency and effective competition. Against this, the present study aims to 
understand how the existing regulation of interconnection regime in Rwanda has achieved its 
intended objectives of market efficiency.  
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CHAPTER TWO: INTERCONNECTION REGULATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents a review of studies and viewpoints from different researchers and 
experts in the field of interconnection regulation. It starts by giving a definition of 
interconnection drawn from different peer reviewed articles and takes into account arguments 
for and against these articles. With reference to Armstrong (2001) and OECD (2004) 
arguments on access pricing problem, it further discusses problems associated with 
interconnection in telecoms market, bearing in mind that most interconnection problems are 
associated with internalizing network externalities (Armstrong, 2001).  This chapter in the 
second section will give a clear description of network externalities and discuss how their 
effect on telecom market depends on a type of pricing principle that has been adopted. For 
instance, literature (Di Pillo et al. 2009; Cave et al., 2003) has shown that attributes of Call 
Party Pays (CPP) regime, such as price discriminatory strategies has made interconnection a 
more controversial issue in the Telecoms market. In this regard, the third subsection, will 
share light on the essence of interconnection in Telecoms market and then discuss how 
unregulated negotiation may result into high interconnection charges and how these high 
interconnection charges can be a barrier to competition and finally lead to market failure. 
After showing this strong desirability of regulatory intervention, this chapter, in the fourth 
section, will further discuss the interconnection regulation in telecommunication sector. This 
section will specifically engage in debates and literature around how interconnection should 
be regulated, who should regulate it according to different viewpoints from different 
countries’ experiences and the role of the regulatory body regulating interconnection. Finally, 
the chapter will make a conclusion. 
2.2 WHAT IS INTERCONNECTION?     
Interconnection, according to the World Trade organization is defined as  
linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications transport networks or services in 
 order to allow the users of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier and to 
 access services provided by another supplier, where specific commitments are undertaken 
 (Chung, 2006:10).   
From a technical point of view, Vogelsang (2003:10) defines interconnection as “the linking 
of two networks to provide call origination, transit and termination for each other and 
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networks operate at the same level of network hierarchy”. The FCC also aligns with 
Vogelsang’s definition of interconnection by interpreting interconnection as “the physical 
linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic” (Melody, 2007:10). However, 
RURA’s interpretation of interconnection aligns with WTO’s definition. RURA interprets 
interconnection as  
physical and logical linking of public communication networks used by the same or a 
 different undertaking in order to allow the user of one undertaking to communicate with users 
 of the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking 
 (RURA, 2004:20). 
Unlike RURA’s interpretation and WTO’s definition, FCC‘s interpretation and Vogelsang’s 
definition undermine the logical linking of networks.  Furthermore, WTO’s definition seems 
to encapsulate some unique parameters that express the rationale behind interconnection and 
what is required for operators to interconnect than Vogelsang’s do. Vogelsang’s also entails 
parameters to draw a line between interconnection and access. For clarification, it literally 
means that when the network is operating at the same level of network hierarchy we refer to 
interconnection, otherwise we refer to access. However, neither WTO’s nor Vogelsang‘s 
definition is clear about the scope of interconnection. In fact, Chung (2006) argued that 
interconnection disputes in the world are attributed to the incapacity of WTO’s 
interconnection definition to specify domestic and international interconnection rules. 
However the good thing is that both definitions make it clear that successful interconnection 
must guarantee the interoperability of telecommunication network and services.    
To understand interconnection and the problems related to it, it is worthwhile to first discuss 
one-way access and two-way access pricing models.  Armstrong (2001) and OECD (2004) 
define one-way access problem as where entrants need to purchase important inputs from the 
incumbent but not vice versa. While as two-way access problem, which is an interconnection 
model problem, arises when each firm in the telecoms market must purchase inputs from 
other firms in the markets (Armstrong, 2001; OECD, 2004). The figure 1 below illustrates an 
interconnection model. 
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Figure 2. 1: Interconnection Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cave, Bomsel and Neuman (2003)  
When the call is made between two customers, two essential elements, call origination and 
call termination are involved. Call origination is the collecting of the calls from the start point 
where the user makes the call to the interconnection point between two networks. Whilst   
call termination service is the collecting of a call from a point of interconnection between two 
networks to the consumer who is called (ACCC, 2004).  To complete the calls, the network 
owner (operator A) that originates the call generally purchases terminating access from the 
network owner (operator B) that terminates the calls. The called network sets the termination 
charges, which are collected from the call-originating customer by the network that originates 
the call (ACCC, 2004). Under one-way access model, operator A has to pay termination 
charges to operator B (monopoly in upstream market) but not vice versa, and yet has to 
compete with operator B in the downstream market(Armstrong,2001). Whilst under two-way 
access model where operator B and operator A have to purchase inputs from each other it 
may not be so much of a foreclosure as in one-way access model, but interconnection 
agreements between operators on terms and condition, especially access charges (Armstrong, 
2001). 
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2.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF INTERCONNECTION  
Interconnection is the heart of competition and investment in the telecommunication industry 
(Falch, 2004). OFTEL (1997) and Melody (1997) argue that liberalization per se is not 
enough, because interconnection is a cornerstone of the competition. Practically, according to 
Cave et al. (2003), interconnection rate is been proved to be the company’s second largest 
revenue stream after air time and access. This has been evident in South Africa, in 2008, 
MTN generated R6.9bn and Vodacom received R7.9bn (18% of its revenue) in 
interconnection fees (BalanceAct, 2010).  ITU (2004) also highlights that interconnection 
charges of a new entrant typically represent between 40-50% of total operating costs in its 
first few years of operation. In South Africa, for example, in 2008, Telkom (Fixed 
incumbent) paid other mobile operators R6.9bn (21% of its revenue) in interconnection fees 
during its last financial year (BalanceAct, 2010). Of that, R.3bn was paid to Vodacom and the 
rest was split between MTN and Cell C. In this regard, it appears that inasmuch as 
interconnection rate are crucial for incumbents to upgrade their networks, the regulator 
should also know that it is also crucial for new entrants to get a foothold in the market and to 
compete with the incumbents.   
However, Armstrong (2001) highlights that the main controversial issue is to grant operator 
A (new entrant) access to operator B’s network on a fair and reasonable access charges. To 
explain this issue, in one-way and two-way access models, the OECD(2004) explains that 
under one-way access model, the problem arises when operator A cannot reasonably 
duplicate the bottleneck facilities and if the operator B (owner of essential facility) is not 
willing to let operator A use it at reasonable terms.  OECD (2004) and Armstrong (2001) 
explain that under two-way access model where operator B and operator A have to purchase 
inputs from each other it may not be so much of a foreclosure as in one-way access model, 
but interconnection agreements between operators on terms and condition, especially access 
charges. However, Armstrong (2001) argues that in an intensive competitive market, operator 
B is likely to use termination charges as an instrument to exclude operator A in the market. 
Armstrong (2001) and the OECD (2004) attributed access pricing problems to the 
internalization of network externalities by Caller Party Pays (CPP) system which gives the 
operator B (owner of essential facilities) incentives to charge exorbitant access charges in 
order to exclude operator A in the market. Therefore the next section discusses network 
externalities.  
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2.3 NETWORK AND CALL EXTERNALITIES    
There are two categories of network externalities; fixed externalities and mobile externalities. 
Fixed-line network externality is an externality obtained by the fixed-line user to reach and 
call a mobile-line subscriber, while mobile externality includes mobile extra utility from extra 
mobile subscription (York & Albon, 2006). In microeconomics, network externalities are 
defined as follows: the more the number of subscribers the more valuable subscription 
becomes (Cave et al., 2003). The rationale behind this is that new subscribers decide to join 
the network because there is a large number of subscribers from whom they can make calls 
and from whom they can receive a call. Practically this has been proven to be true not only in 
one network but also in all networks that are interconnected to each other such that customers 
of one network to be able to communicate with customers of the other network.  This utility 
is one of the reasons why interconnection is mandatory in telecommunication networks. 
According to Cave et al. (2003) this is specifically to maximize the value of communication 
opportunities for greater community of users.  Therefore not being concerned about these 
externalities would imply reaching a socially sub-optimal network size (York & Albon, 
2006). In short, there is a welfare loss not internalizing the network externalities (Cave et al., 
2003).   
This effect is termed as externalities based on the fact that they hardly enter into a decision of 
a user when on the verge to becoming a subscriber to a particular network, unless the pricing 
regime is adopted to take into account these interdependencies (Cave et al., 2003).  However, 
there are other important externalities in telecommunication networks related to calls, which 
seem to be neglected but having a high degree of relevancy in interconnection. Normally in a 
telecoms network the benefit must be shared between the caller party and the receiver party. 
However, based on the pricing regime that has been adopted this may not be so.  According 
to Lazauskaite (2009), CPP is defined as the regime where the subscriber initiating a call pays 
the entire cost of a call. This literally means that subscribers on a large network will make 
more on-net calls but subscribers on a small network make more off-net calls.  As a result, Di 
Pillo, Cricelli, Gastaldi and Levialdi (2009) argue that CPP could produce incentives for 
larger operators to lower the prices on-net calls and increase the charges of off-net calls in 
order to drive the small network operator out of the market. In this case, subscribers on a 
small network will receive less call than they desire. This could be the reason for the 
subscribers on a small network to shift to a larger network. This call imbalances and price 
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discrimination strategy under CPP have made the issue of high interconnection charges more 
complex in telecommunication sector (Di Pillo et al., 2009).   
 
However, Di Pillo et al. (2009) argued that Receiving Party Pays (RPP) regime could address 
the deficiencies of CPP regime. According to Lazauskaite (2009), RPP is regime where 
subscribers receiving a call pay all or most of the cost of calls. Under RPP, fixed-to-mobile 
calls are charged at normal fixed network tariffs and the called mobile party makes payment, 
which is closely related to the mobile termination rate to the mobile operators (Cave et al., 
2003). Therefore, Cave et al. (2003) highlight that the issue of call externalities may be 
solved by RPP.  As a result, some countries such as Northern America, Japan and India have 
adopted RPP in order to address the issues of dominance, such as call externalities.  
Nevertheless, Cave et al. (2003) and Di Pillo et al. (2009) concur with each other that RPP 
has been less attractive than CPP in many countries. This could be attributed to the fact that 
some subscribers may switch off their phones to avoid paying for unwanted calls or would 
decide not to receive calls. This behaviour could lead to a socially sub-optimal level of using 
services and slow-down of volume in the market (Cave et al., 2003).  Consequently, many 
countries such as UK, Australia, Uganda, South Africa and New Zealand using CPP regime 
and the issue of high interconnection charges has been addressed by regulation in the 
telecommunication industry.  Laffont et al. (1998) argue that access charges resulted from 
free negotiation can be a bottleneck to competition. Therefore prior discussing regulation of 
interconnection in telecommunication sector, it is worthwhile in the next subsection to first 
discuss high interconnection charges and its impact on the telecommunication market.  
2.3.1 HIGH INTERCONNECTION CHARGES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE TELECOMS MARKET  
In the course of interconnection negotiations, the incumbent usually has stronger bargaining 
power than the new entrant. As a result, the incumbent always has incentives to set access 
charges above monopoly level (Wright, 2000). Armstrong (2001) discussed that the main 
objectives and instruments of an incumbent is to ensure productivity efficiency, to maximize 
total industry profit and to extract industry profits for itself. In this regard, he strongly argues 
that without control the incumbent will always set access prices high. This will have a 
negative impact on the telecoms market. According to Cave and Vogelsang (2003:48) high 
prices are defined as “prices above the cost production as determined”.   
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A wide range of literature (Laffont, Ley & Tirole, 1998; Falch, 2004) argue that high access 
charges which result from negotiations between competitive operators can be a barrier to 
effective competition.  Laffont et al. (1998) argue that high interconnection charges prevent 
effective competition in a mature market and erect barriers to entry in transition towards 
competition. Armstrong (2001) highlights that too high access charges can be an instrument 
for the incumbent to drive the new entrant out of the market. Furthermore, Falch (2004) also 
argues that too high access charges discourage competition in the telecommunication market. 
In the light of this argument, Cave and Vogelsang (2003:54) in their study on the relationship 
between access prices and investment found that “there is no evidence to support that high 
interconnection price is a means to encourage infrastructure competition”. Instead, they 
conclude that low access prices encourage entry and enables entrant to compete with the 
incumbent. This means that interconnection prices should be brought down at a reasonable 
level in order to enhance competition and efficiency in the market. To achieve this, Intven 
and Tetrault (2000) explain that there was a need to transition from government–based supply 
to market-based supply. They further explain that government-based supply regime was 
characterized by lack of efficiency and market entry barrier such as high interconnection rates 
set by state-owned operators. To address such competition issues associated with CPP 
regime, countries such as South Africa, Uganda, UK and Rwanda had to embrace this 
transition to market based supply. In other words, they adopted regulatory intervention 
approaches. These include sector specific regulation and competition authority approaches.  
2.4 THE RATIONALE OF REGULATION  
The term regulation in an industry can belong to one of distinct categories: technical 
regulation4; economic regulation5 and access regulation6. In the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector, physical and logical interconnection regulation issues are addressed under economic 
regulation (RURA, 2004). Regulation is used in network industries such as 
telecommunication industry with unique characteristics such as the presence of elements of 
natural monopoly, external effects, universal service obligations and asymmetric information. 
                                                                 
4
 Technical regulation entails the determination of standards and may extend to issues of safety, environment 
and privacy (Debbah, 2011).   
5
 Economic regulation extends to pricing issues those concerning standard marketing practices (Debbah, 2011). 
6
 Access regulation entails issues of ensuring non-discriminatory access necessary, such as infrastructure 
(Debbah, 2011). 
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The main purpose of regulation is to let the concerned market operate in an efficient way 
(Cave and Crowther, 2004). In addition, Intven and Tetrault (2000) highlight that the main 
objectives of the regulator is to remove barriers to market entry and oversee interconnection 
of new entrants with incumbent operators. Cave and Crowther (2004) put it clear that the 
rationale behind regulation is protection against the economic harm associated with the one-
sided exercise of market power. To achieve this, Intven and Tetrault (2000) explain that 
regulation relies on the ex-ante descriptive market conducts, for instance price control (Intven 
& Tetrault, 2000). Cave and Crowther (2004) highlight that sector specific regulators are 
considered to be suited to carry out economic regulation. In Australia, for example, 
traditional specific regulations have been quite successful in delivering both competitive 
interconnection rates and a smooth implementation of equal access (Spiller & Cardilli, 2007). 
According to Buigues (2006) this could be attributed to less uncertainty faced by operators 
associated with ex ante intervention policy. This enables operators to invest in the network 
infrastructure.  
Despite these arguments for regulation, Intven and Tetrault (2000) highlight that some forms 
of telecommunication regulation have been viewed more damaging than beneficial to the 
development of national telecommunications infrastructures and services. To underpin this, 
Buigues (2006) highlighted that in the sectors of rapid change in technology like 
telecommunication markets, traditional ex ante regulation can create major market distortion 
and additional costs.  Furthermore, Cave and Crowther (2004) highlight that sector specific 
approach requires large flow of information from the regulated entity.  This creates the 
premise to question whether regulation or competition policy is the appropriate approach to 
address interconnection issues in the telecommunication sector. Debbah(2011) states that 
unlike technical regulation, competition authority can also handle economic regulation.  
According to Spiller and Cadilli (2007), competition policy operates ex-post and it is a harm-
based approach. They further explain that it relies on the ex-post descriptive of the market 
structure. According to Cave and Crowther (2004) ex-post regulation deals with conducts that 
reduces competition and raises prices in the telecommunication market.    Buigues (2006:23) 
argues that” in principle, it is easier to ex-post judge if a price is unfair than to set ex ante a 
fair price”. Unlike regulation, Cave and Crowther (2004) highlights that competition policy 
requires no information operators but just relies on the complaints and gathers information 
only in connection with enforcement agencies. However, Buigues (2006:23) highlights that 
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ex-post aspects of competition policy may create uncertainties for new entrants. Furthermore, 
Spiller and Cardilli (2007) argued that solving interconnection rate issues using competition 
policy does not seem to work well in many countries. New Zealand, for example, a “light-
handed regulation” regime was characterized by lengthy disputes and uncertainty over the 
acceptable prices (Jamison, 1998:17).  In the light of the complementarities and differences 
between regulation and competition policy, Cave and Crowther (2004) and Buigues (2006), 
in their school of thoughts, proposed that new regulatory framework of telecom market based 
on competition analysis principle could be the appropriate ex ante regulation for any other 
network industries which still needs regulatory intervention. Buigues (2006) strongly argues 
that competition rules and regulations are not substitutes but complements.  In line with this, 
ITU (2004) highlighted that many countries have adopted ex-post regulation to supplement 
ex-ante regulations and vice versa. As the result, a wealth of countries have adopted different 
models of concurrent jurisdiction. These models includes: Firstly, sector specific regulator 
and competition authority having jurisdiction over the economy-wide competition matters 
(Geradin & O’Donoghue, 2005). Countries such as United States, South Africa and Chile 
have opted for this model. Secondly, most of developing countries have no competition 
authority but a sector specific regulator with sector specific competition mandate.  These 
include Rwanda, Kenya and Dominican republic to mention a few. Lastly there is a least 
common model that was adopted in New Zealand, where the sector specific regulator is a part 
of economy-wide competition authority.  Based on the fact that this study is about the 
regulation of interconnection in Rwanda, sector specific regulator with sector specific 
competition mandate model is relevant in this study than any other model. Therefore the next 
subsection discusses interconnection regulation in the telecommunication markets.   
2.4 INTERCONNECTION REGULATION IN TELECOMS SECTOR    
                 
The main objective of interconnection regulation is to ensure that new entrants can access the 
incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms and conditions. However, the OECD (2004) 
highlighted that in network industries one of the most important issue is the pricing for 
interconnection among the competitors.  As a result, according to Peitz (2003) there have 
been debates on  i) whether access prices should be set independently by operators, ii) 
whether access prices should be negotiated among operators iii) whether access prices should 
be imposed by the public institutional body. It has been argued that the independent setting of 
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access prices lead to disputes (Wright & Carter, 2006). This has made it undesirable in many 
jurisdictions. Consequently, negotiation among the operators seemed to be the next option, 
however, Peitz (2003) argued that it does not include a clause that specifies what happens 
when negotiations fail. To address this challenge, many countries have adopted a 
combination of policies and interconnection regulation regimes. This is to say, negotiations 
are done between the operators and in case of negotiations breakup, the institutional body 
intervenes and sets the access prices that are balanced in order to enhance social welfare in 
the sector.  However, there has been an intense debate in all countries on whether this 
institutional body should be the competition commission or the regulatory body. Although 
there is spectrum of concurrent models that have been adopted by different countries to 
address interconnection issues as shown in the previous section,  based on the context of the 
study, the role of sector specific regulator with the sector specific competition mandate to 
regulate interconnection will be discussed in the next subsection.  
2.4.2 THE ROLE OF A REGULATOR IN INTERCONNECTION REGULATION    
Further to the discussion above, the main role of interconnection regulation is to ensure that 
new entrants are able to get access to incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms and 
conditions. In principle, in order for interconnection to take place, incumbents and entrants 
have to negotiate on access terms and conditions. However, since the incumbent has a higher 
bargaining power than the new entrant, Wright (2000) argues that the incumbent always has 
the incentives to charge access prices that are above monopoly prices. Laffont et al. (1998) 
also highlighted that prices resulted from unregulated interconnection negotiation may lead to 
barrier of entry.   
From the above discussions, it is very apparent that the main role of a regulator in 
interconnection regulations is to promote a successful conclusion of interconnection 
negotiation between operators in the interconnection sector. However, there is a growing 
consensus in many countries that advanced regulatory guidelines or specific interconnection 
rules may be necessary to establish a proper environment to facilitate interconnection. The 
ITU (2004) highlighted that interconnection negotiations conducted in a regulatory 
environment without guidelines in place, may lead to regulatory uncertainty and discourages 
investment. Therefore, Spiller and Cardilli (2007) discussed three regulatory guidelines that 
should be established by the regulator prior interconnection negotiations process in the 
telecoms sector.   
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Firstly, the regulator should establish interconnection guidelines in advance of negotiations. 
Interconnection guidelines assist all key players, policy makers, the regulatory authorities, the 
operators and all end users. In addition to the essence of interconnection guidelines, Spiller 
and Cardilli (2007) said that lack of clear and comprehensive interconnection guidelines leads 
to delays and deadlocks to solve interconnection disputes in the telecommunication market.  
For example, Jamison (1998), said that in New Zealand the interconnection dispute between 
Communication and Telecom took 5 years to be resolved and costed parties millions of 
dollars in legal fees, experts advice and management time. However, Peitz (2003) and 
Jamison (2003) concur with each other that this is attributed to information asymmetry. To 
support the argument, Peitz (2003) says that in countries where the is no information 
available, interconnection guidelines tend to be fairly general and Jamison (2003) highlights 
that regulatory rules also tend to turn out impropriate in the light of actual costs and market 
conditions. 
Secondly, the regulator should publish default interconnection arrangements together with the 
guidelines in advance of negotiations (Intven & Tétraut, 2000). According to Jamison (2003) 
this policy can lessen the degree of information asymmetry during interconnection 
negotiations.  Intven and Tétraut (2000) further explain that when the negotiations fail then 
the default interconnection arrangement will apply. However there is still a concern on the 
suitability of these default arrangements.  
Lastly, Jamison (2003) highlights that the regulator should set deadlines at the beginning of 
negotiations for the completion of various steps. For instance, the owner of essential facilities 
or incumbent may be demanded to produce a proposed interconnection agreement in 20 days. 
Failure to meet the deadlines may lead to regulatory intervention to impose an agreement and 
independent mediations or arbitration (Intven & Tétrault, 2000). Another alternative could be 
the consideration of the final arbitration. In this case the arbitrator, which is the regulator, will 
be constrained to choose one of the parties’ offers as a settlement.  Spiller and Cardilli 
(2007:25) believe that this dispute resolution mechanism “serves as the bridge between courts 
and regulators”. As a result many countries, for instance, Chile and Guatemala embraced 
dispute resolution mechanism with hopes to solve interconnection disputes.   
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Despite the importance of the three principles to enforce interconnection agreements, 
Noumba et al. (2004) argue that for interconnection negotiations will be successful and 
effective only if the regulator is staffed and equipped with regulatory tools.  They discuss that 
these regulatory tools must make it possible to:  
a) Effectively enforce the accounting separation principles or unbundling of regulated 
activities from the competitive ones.  
b) Ensure that interconnection rates are non-discriminatory  
c) Publish a detailed reference interconnection offer, including description of relevant 
offers broken down into network elements as demanded by the corresponding modalities, 
conditions and prices.  
d) Ratify interconnection reference offer submitted by dominant operations according 
detailed procedures  
e) Ratify interconnection reference offer submitted by dominant operators according to 
detailed procedures  
f) Ratify the terms and conditions to negotiated interconnection agreement  
g) Effectively arbitrage the interconnection disputes.  
In spite of the regulator’s commitment to ensure that entrants are able to access the 
incumbent’s network on fair terms and conditions in order to promote competition, Jain 
(2003) highlighted that in most countries incumbents have continued to maintain their 
dominant positions. In so doing incumbents still charge high interconnection charges to their 
competitors in some jurisdictions. As a result, Peitz (2003) argues that interconnection prices 
have been the most controversial issue in interconnection regulation.  
2.5 CONCLUSION  
Through interconnection regulation, new entrants in many countries have been able to access 
incumbent’s network at appropriate prices, terms and condition. With the intervention of 
regulatory body, interconnection guidelines have been set before hand to promote successful 
interconnection negotiations between telecoms operators. However, in countries where CPP 
pricing regime has been adopted, incumbents still use their monopoly position to charge high 
interconnection charges in order to exclude new entrants in the market. This shows that 
interconnection pricing regulation is a serious regulatory issue in the telecommunication 
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sector. Therefore in the next chapter, this study will discuss interconnection price regulation 
in the telecommunication sector.  
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CHAPTER THREE: INTERCONNECTION PRICE 
REGULATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents views of researchers, regulatory agencies and policy makers on how 
efficiency and competition can be achieved through interconnection price regulation. It starts 
by giving a clear description of price regulation and discusses why interconnection pricing 
regulation is important in the telecommunication sector.  Secondly, it discusses how through 
conducting an interconnection market review the regulatory agency can identify ex-ante and 
ex-post pro-competitive regulation remedies that can maintain the balance between the 
incentives to build the new infrastructure and access to the existing ones. In fact, de Streel 
(2005) and Peitz (2003) underscore that many countries that adopted pro-competitive 
regulations could not ensure an efficient level of interconnection rates. Therefore this chapter 
discusses how determining an appropriate interconnection rate has been a challenge to the 
regulators and policymakers and what approach many countries have adopted to address this 
challenge. A range of literature (Chiang, Raton and Lal Hada, 2007; Intven and Tétrault, 
2000) argued that the approach to be adopted should bring interconnection rates closer to the 
real cost of network construction and operation. As a result, the third section discusses the 
rate rebalancing approaches (cost-based methodology and benchmarking interconnection 
approach) the regulatory agency can choose from to calculate an appropriate interconnection 
rate. It also considers the arguments for and against cost-based methodology. It further 
discusses in details the effectiveness of the cost-based approaches (LRIC, TERLIC, LRAIC 
and FAC) in calculating an optimal interconnection rate that can enhance productive, 
allocative and dynamic efficiency, drawing from the argument of Laffont et al. (1998) 
focusing on the pricing principle only may not lead to achievement of efficiency objectives.  
The fourth section discusses other ways of implementing interconnection rate and the fifth 
discusses other enforcements for an effective interconnection regime. Lastly, this chapter will 
draw a conclusion.  
3.2 INTERCONNECTION PRICE REGULATION     
 Interconnection price regulation, according to Melody (1997) is defined as an instrument that 
ensures any-to-any connectivity and safeguards against any abuse of market power in the 
provisioning of telecommunication services. In addition, Jamison (1998) said that 
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competition and innovation in the telecommunication sector hinge on interconnection pricing 
regulation. Therefore, in this view, interconnection price regulation despite its newness in the 
regulatory arena, is perceived as a panacea for unceasingly interconnection disputes that seem 
to have become a barrier to the promotion of infrastructure-based competition and service-
based competition. In underpinning this point, OFTEL (1997) asserted that promoting 
competition will lead to greater choices of customers of suppliers, services, prices and 
quality.   
Therefore, regulatory agencies and competition agencies are put on the pressure to create 
effective competition and efficiency through interconnection pricing regulation. Firstly, 
interconnection negotiation and regulatory intervention has been preferred as the means for 
competitors to reach mutual interconnection agreements on prices, terms and condition. Cave 
and Prosperetti (2001) strongly argued that interconnection negotiations always fail in the 
absence of pro-competitive regulations that articulate the specific terms and condition of 
major supplier’s obligation to its competitors to allow them to enter into the market. In 
addition to this, they pointed out that regulators should adopt or design policies that promote 
investment in the infrastructure and lower the entry cost for the service provider.  
In order to embrace the above-mentioned objective, many countries have established 
obligations such as transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, compulsory 
access and price control. However, de STREEL (2005) argued that none of these safeguards 
offered certainty of anti-competitive behaviours in the market. In addition, Cave & 
Prosperetti (2001) highlighted that most of the pro-competitive regulation adopted did not 
restore the balance between incentives to build new infrastructure and access to the existing 
ones. Cave and Crowther (2004) asserted that this balance is important because excessive or 
unpredictable intervention can discourage stakeholders from engaging in competition that 
helps them to attain competition policy objectives.  
In the light of the fact that ex-ante interventions enhance market efficiency and ex-post 
interventions protect the customers, balancing the two interventions in the market may lead to 
the achievement of the balance between efficiency and competition. Therefore, many 
interconnection directives recommend the regulatory agency to conduct study on the relevant 
market in order to identify where to impose ex-ante pro-competitive remedies and impose ex-
post pro-competitive remedies. 
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3.2.1 INTERCONNECTION MARKET REVIEW  
An interconnection market review is crucial for the regulatory body to identify appropriate 
pro-competitive measures to prevent against abuse of market power (Peitz, 2003). It appears 
from literature such as Armstrong (2001) and Jamison (1998) that though efficiency and 
competition hinges on interconnection pricing, interconnection pricing has been ranked as the 
most controversial regulatory issues in many jurisdictions. Therefore as per ITU and EU 
directives many countries such as South Africa, UK and USA have conducted a review on 
interconnection wholesale market. This policy has been also incorporated in their local 
telecommunication framework. For instance, in South Africa, section 67(4) of the ECA 
suggests that the authority must “Define and identify the retail or wholesale market or market 
segments in which it intends to impose pro-competitive measures in cases where such 
markets are found to have ineffective competition”.  
In Chapter Two it has been discussed that interconnection rate disputes seem to result from 
existence of network externalities that put the owner of essential facilities on advantage to use 
its dominant position to deter competition in the market.  Therefore in studying wholesale 
and retail market the regulatory agency or consultants first and foremost determines the 
market dominance position. There are four steps to determine the market dominance position 
in a particular market. These steps include 1. Define the relevant market, 2. Assess the market 
shares, 3. Determine which operators have SMP, 4. Determine competitive remedies. To 
explain these steps, de Streel (2005) states the market to be regulated should be defined in 
which the agency intends to impose pro-competitive measures. This can outline the ex-ante or 
ex-post methodologies that are used to determine the effectiveness of competition in such 
markets. Secondly, the regulatory agency analyses the market to determine the licensees that 
enjoys SMP in that particular market. Lastly, the regulator sets out the pro-competitive 
measures that the authority may impose to address the market failure in the relevant markets. 
These obligations are to be chosen from a menu provided in the directives (transparency, 
non-discrimination, accounting separation, compulsory access and price control) or any other 
type of remedy with the prior agreement of the commission on  SMP operators(de Streel, 
2005). Furthermore, Cave and Prosperetti (2001) discussed that remedies should be chosen 
according to four principles: the remedy should be based on the nature of the problem, 
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justified with regard to one of the two objectives of the existing regulatory framework, 
proportionate (i.e. the least burdensome), and incentive compatible.  
Nonetheless, Melody (1997) argues that of all studies or reviews that have been 
recommended to the regulatory agencies, only some of them have turned out to be 
ineffective. Besides, Noumba et al. (2009) found out that a few regulators are equipped to 
effectively implement the above pro-competitive regulations.  They further explained that 
most of regulators do not have relevant cost information that would allow for effective 
arbitration of interconnection disputes. Consequently ensuring reasonableness of 
interconnection prices is still complex issue to the regulatory agency.  
3.2.2 DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF INTERCONNECTION RATES   
Although it is argued by Cave and Volsgang (2003) that bringing too high interconnection 
rate as lower as possible will encourage entry and enable the new entrant to compete with the 
incumbent, a range of scholars (Spiller & Cardilli, 1997 and Falch, 2004), nevertheless, 
argued that too low interconnection charge also discourages investment and delays facility- 
based competition in the telecommunication market. Therefore the challenge to a regulatory 
agency is determining a level of interconnection rate that is not too high and not too low.   
 A wide range of literature (Chiang, Raton and Lal Hada ,2007; Intven and Tétrault,2000) 
argued that interconnection price regulation ensures appropriate interconnection charge level 
that can enhance competition and efficiency if policy instruments that bring interconnection 
rates closer to the real cost of network construction and operation are adopted. Consequently, 
many regulatory agencies in different countries to maintain this “delicate balance” (Falch 
2004:54), adopted rate rebalancing approaches. According to Chiang, Raton and Lal Hada 
(2007: 1) rate rebalancing approach is described as “the adjustment of retail prices among 
services such that prices reflect their actual costs while allowing a fair and market return on 
investment”. The OECD countries’ study shows that adoption of rate-balancing approach 
provided lower interconnection prices in the countries that were surveyed (Intven & Tétrault, 
2000).They further said that rate rebalancing increased social welfare by moving prices closer 
to cost.   
Albeit, it is arguably perceived that reduction of interconnection rates is an off-trend for the 
regulatory agency to enhance competition and efficiency. However, in the mobile market, a 
great deal of literature (Genako and Vallette, 2009; Frontier economics, 2009) seem to partly 
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disagree with this perception. Frontier economics (2008) argues that lower mobile 
termination rate does not imply lower retail prices. Furthermore, Geneko and Vallette (2009) 
argue that because of “water bed” effect 10% reduction of mobile termination rate leads to an 
increase of 10% in mobile out going prices on average.  According to their findings in 24 
European countries, this effect has been proved to be strong in mobile telecommunication 
market.   
Therefore, in the light of the above arguments, it is apparent that inasmuch as the regulatory 
agency puts much effort in adopting rate rebalancing approaches in order to determine an 
efficient level of interconnection rate that can enhance effective competition and efficiency in 
the market, more attention should also be put on the degree of “waterbed” effect in the 
mobile market. Therefore, the next subsection of this chapter will discuss the rate rebalancing 
approaches such as cost-based methodologies, benchmarking approach, Efficient 
Components Price Rule (ECPR) that can be adopted by the regulators to calculate efficient 
interconnection rate in the telecommunication market.        
3.3 TECHNIQUES TO CALCULATING INTERCONNECTION RATES  
3.3.1 COST-BASED INTERCONNECTION METHODOLOGY  
According to Cave and Prosperetti (2001) for a regulatory agency to adopt or impose pro-
competitive remedy, it should focus on remedies that are less burdensome, enhancing 
efficiency (dynamic, allocative and productive efficiency) and incentive compatible. Based 
on the impact of information asymmetry in many jurisdictions on regulatory principles, 
Jamison (1998) asserted that regulatory agency should adopt rebalancing model that will not 
turn out to be impropriate in the light of actual costs and market conditions.  
As a result, in a liberalized market, Noumba et al. (2009) and Peitz (2003) asserted that cost-
based access principle will establish a level playing field for a favourable environment that 
encourages greater participation by the private sector. In the light of the fact that some 
safeguards could not offer certainty against anti-competitive behaviours due to insufficient 
information from incumbent’s cost, Peitz (2003) and Jamison(1998) seem to argue for cost-
based access rule because it impedes excessive profits by the incumbent. Peitz (2003) 
explains that when the incumbent is subject to this rule, it implies that it will not make any 
profit from the incoming traffic. Furthermore, Jamison (1998:20) explained that under cost-
based access principle, regulations lean towards the incumbent in such way that it allows it to 
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charge a “reasonable” access mark up. In this regard, Peitz (2003) argues that for regulators 
to obtain efficient per-minute prices under two-part tariffs would need to set cost-based 
access prices.  Noumba, Gille, Simon and Rudelle (2004) strongly argue that for this 
objective to be embraced, the regulator must build and enhance its knowledge with respect to 
the industry cost frontiers and cost drivers. This can be done by determining the cost incurred 
to produce a specific product or service. Melody (1997) argues that without detailed cost 
analysis there can be no cost-based pricing. Therefore the next section will discuss some 
concepts in cost analysis process.  
3.3.1.1 CONCEPTS IN COST ANALYSIS  
According to Melody (1997) cost analysis is directed towards understanding the more 
detailed cost relationships in a firm’s operation. He further explains that cost analysis 
attempts to identify cost characteristics which will facilitate pricing, investment and other 
resource allocation decisions by the firm.  
A. DIRECT AND INDIRECT COST  
Costs are often classified between direct and indirect costs, especially in estimating the costs 
of particular services or activities. Direct costs are expenses that are incurred when producing 
a specific service or a series of services or products (Noumba et al., 2004). Indirect costs are 
those that have a causal relation to an activity or service, but the relation is indirect and must 
be studied to examine what the specific relationship is (Melody, 1997). Noumba et al. (2004) 
highlight that under direct attributable costs it is imperative to classify fixed and variable 
costs.  
B. FIXED AND VARIABLE COSTS   
Melody (1997) explains that one of the first distinctions that should be made under cost 
analysis is the division of a firm’s total costs between fixed and variable costs. Fixed cost 
represents the proportion of the firm’s expenses that does not depend on, or vary with the 
activities of the firm (Noumba et al., 2004). These include capacity costs and other 
preinvestment expenses. Variable costs are those that are directly related to the production of 
services on the network (Noumba et al., 2004). These include raw material cost and labor 
costs.  
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C. JOINT AND COMMON COSTS  
Joint costs are generated by a family of services or products (for example, buildings costs for 
a telephone firm. From an economic viewpoint, joint costs are costs incurred in fixed 
proportions every time a service or a product belonging to the same family is produced by the 
firm, for example, a telephone company incurs joint costs whenever it conveys a local, 
interurban, or international call (Noumba et al., 2004). 
Common costs are those costs shared by all the services or products of the company (for 
example, the fixed costs of acquiring licenses). Common costs include the remainder of the 
costs that are not directly attributable or joint, and which are incurred by the firm (Noumba et 
al., 2004).   
Despite this cost awareness, Wright, Guthrie, and Small (2006) strongly highlight that under 
cost-based access prices regime, incumbents have a tendency to delay the investment in order 
to recoup their sunk cost in building its network infrastructure.  In so doing the incumbent 
overlooks the extra costs the new entrants and consumers are incurring in the mean time, 
while waiting for the regulatory intervention. From this point it is apparent that the main 
challenge to the regulatory agency is encouraging the incumbent to invest earlier. 
 In the discussion to address this challenge, Wright el al.(2006) explained that high access 
prices would provide such an incentive by raising the profitability of the project and raising 
the opportunity cost of delaying investment, nevertheless according to Cave and Volsgang 
(2003) high access prices reduce the flow of surplus to consumers through high retail prices 
once the investment has been made. In this regard, Wright el al.(2006) suggest that the 
preferred access pricing scheme should match the marginal cost of bringing investment 
further forward in time and the marginal benefits. Wright el al.(2006) in conjunction with  
Cave and Volsgang (2003) highlighted that the above objective can be achieved by using 
backward or forward-looking access pricing approach.  
3.3.1.2 Forward-looking and Backward Looking approach  
According to Geradin and Kerf (2003), under the backward-looking approach the 
interconnection price encompasses the costs which are specifically attributable to provision 
of interconnection services plus a share of common costs which cannot be attributed to any 
specific service. The main advantage of this methodology is that it encourages competition in 
the downstream market, enables the incumbent to recover its investment since it does reflect 
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accurately the cost incurred and finally it facilitates negotiation between access seekers and 
providers.   However, it has got drawbacks. Geradin and Kerf (2003) highlight that under 
backward-looking methodology incumbents have incentives to practice anti-competitive 
behaviours such as non-price exclusionary practice.  Secondly, there is no guarantee that the 
incumbent will recoup its investments since historical cost accounting may present a distorted 
picture of the costs actually incurred by the services providers (Guardian & Kerf, 2003).    
Forward-looking prices are set at each point in time based on the current cost of building the 
project (Wright et al., 2006). As the result, several methods of pricing are based on the 
forward-looking long run incremental cost, which will be discussed with its variations in the 
next subsection.  According to Geradin and Kerf (2003) the under forward-looking approach 
the incumbent has the incentives to be efficient and reduce the actual costs that it incurs in 
providing interconnection since the compensation of the incumbent are based on the costs of 
an efficient firm. Contrary to backward-looking approach, under the forward-looking access 
price regime the incumbent has no incentives to shift costs from competitive markets to a 
regulated segment of the market since the interconnection price is based on the actual costs it 
incurs(Geradin & Kerf,2003).   
However, the forward-looking approach also enforces an incumbent to take additional risk 
due to uncertainties in technology innovations (Wright et al., 2006). Therefore, regulators are 
required to compensate for this additional risk by increasing the access prices under forward-
looking approach. In this regard, it is apparent that forward-looking approach requires a 
higher initial access price if it is to encourage the same investment performance as backward-
looking rule. In this regime, the lower investment cost implies the lower access prices-which 
also imply the lower profit flow (Wright et al., 2006). However, without regulatory 
conditions in place it could be argued that this principle may deter customer welfare. 
Therefore Wright et al. (2006) assert that the ability of backward-looking rule to encourage 
investment for a given access price result in higher welfare should never be undermined by 
the regulator and policy maker.   Moreover, Wright et al. (2006) highlight that the two main 
policy implications that should be taken into consideration if these approaches are to be 
implemented effectively to enhance efficiency and competition in the market. Firstly, 
regulators and policy makers should give the dynamic efficiency advantages of backward-
looking rules more serious consideration. Secondly, if a forward-looking rule is used, the 
initial access price should set a level higher than it would be the case if a backward-looking 
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rule is adopted. A high rate is required to compensate the incumbent for the risk it bears when 
faced with forward looking access prices. Otherwise, the incumbent will delay investment too 
long unless it receives such compensation.  All these issues discussed from above assert that 
considerable attention should be devoted to design and implementation of access pricing 
regimes. As a result, the ITU recommends the regulator to carry out cost of service studies to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the interconnection price in the market (ITU, 2009). The ITU 
states that the examination of cost needs to be made from more one point of view to reinforce 
the accuracy of the results, especially in countries where information asymmetry is eminent. 
ITU recommends three general approaches to cost studies that can be pursued, either 
separately or in combination. These include bottom-up, top-down and outside-in approach. In 
this chapter we shall discuss bottom-up and top-down approach only.   
3.3.1.3 Bottom-up approach  
According to ITU, this method is arguably the most “accurate” approach of measuring unit 
costs, assuming sufficient data are available (ITU, 2003:50). It is based on the idea that 
service costs can be indentified from the facilities and other inputs needed to provide the 
services (ITU, 2003). This approach depends on the availability of complete, disaggregated 
data on input costs and the relative use of facilities in the provision of different services. This 
can be analyzed on the historical cost basis or forward-looking incremental cost basis, but 
any result expressed as pure, incremental facility-based unit costs must be reconciled with 
joint and common costs and administrative overheads (ITU, 2003).     
3.3.1.4 Top-down approach  
As per ITU recommendations, the top-down approach begins with aggregate, company-wide 
cost data such as total annual expenditures, capital investments and operating costs. Ideally, 
such costs will be tracked according to some general categories, such as whether they are 
capital or operating costs (Wright et al., 2006). The goal of top-down study is to take these 
aggregate costs and allocate them among all services provided by carrier. The rationale 
behind this method is that it makes sure that all the carrier’s costs are accounted for (Wright 
et al., 2006). However, the drawback is that determining an economically justifiable 
allocation formula is very complex (Wright et al., 2006).  
Finally, the top-down method is also used as the integral part of the cost study and is used to 
estimate capital and operating cost where exact facility input data are unavailable (ITU, 
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2009). In Australia, for example, top-down analysis is used as an option of settling 
interconnection rate disputes (ITU, 2009).  
3.3.2 Fully allocated costs (FAC)  
The concept of FAC is based on backward-looking approach. FAC is an approach where all 
costs are allocated to one or another service, even where a cost is not caused by a single 
service (Braeutigam, 1980). FAC is simple and easy to understand comparing to other costing 
methodologies. Jamison (1998) argues that regulators could also apply FAC to measure costs 
for USOs. With this approach, the difference between the prices services provider is allowed 
to be charged in the market and the FAC of the market is treated as the USO. Jamison (1998) 
further argues that setting prices using FAC protects against anti-competitive cross subsidies. 
Consequently, traditionally many regulatory agencies adopted FAC to address the problem of 
the rate structure. As a result countries such as Belgium, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal and 
Sweden have implemented FAC as the best approach. Despite being adopted in many 
countries, Jamison (1998) and Braeutigam (1980) argue that FAC has some drawbacks:  
 
i) The main rationale behind FAC is that regulators can use accounting records to 
determine the costs caused by particular services. Unfortunately, FAC allocates costs 
by account. For the reasons explained above, the costs allocated to a service may be 
less than, or even a lot more than the cost of services.   
ii) Formulas shift costs to non-competitive markets. This happens for two reasons. 
Firstly, the accounting records on which FAC is based do not show why costs were 
incurred. So it is at best difficult for regulators to prevent companies from acting on 
the incentives to shift costs incurred for competitive services into prices for non-
competitive services. Secondly, usage-based allocators shift cost to non-competitive 
markets when companies lose market share in competitive markets. This shifts the 
risk of cost recovery from shareholders to captive customers. 
iii) FAC restricts regulated companies’ abilities to innovate and to respond to competition 
in two ways (Braeutigam, 1980).  
a) Firstly, regulatory processes to approve investments and new services cause delays. In 
US, for instance, local exchange carrier (LEC) video dial tone services, before the 
passage of the Telecommunication act 1996, had to get approval from FCC before 
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constructing facilities for video dial tone. This prior approval was required to prevent 
cost shifting through the accounting process. 
b) The second reason FAC limits innovation is that it creates rigid strictures and 
procedures. For instance, in US, FCC contains artificial distinctions between switched 
and non-switched services.  
3.3.3 Long run incremental cost model   
The concept of LRIC is forwarding looking approach. LRIC is defined as “an incremental 
additional cost the firm incurs in the long run term in providing the additional unit of 
services” (Falch, 2004:10). The rationale behind the development of LRIC was to enhance 
economically efficient interconnection prices as economic theory speculates (Melody, 1997). 
In LRIC pricing scheme interconnection prices are delivered from the benchmark provided 
by the efficient operator. Therefore interconnection rates must be equal to LRIC in order to 
maximize efficiency.  In so doing, LRIC impedes excessive profits by the incumbent 
(Noumba et al., 2004). In this light, LRIC regulations provide the regulators with the key tool 
to manage industry entry (Noumba et al., 2004). Due to this, regulators, policy makers, 
economists and new entrants are campaigning for LRIC as the best practice and regulatory 
policy. For instance, United Kingdom, the European Community and the United States have 
adopted LRIC approach as an approach relevant to real world decision making.   
However, the impact of LRIC pricing scheme on determining efficient interconnection rates 
is inconclusive. Though LRIC’s significance hinges on the concept of efficiency, it has been 
strongly criticized that it has no precision to optimize resource allocation efficiency and its 
impact in a dynamic framework has been a source to intense debates (Melody, 1997).  In this 
regard, Salinger (1998) in Noumba et al. (2004) argue that implementation of LRIC is 
complex and could undermine the profitability of the investment of incumbents if poorly 
executed. Additionally, Valletti (2001) and Armstrong (2001) strongly argue that pure LRIC 
becomes an appropriate benchmark if the retail-level distortion are eliminated and dealt with 
effectively by the regulatory instruments.  
From these arguments, it could be argued that the effectiveness of LRIC pricing scheme 
hinges on how it has been implemented and the policy instruments and information that are at 
regulator’s disposal.   Top-down LRIC approach can be estimated from the current costs of 
the existing firm (Falch, 2004). This will yield highest estimates of cost since it does not 
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allow optimization. In bottom-up LRIC model puts into account fixed cost caused by the 
provision of interconnection services. Nevertheless, it does not put into account common 
costs which do not vary proportionally with the provision of interconnection services 
(Noumba et al., 2004). In so doing, it gives lower estimates of LRIC because it removes all 
the inefficiencies due to historical development of networks.  
In this light, it could be argued that the effectiveness of LRIC pricing scheme depends on the 
trade-off made by the regulator based on the LRIC estimations. For instance, basing on 
estimates of LRIC on current costs will deter market entry because the new entrant will pay 
more than the efficient costs (Wright et al., 2006). Basing on the bottom-up approach is also 
seems to be problematic. It could discourage the network operator from making investments 
that are efficient given the actual configuration of the network, since it undermines the 
existing network configuration. Despite bottom-up being criticized for its lack of realism, it 
has been highly recommended by ITU for regulatory decision and it is internationally used. 
For instance, regulators in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Austria, and Switzerland have adopted bottom-up LRIC approach.  
The deficiencies of bottom-up LRIC and top-up LRIC could also be attributed to regulatory 
uncertainty about incumbent’s network. Xavier (1997) also argues that calculating forward-
looking cost often becomes challenging and time consuming due to the absence of reliable 
cost information from the incumbent. Armstrong (2001) states that this can be attributed to 
the distortion in incumbent’s retail market.  When the incumbent is experiencing distortion in 
its retail market it tends to give wrong information about its costs.    
Due to the complexity associated with LRIC, regulators and policy makers and economists 
argue for LRIC plus the mark up as the proxy to recoup “access deficit” (Laffont & Tirole, 
1996:25). Therefore many jurisdictions have adopted LRIC plus the mark up to overcome 
deficiencies of LRIC. LRIC plus the mark up include Long run average increment cost 
(LRAIC) , Total element long run increment cost (TELRIC) and Total service long run 
increment cost (TSLRIC)  were developed (Falch, 2004). 
3.3.3.1 LONG RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COST (LRAIC) APPROACH  
The concept of long run average increment cost (LRAIC) which is based on a forward-
looking cost was developed in USA to maintain the level of interconnection charges in order 
to induce competition and efficiency in the telecoms market (Falch, 2004). LRAIC can be 
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calculated using two approaches, bottom-up approach and top-down approach. The Bottom-
up approach is where incremental costs are calculated based on an engineering model which 
estimates the costs of a modern equivalent network and the allocation of the associated cost. 
Top-down approach is where incremental costs are calculated based on the actual costs of the 
operator expressed in current cost terms, and adjusted to remove costs not incremental to the 
relevant services(Braeutigam, 1980).  The difference between LRAIC, TSLRIC and TELRIC 
is that LRAIC does not include costs shared by more increments. However, it is argued that 
the definition of very large increments limits the impact of this difference as most costs can 
be allocated either to the access or the core network (Braeutigam, 1980).  Falch (2004) argues 
that the choice of calculation principle will affect the level of interconnection rates. Hence, 
reduction of competition in telecommunication market.   
3.3.3.2 TOTAL ELEMENT LONG RUN INCREMENTAL COST (TELRIC) 
The Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs methodology (TELRIC) estimates additional 
costs incurred in producing interconnection relative to the costs already incurred by 
producing a portfolio of other services (Falch,2004). In brief, the TELRIC of interconnection 
encompasses all the costs that could be avoided if interconnection were not produced (Falch, 
2004). In other words, it takes all costs that seem to be directly attributable to 
interconnection. The TELRIC for interconnection services only takes into account a portion 
of joint costs and common costs that are related to networks. In this regard, Melody (1997) 
argues that distinction between TELRIC and FAC is that FAC is a distributing forward-
looking costs not actual cost. Furthermore, FCC explained that forward –looking concept was 
used to allow new competitors to incur costs for their forward-looking decision but not costs 
arising from the past decision. From this point, it is apparent that TELRIC was designed to 
facilitate the implementation of pro-competitive policy for local exchange interconnection 
and network access for LEC competitors (Melody, 1997). 
Consequently many regulatory bodies such as OFTEL have shifted from backward-looking 
approach to forward-looking approaches. To explain how this transition is done, Noumba et 
al.(2004) explains that starting with the total cost estimate obtained with an FAC-regime, the 
regulators can move to LRIC step by step by removing layers of cost inefficiencies.  The 
figure 3.1 below shows the transition from historical account cost to LRIC. 
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Figure 3. 1:Transition from historical costs to LRIC 
 
Source: Noumba et al. (2004) 
For the regulator to have effective interconnection regulation, Noumba et al. (2004) explain 
that the regulator is expected to introduce concepts such as specific nature of cost and 
pertinence of costs. The figure 3.1 above shows that for the costs to be adjusted to LRIC, 
non-pertinent common cost, economic lifetime and efficient supplier should be removed. The 
result will be the total cost of joint related to network, which is TELRIC top-down historical. 
This is based on the fact that TELRIC only involves not global cost but only common and 
joint costs that are related to networks. This is a clear distinction between FAC and TELRIC. 
According to the figure 3.1 joint and common costs that are related to networks are referred 
to as pertinent costs and those common costs that are not related to networks are referred to 
as non-pertinent common costs.   The second step is to adjust to forward-looking cost by 
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removing the current cost adjustments. This will lead to TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking. 
The third step of the process is to remove the relevant common and joint costs related to 
networks. This will lead to pure LRIC forward-looking cost.      
Under TELRIC historical top-down regime, Noumba et al. (2004) argue against the concept 
of pertinent cost. They argue that the concept of pertinence affects the handling of joints and 
common costs. They further underpin that there is always a risk in overestimating the 
common cost. For instance, the dominant operator’s could argue high common cost to 
squeeze out its competitors by reporting costs derived from competitive activities. However 
they argue for TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking approach. They argue that in cases where 
the regulator and operators do not have a good knowledge of the industry structure, TELRIC 
bottom-up forward-looking approach can represent a decision-making instrument that 
induces improvement on procedures and process implemented by regulator to collect and 
retrieve information. They further say that it also improves the quality of investment 
decisions for firms as it naturally enhances the transparency of the interconnection services.  
However, the unclear and non comprehensive definition of forward-looking increment has 
left many regulators in the valley of decisions. This rather simplistic definition of output 
increment has put TELRIC under rigorous critics on its strength to enhance efficiency in the 
telecommunication market. Melody (1997:45) argued that under TELRIC regime the 
expression “forward-looking “seem to mean the evaluation of the existing actual network 
element. Therefore he argues that TELRIC is not a policy of consumer protection for basic 
local telephone services. This issues that have been highlighted in TELRIC’s theoretical 
framework seem to make it more complex for the regulators to implement it effectively.   
Noumba et al. (2004) argue that TELRIC regime poses challenges to regulators and policy 
makers in satisfying competition policy and consumer protection objectives. For instance, 
NRAs are required to implement pro-competitive TELRIC studies periodically for them to 
achieve consumer protection objectives (Melody, 1997). In 2001, FCC argued that TELRIC 
distorts investment incentives and poses obstacle to an all-IP broadband world because of 
high termination revenue that provides little incentives for operators to upgrade their network 
to the most efficient technology or to negotiate interconnection agreements that are designed 
to accommodate the efficient exchange of IP traffic (Melody, 1997).  
44 
 
However, TELRIC prices being determined by estimations may also lead to some kind of 
arbitrage exercise. Nevertheless, the accuracy of these estimations depends on the TELRIC 
method that has been used to implement TELRIC (Noumba et al., 2004).  
The study that was conducted in Denmark in 2001 on top-down approach and bottom-up 
approach found out that the networking cost under top-down approach was twice the costs 
that were derived from the bottom-up approach(Falch,2005). Falch (2005) asserted that the 
difference seemed to have emerged from assumptions that were made in allocating joints and 
common costs. From this point, it is apparent that under top-down approach more estimates 
are made than bottom-up approach.  Falch (2005) argues that high interconnection charges 
discourage competition and on other hand too low interconnection prices also discourage 
innovation and facility based competition. Therefore it is up to the regulator using the costing 
methodologies to determine the “correct” price level of the input (Noumba et al., 2004:200).  
Noumba et al. (2004) argue that selecting a specific TELRIC method involves regulators into 
arbitrage exercise. Determining this “delicate balance” (Falch, 2005:5) becomes a challenge 
to the regulator due to lack of good information of the telecommunication industry cost 
structure (Noumba et al., 2004:39).  However, Noumba et al. (2004) shade light on bottom-up 
TELRIC approach that it improves procedures and processes implemented by the regulator or 
operator to collect and retrieve information. They further asserted that it enhances 
transparency of interconnection service market. On other hand, Falch (2005) emphasizes 
hybrid model, a combination of both bottom-up and top-down approach.  
In comparison with FAC, Noumba et al. (2004) state that depending on the elements 
considered, the TELRIC method seems to be less favourable to new entrants than the FDC 
method. Secondly, they explained that if a network section A is subject to substantial 
depreciation and if current depreciation and if current costs for reconstructing A are similar or 
higher than the historical costs, TELRIC can lead to higher costs than the one that would be 
delivered from the FDC method. Lastly, Wright el al. (2006) state that depending on the 
assumptions made, the TELRIC method can lead to a relatively wide range of estimates.  
3.3.4 BENCHMARKING INTERCONNECTION RATE APPROACH  
Stork (2009:8) describes benchmarking approach as “a process of establishing 
interconnection rates based on rates in other jurisdictions”. Samarajiva (2001) suggested that 
developing countries where data is not available, simple models should be used to determine 
interconnection rates in order not to distort competition. Samarajiva (2001) recommended 
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benchmarking as a best practice in settling interconnection rate disputes on time. In Korea 
benchmarking approach has been adopted not as a substitute to cost-based approach but as a 
complement (Xavier, 1997).  Stork (2009) argues that when no appropriate adjustments are 
done benchmarking results make little sense. He further said that under benchmarking 
approach, regulators try to model interconnection costs without having enough detailed 
information on local cost inputs to carry out full forward-looking cost analysis.  Reduction in 
interconnection rates that has induced competition and attracted more investments in 
Denmark’s telecom industry was resulted from implementation of benchmarking approach to 
supplement its costing methodology (Falch, 2004).  In 2003, Botswana Telecommunication 
Agency (BTA) considered benchmarking methodology as the most efficient methodology to 
solve interconnection rate dispute between Mascom Wireless Limited, a mobile operator and 
Botswana Telecommunication Corporation, fixed-line operator(BTA,2003). 
3.4 OTHER WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING INTERCONNECTION RATES  
3.4.1 Asymmetric interconnection regulation  
Many NRAs have identified that the positive network externality of the incumbent as a 
competitive issue, due to the strategy of price discrimination between the off-net and on-net 
prices. Laffont et al. (1998) highlighted that first movers in the market with greater brand 
loyalty and large consumer base, can use discriminatory retail prices as a competitive 
instrument. The mobile or fixed incumbent always offers its subscribers lower on-net 
termination prices and higher off-net termination prices. This becomes a barrier to entry. 
 Di Pillo et al. (2009) said that almost all European NRAs have adopted asymmetric 
interconnection regulation as a feasible regulatory measure. They further explained that in 
countries where the market is highly concentrated and characterized by the presence of 
incumbent operators that have a dominant position. In developing countries where there is a 
lower mobile penetration, the introduction of asymmetric charges is needed to encourage the 
growth of follower operator on the market, which suffers from a lack of scale due to late 
market entry.   Asymmetric interconnection charges allow higher expected profits in the short 
term and strengthen the relative competitive position of those follower operators permitted to 
increase the competition in the long term to the benefit of end users (Di Pillo et al., 2009).  In 
order to obtain a significant market share a certain period of time, follower operators must 
benefit from the economies of scale, by increasing their market share and their traffic volume.  
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When follower operator have higher unit costs, it is appropriate to impose asymmetric 
interconnection charges, which allow them to recover higher termination costs. This is 
recognized by the majority of NRAs, despite the risk of market entry by an inefficient 
operator.   However, prior any decision to implement asymmetric measure the regulator 
should implement a public consultation mechanism in order to elicit relevant information on 
which decisions can be based on.  Therefore the next subsection discusses public 
consultation.      
3.4.2 PUBLIC CONSULTATION   
Public consultation is one of the regulatory instruments employed to improve transparency, 
efficiency and effectiveness of interconnection regulation. It is conducted using five 
regulatory instruments; public hearings, informal consultation, public notice-and-comments 
and advisory bodies.   The rationale behind public consultation is that it increases the 
information available to the government on which decisions are based. As a result, EU 
framework directive mandates national regulatory authorities of member states to publish 
their consultation procedures. As a result many countries, According to Noumba et al. (2004) 
where pro-competitive regulations turned out to be ineffective due to lack of information 
from the incumbent’s cost have opted for public consultation process. For example, 74% of 
African countries have adopted and implemented public consultation approach. In these 
countries, public consultation approach has enabled regulators to assess the fairness and 
reasonableness of the interconnection rate.  
Some countries have implemented more than one public consultation approaches. In the 
United States a public hearing is attached to the notice-and-comment procedures. In Germany 
and Korea advisory bodies as well as public hearing approaches have been implemented. 
Furthermore, Canada, UK and Japan governments recommended their regulatory agencies to 
conduct information consultation before a formal consultation. It has been shown that with 
the adoption of public consultation approach the reasonableness of interconnection rates has 
been ascertained and regulatory decisions have been improved due to the availability of 
information for the government and the stakeholders. For instance, through ICASA public 
hearings, Vodacom was able to propose to the regulator to implement a glide path (time 
frame over which the interconnection rates will come down) in three years starting from 2010 
in order to enable them to recoup their sunk cost. From this illustration, it is apparent that 
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public consultation process can complement the existing interconnection regime form 
ensuring a fair and reasonable interconnection rate that is acceptable by the involved parties.  
Despite ITU’s recommendations to develop and developing countries to adopt contemporary 
models calculate interconnection charges and instruments to complement these modes, 
Bezzina (2005) argues that competition and efficiency are still far way from effective due 
unclear and comprehensive interconnection regime. Furthermore, Laffont et al. (1998) 
highlighted that focusing on the access principle regime alone can give ensure positive results 
in telecommunication. Therefore the next subsection discusses other necessary enforcements 
that contribute to the effectiveness of an interconnection regime.   
3.5 CHALLENGES FACING INTERCONNECTION REGIMES       
Independence of regulatory agencies  
Setting up regulatory agencies and adopting regulatory policies is not sufficient to ensure 
optimal interconnection rates in the telecommunication industry (Jain, 2003). Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) argue that for the government to influence a regulatory outcome there 
must a degree to which the NRA lacks independence. Independence here means the ability of 
the regulator to implement policy without undue interference from the government or 
industry (Bandanayake, 2005).  
However, the degree of independence of NRAs and their susceptibility to government 
influence varies as across a set of well-developed countries (Edward & Waverman, 2006). 
Jain (2003) in his study on regulation of the interconnection in India found that Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) could not manage interconnectivity in a smooth 
manner due to a lack of independence. He further explained that the intervention by the 
minister, judicial bodies and Department of Telecoms(DoT) considerably reduced TRAI’s 
credibility.  
Furthermore, Jain (2003) suggests that the scope and powers of regulatory agencies should 
clearly specify the oversight and enforcement scope to cover the incumbent. In the UK, for 
example, the telecommunication Act of 1984 clearly stipulated the regulating role of OFTEL 
to regulate British Telecom (BT). Also as part of its license, BT was mandated to follow the 
OFTEL’s regulations (Edward & Waverman, 2006). He further highlighted that such clarity 
does not exist in developing countries, for instance, in India, DoT was the policy maker, part 
regulator and operator until 2000 when the operator was corporatized.  
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Lack of independence for the regulatory body has an effect on the appropriateness of the 
interconnection charges. For instance, Falch (2004) in his study to determine the 
effectiveness of LRAIC on competition in Denmark argues that LRAIC will determine the 
level of interconnection rates accepted by all parties only if the process is managed by a 
strong regulator with which is able to stay independent of the huge political and economic 
interests related to interconnection rates.  
Regulatory Capacity  
It has been argued that regulatory policies only determine an appropriate level of 
interconnection charges if the process is being managed by a strong regulator with sufficient 
technical and administrative expertise (Falch, 2005). Jain (2003) also highlighted that most 
regulators in developing countries have no essential technical background and mindset to 
adopt new models to calculate interconnection charges. This has been evidenced in the Indian 
case (Jain, 2003). TRAI continued to focus on access deficit charges (ADC) and USO 
funding through fixed line networks, while wireless technologies were growing very fast. It 
was also slow to give up the historical cost model, as it was given by the need to protect 
DoT/BSNL, rather facilitating sector growth (Jain, 2003). Falch (2005) also did a case study 
on the impact of LRIAC approach in Denmark.  Falch (2005:17) argues that “the subsequent 
reduction in interconnection rates in Denmark is the result of a dedicated regulator rather than 
of the LRAIC approach as such”.   
Availability of data 
Jamison (1998) highlighted that the more information the regulator has at its disposal the 
more efficient the access charge regime will be. Xavier (1997) also argues that calculating 
forward-looking cost often becomes challenging and time consuming due to the absence of 
reliable cost information from the incumbent. Braeutigam (1980) also highlighted that under 
backward-looking approach regime, incumbents tend to give costs that are not related to cost 
causation.   
Therefore, regulators should recognize this limitation and validate its approach using a 
variety of models. Jain (2003) suggests that to have a broader basis of acceptance, regulators 
also need to rely on a number of models (such as top down and bottom up variants) to arrive 
at indicative costs that can be corroborated. For instance, in India, BT’s interconnection 
pricing review is based on management (top down) as well as engineering approach that 
examine the cost of hypothetical telecom network of a specified capacity(Jain,2003). 
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Moreover, Jain (2003) highlighted that one of the critical success factors in the deployment of 
the telecommunications development fund for supporting rural services was the models based 
on charges that allowed for an efficient assessment when the cost data is not in place. For 
instance, the top down model incorporates the actual costs and provides a check on what is 
achievable in practice (Jamison, 1998). In Chile, for example, the access charges for rural 
were determined through a model that reflected the operations of an efficient firm.  
3.6 SUMMARY  
Many countries have embarked on interconnection pricing regulation as the tool to promote 
infrastructure-based competition and service-based competition. However, efficiency and 
competition seem to be far from effective in these countries because of too high access 
charges and too low access charges. Literature has shown that optimal level of 
interconnection and the awareness of the regulator about “water bed” effect may maintain the 
balance between incentives to build new infrastructure and access to the existing ones. The 
challenge to the regulators and policy maker has always been maintaining this “delicate 
balance” (Falch, 2005:20). In conclusion, in many countries to ensure the determination of 
optimal interconnection charge that can enhance effective competition and efficiency, cost-
based methodologies have been adopted and supplementary approaches such as asymmetric 
interconnection regulations, public consultations. However, Melody (1997) and Noumba et 
al. (2004) argued that all studies conducted and approaches adopted by the regulators in 30 
years seem to have turned out to be ineffective. Therefore there is a need to know whether 
cost-based principle has managed to balance the three objectives of efficiency.   
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             CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH    METHODOLOGY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Firstly this chapter sets out the problem statement, purpose statement and research questions. 
Secondly, the chapter gives a clear discussion and clarification of the qualitative research 
method. A detailed explanation of the two collection methods (document collection and 
interviewing) is also provided. Thirdly, the chapter explains the data collection instruments 
that were used and sampling techniques used to identify interviewees during the case study. 
Lastly the chapter details data analysis strategies employed and how reliability and validity of 
data were ensured in the study. 
4.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Enhancing the effectiveness of infrastructure-based competition and service-based 
competition in the telecommunication sector has been the main goal of telecoms regulatory 
institutions. Many regulatory institutions have embarked on interconnection regulation as a 
mechanism to ensure that new entrants can access the incumbent’s network at appropriate 
prices, terms and conditions. The most important and yet controversial issue in 
interconnection regulation is interconnection charging in the context of a dominant 
incumbent (Jain, 2006).  Even though the cost-based access pricing principle has been noted 
as the best pro-competitive regulation to ensure any-to-any connectivity and safeguard the 
abuse of market power, determining an appropriate level for the interconnection rate that can 
enhance efficiency and competition in the telecommunication market has been far from 
effective in many countries.  
Thus far, RURA has put much effort into promoting efficiency and competition through 
interconnection pricing regulation in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. However, an 
appropriate level of efficiency and competition in the telecommunication market hinges 
partly on the effectiveness of the interconnection rate regime.     
In an attempt to determine an appropriate level for the interconnection rate that is acceptable 
to all stakeholders, RURA adopted the cost-based access pricing principle. However, Salinger 
(1998:28) argues that “the use of LRIC is theoretically sound, but its implementation in 
practice is rather complex and could undermine the profitability of the incumbent’s 
investment if poorly executed”.  In addition, a number of scholars (Armstrong, 2002; Wright 
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et al., 2006; Jamison, 1998 and Jain 2003) argue that cost-based methodologies can only 
ensure an efficient level of interconnection rate if a high degree of independence, detailed 
information from the incumbent, skills and enough policy instruments are at the regulator’s 
disposal. Therefore, the study aims to understand the interconnection pricing regime in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector and to what extent it has achieved its objectives. 
4.3 THE PURPOSE STATEMENT    
The purpose of this study is to investigate the regulation of interconnection pricing in 
Rwanda. Armstrong (2002) says that efficiency and competition in the telecommunication 
sector hinge on the interconnection pricing regulation. Specifically, this study will investigate 
whether the current interconnection pricing regime has ensured an appropriate level for the 
interconnection rate that can enhance efficiency and effective competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. The study will further make recommendation on approaches that 
could be adopted by the regulator to improve the regulation of interconnection in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector.   
4.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The focus of this study is on the interconnection pricing regulation in Rwanda and thus an 
attempt is made to find answers to the following main research question: 
How has interconnection pricing regulation impacted the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector?  
For practical reasons, this question was broken down into sub-questions as follows:  
a) What is the interconnection pricing regime in the Rwandan  telecommunication 
 sector?  
b) To what extent has the interconnection pricing regime affected the Rwandan 
 telecommunication sector?   
c) What are the challenges facing interconnection pricing regulation in the Rwandan 
 telecommunication sector?    
d) What approaches could be adopted to improve the regulation of interconnection 
 pricing in Rwanda?  
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4.5 RESEARCH APPROACH  
This study made use of a qualitative and quantitative approach. McMillan and Schumacher 
(2006:27) say that the use of mixed- method research approach, which combines quantitative 
and qualitative, is increasingly becoming popular. McMillan and Schumacher (2006:27) 
highlights that with combined method approach, researchers are not limited to using 
techniques associated with traditional designs, either quantitative or qualitative, but both 
research methods are used either simultaneously or consecutively. In this approach the 
researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomena of interest (Patton, 2002). In other 
words, a qualitative study emphasizes the importance of looking at variables in the natural 
setting in which they are found (Opie, 2004). Taking this interpretative position will 
overcome bias as the researcher will be thinking abstractly and critically analysing the 
situation (Gerhardt, 2004).  
4.5.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH METHOD   
In this study the researcher took a case study on Rwandan utility regulatory agency (RURA), 
MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda.  The notion of the case study was defined 
by Mohd Noor (2008:1602) and Cassell and Symon (2004). Mohd Noor (2008:1602) defines 
a case study as a “strategic qualitative research methodology”. According to Cassell and 
Symon (2004) a case study is one which refers to a detailed investigation of phenomena 
within their context. In conjunction with them, Opie (2004:45) also defined a case study as a 
“detailed investigation on a real situation, with real people in an environment”.  
To understand the regulation of interconnection regulation in depth (Bell, 1999), four case 
studies (RURA, MTN-Rwandacell, TIGO-Rwanda and Rwandatel) were conducted in this 
study.  This is in line with Mohd Noor (2008) argument which states that choices of multiple 
cases ensure findings given that replication is found in several cases. In this study the 
researcher attended to understand whether the current interconnection regime achieved its 
intended objectives in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. This resonates with Mohd 
Noor’s (2008) argument that the case study does not focus on the entire organization but a 
particular issue or a unit of analysis.  Furthermore Yin (1994:13) describes a case study as 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”. The multiple sources of evidence in the 
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case of this research include semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis which will 
be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
4.7 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
4.7.1 DOCUMENT COLLECTION  
One of the two methods the researcher used in his data gathering exercise was document 
collection. Document collection is an extremely valuable alternative source of data used to 
supplement information obtained, in this particular research through interviewing (Bell, 
2005). According to McMillan and Schumacher (1993) document collection provides an 
internal perspective as well as the values of the organisation (or the RURA, MTN-
Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda).In addition, Henning,  Rensburg  and Smit 
(2004: 98) explain that documents are considered as the main source of data in qualitative 
research. They state that “any document, whether old or new, whether in printed format, hand 
written or electronic format and which relates to the research question may be of value” 
(p.99).  
In the light of the above arguments, in this study the researcher analyzed documents collected 
from RURA, MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda in order to align evidence 
with the triangulating evidence (Neuman, 2010). The document collected and analyzed 
included weekly minutes of interconnection agreement documents between operators, annual 
reports from 2001 to 2010, interconnection rate issues documents and companies financial 
reports, minutes that were taken in meetings between RURA and stakeholders, companies 
newsletters and magazines, and the cost-based interconnection study reports for both MTN-
Rwandacell and Rwandatel that were submitted by ICEA consultancy firm in 2006. Some 
issues on interconnection rates among the operators and the regulator vary widely in 
circulating newspapers like “Rwanda New times”, “Invaho”, and “Igihe news paper”.  Most 
of the documents  that the researcher collected and reviewed fall under the category of 
primary sources of telecommunication data and are also official documents in Bell’s (2005), 
McMillan and Schumacher’s (1993) and Best and Kahn’s (2003) categorisation of 
documents. 
4.7.2 INTERVIEWING  
The second data collection technique that the researcher used was interviews. Interviews 
according to Fetterman (1997) help in explaining and putting into larger context what the 
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researcher sees and experiences. Neuman (2006) and Best and Kahn (2003) regard interviews 
as a research tool for obtaining specific information from another person as it allows the 
interviewer to access the perspective of the person being interviewed.  Thus from interviews 
information regarding an individual’s experiences and knowledge and his/her opinions, 
beliefs and feelings can be gathered (Best & Kahn, 2003). The major advantage of interviews 
which has been cited by most writers is its adaptability and flexibility (Bell, 2005; McMillan 
& Schumacher, 1993).  
The researcher used semi-structured interview to solicit for information from key staff of 
RURA, MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda. A semi-structured interview was 
selected as the means for data collection in this study because standardised interviews do not 
give the researcher a chance to explore respondents’ opinions, clarifying interesting and 
relevant sensitive issues (Bell, 1998). Some freedom to probe was essential to the researcher 
since interconnection rate seem a controversial issue in all jurisdictions.  This attribute added 
value on this study because the researcher was able to investigate questions which were very 
critical and sensitive for operators, especially the incumbents to articulate. For instance the 
question that was related to the fairness of current interconnection rates in Rwanda seemed 
provocative to some operators that are in interconnection disputes, therefore, the use of semi-
structured interviews enabled the researcher to probe it thoroughly.   
As regards some of the topics, questions and issues to be covered were selected in advance in 
order to guide the researcher during the interview (Bell, 2005). In designing the interview 
guide, questions were worded in a completely semi-structured format (Best & Kahn, 2003). 
The advantage of using the semi-structured interview according to McMillan & Schumacher 
(1993) is that it reduces interviewer effect and bias. Bias, it must be note, has been and will 
always remain the “old enemy” of interviewing (Bell, 2005:116). Secondly, semi-structured 
interviews allow and easily facilitate the recording, summarizing, organization and analysis 
of data (Best & Kahn, 2003). 
4.8 SAMPLING 
The purposeful sampling strategy was used to identify and choose individuals likely to be 
knowledgeable and informative about the phenomenon of interest (McMillan and 
Schumacher, 1993). To that effect in this research RURA staff, the acting CEO of MTN-
Rwandacell and three experts in the field of interconnection regulation and the heads of 
department at MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda were selected as information 
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rich informants.  All these people that were purposefully selected provided the researcher 
with relevant information during the interview (McMillan and Schumacher, 2006; Neuman, 
2006).  Other knowledgeable and informative respondents that were purposefully sampled 
and interviewed using semi-structured interviews were staff from RDB in charge of 
interconnectivity in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. The researcher therefore 
compiled 16 semi-structured interview schedules that were used during the data collection 
exercise. 
4.8.1 PILOTING  
Before data was collected, the pilot study was conducted in January 2011 with one 
interviewee. This was done to validate the interview schedule to enable the researcher to 
think about what to expect  from the regulator’s and operator’s responses. However, the 
interviewee from the regulator did not have knowledge of interconnection regulation, 
although this was not at first apparent. Nevertheless, the reseacher used the opportunity to 
reframe the interview questions to use simpler language.    
A further pilot interview was arranged where the selected interviewee was able to give 
explanations which were very helpful to the researcher as an interviewee had an idea about 
the current interconnection rate regime.  
The reseacher then arranged to conduct interviews with other RURA staff and operators’ staff 
after the researcher was satisfied that the instrument was usable. Appointments were made 
after working hours and during weekends. Interviews were arranged in such away that they 
would not interfere with the companies or institutions activities.  Before conducting any 
interview the researcher asked for permission to use a tape recorder in order for interviewees  
to undertand why the researcher would like to use the tape recorder. Because of on going 
tension due to interconnection rate disputes between the operators, none of the participants 
granted the  researcher permission to use the tape recorder. After asking for the permission, a 
brief introduction was given to the interviewee explaining the aim of the study. In the 
introduction the interviewees were told to be free to express any opinion. They were also told 
that information collected was strictly confidential 
4.8.2 THE PARTICIPANTS 
There were more than six departments in each telecommunication company, but the 
researcher selected only people from the department dealing with interconnection. In this 
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department, the researcher decided to interview interconnection managers since they seemed 
to have more experience in interconnection regulation than the rest. In MTN-Rwandacell, the 
researcher interviewed four (4) interconnection and roaming managers and the Acting CEO. 
In Rwandatel, the researcher interviewed the two (2) interviewees (interconnection manager 
and the director of the department).  In TIGO-Rwanda, the researcher interviewed four (4) 
interviewees (interconnection, roaming manager and operations manager).  In RURA, out of 
eight departments, the researcher interviewed four (4) interviewees in the interconnection 
regulation department. The researcher interviewed the head of the department, the head of the 
section and two economic regulatory officers.  Finally, the researcher also interviewed one 
employee in charge of interconnectivity in Rwanda Development Board (RDB). Since of 
each both RURA and selected operators do have interconnection regulation departments, the 
selected number of participants from this departments are the well-informed informants as 
they have been involved between interconnection rate issues between operators and 
regulators. Therefore these 16 represent a high percentage of the total number of key 
informants.   To comply with anonymity and confidentiality agreements, the names were then 
coded to represent the respondents in place of their real names throughout this chapter. 
Table 4. 1: Codes given to all participants in place of their real names 
RURA 
 NO   INTERVIEW SCHEDULE    CODES  
1  2/2/2011  PR1-RURA 
2 2/2/2011  PR2-RURA 
3 7/2/2011  PR3-RURA 
4 7/2/2011  PR4-RURA 
MTN-RWANDACELL 
No INTERVIEW SCHEDULE    CODES 
1 5/2/2011  PR1-MTNRWANDACELL 
2 10/2/2011  PR2-MTNRWANDACELL 
3 11/2/2011  PR3-MTNRWANDACELL 
4 12/2/2011  PR4-MTNRWANDACELL 
RWANDATEL 
No INTERVIEW SCHEDULE   CODES 
1 5/2/2011  PR1-Rwandatel 
2 11/2/2011  PR2-Rwandatel 
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3 21/2/2011  PR3-Rwandatel 
                                                             TIGO-RWANDA S.A  
No INTERVIEW SCHEDULE    CODES 
1 21/2/2011  PR1-TIGORwanda 
2 23/2/2011  PR2-TIGORwanda 
3 11/2/2011  PR3-TIGORwanda 
4 23/2/2011  PR4-TIGORwanda 
                                                                OTHERS-RDB   
No INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  CODES 
1 25/2/2011  PR1-RCIP 
 
4.9 PROCESS OF DATA ANALYSIS  
As discussed earlier, the study was qualitative but the collected data was analyzed 
quantitatively.  To underpin this, Jorgensen (1989:107) defines data analysis in more details 
as “breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, 
elements or units. With facts broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and 
sifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes”. Macmillan 
& Schumacher (2006:364) finally stress that qualitative data analysis as a process of 
organizing the collected data into categories and identifying relationships among those 
categories to seek explanations of the phenomenon. In the light of the above suggestions, the 
researcher primarily read and revised the interview question responses in order to come up 
with a clear and comprehensive meaning of what the respondents were trying to say. Then the 
researcher identified similar patterns, which became parts of units and then categories. The 
categories in turn helped in the emergence of the themes grouped on the basis of the 
interrelations of categories and research questions. To interpret the research findings, the 
researcher made a comparison and combined the indentified themes in a new way in order to 
arrive at a new understanding of the interconnection regulation in Rwanda (Macmillan & 
Schumacher, 2006:373). Similar methods for data analysis that were adopted for the 
interviews were also used for the analysis of the data collected from document collection or 
document analysis. To produce analytical conclusion from the study findings, the researcher 
referred to a wealth of literature on interconnection regulation and techniques of calculating 
interconnection rates to see whether interconnection regulation in Rwanda comply with the 
interconnection regulation frameworks in other jurisdictions . 
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4.10 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA 
Although the terms reliability and validity are concepts used in quantitative research, Patton 
(2001) argues that a qualitative researcher should be concerned about reliability and validity 
while designing a study, analyzing the results and also judging the quality of the study. In 
qualitative studies, the researcher is the instrument for data collection. Therefore, in 
qualitative research, validity and reliability means credibility of the research and the 
credibility of a qualitative research depends on the efforts of the researcher (Golafshani, 
2003). Although reliability and validity are treated as separate terms in quantitative research, 
these terms are not viewed separately in qualitative research. Instead, terms such as 
credibility and trustworthiness are used in qualitative research (Opie, 2004; Golafshani, 
2003).  
To facilitate the patterns seeking exercise and to ensure validity and reliability of data the 
researcher used the triangulation, sequence analysis and the critical analysis of documents 
techniques. Triangulation involves cross-validation of data so as to test and compare one 
source of information against another and to see whether there is a pattern recurrence and 
corroboration (Wiersma, 1986; Fetterman, 1997). In the data analysis process the researcher 
triangulated and cross-checked data collected from documents and interviews, firstly about 
the history of the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda, secondly, the achievements of 
the current interconnection regime, thirdly the challenges facing the current interconnection 
regime. For instance, all the responses that were given by the respondents on the current cost-
based interconnection regime, the researcher had to cross-check in the documents that he 
collected from RURA related to the cost interconnection studies that have been conducted on 
Rwanda telecommunication sector.   
The sequence analysis technique organizes information, events in order of occurrence or 
across time (Neuman, 2006). For instance, the researcher followed up the challenges the 
current interconnection regime has been facing since 2006 when ICEA consultancy firm was 
hired to conduct the cost-based interconnection study between MTN-Rwandacell and 
Rwandatel.  
The critical analysis of documents calls upon the researcher to subject documents to rigorous 
scrutiny to check consistency, truthfulness and authenticity (Fetterman, 1997; Bell, 2005). 
Thus the operator’s annual financial reports, interconnection policy documents, 
interconnection agreement papers, RURA’s annual reports and cost-based interconnection 
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study report 2005   were thoroughly and rigorously examined to test the truthfulness of these 
documents.  The three methods used in the pattern seeking exercise were used to critically 
assess, verify, check and examine the reliability and validity of the data and information 
gathered during the case study.  
However inasmuch as the researcher attempted to be objective in his data collection exercise 
it must be noted and he frankly acknowledge that at times bias can creep in, especially in this 
study where most of the research participants seemed reserved due to disputes that were 
going on between RURA and the operators.  Bias is regarded as one major cause of invalid 
and unreliable data (Manion & Cohen, 1980). Having been aware that bias can surface, the 
researcher tried by all means necessary to be objective and impartial in this study.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: REVIEW OF INTERCONNECTION RATES IN 
RWANDA 2003 – 2011 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents findings of the study. In this chapter the data is analysed qualitatively, 
based on a quantitative sample, as discussed in the Chapter Four. The total number of 16 
interviewees provides a valid study sample as these key informants represent a high 
percentage of the total number of possible informants who could make well-informed 
comments about the regulation of interconnection pricing. This statement is based on the 
number of years that the interviewees have been involved in solving pending interconnection 
pricing issues in the Rwandan telecommunication sector, making them rich-informants. The 
presentation of the findings is organized alongside specific research questions previously 
stated in the previous chapter of research methodology. These research questions revolve 
around the following themes:  
The existing interconnection pricing regime in Rwanda  
•  Efficiency of the existing interconnection pricing regime in the Rwandan telecommunication 
market.  
• Major challenges facing the current interconnection pricing regime in Rwanda  
• Approaches and strategies that can improve interconnection pricing regulation in Rwanda. 
These themes presented above answer the overarching question and critical questions of this 
study. Rwanda has had several reviews of interconnection regimes since 2003. Therefore 
understanding the existing interconnection regime by probing how and why it was adopted in 
the Rwandan telecommunication sector answers the critical question 1 of this study. 
Investigating the impact of the existing interconnection pricing regulation on the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector was crucial because it helped the researcher to understand whether 
the existing interconnection pricing regime has achieved its intended objectives. Furthermore, 
the sub-themes such as effective interconnection rates and need for change of the current 
regime under the first theme answer question 2 of the study. For instance, the degree of 
fairness and reasonableness of interconnection rates is crucial for promoting market 
efficiency in any telecommunication sector. Different issues highlighted by the operators and 
regulators on the effectiveness of the current interconnection rates created a chance to probe 
the third theme; major challenges facing the current interconnection pricing regulation in 
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Rwanda. This theme answers question 3 of the study. Respondents expressed their personal 
views on challenges such as lack of policy instruments, lack of regulatory capacity and 
information asymmetry that have deterred the current interconnection regime to ensure 
market efficiency in the Rwandan market. Based on the challenges expressed the researcher 
went on further to probe for the fourth theme by asking the approaches and strategies RURA 
can adopt in order to address these challenges. The results obtained from this theme answers 
critical question 4 of the study.  In general, after the researcher compiled all the interviews 
collected from RURA, MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda attending to all 
critical questions of this study, it was apparent that the results answer the overarching 
question of this study which investigates how the current regulation of interconnection 
pricing regulation in Rwanda has impacted  the Rwandan telecommunication sector. More 
details of how results presented in this chapter link with the overarching question and sub 
questions of this study will further be discussed in the recommendations and conclusions 
chapter, which is chapter 7 of this study.  Prior the presentation of the results obtained from 
the above themes, the next subsection presents a profile of the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector.      
5.2 RWANDAN TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR PROFILE  
The Rwandan telecommunication sector is made up of three mobile and fixed operators. 
These include MTN-Rwandacell (incumbent mobile and fixed operator), TIGO Rwanda S.A 
(second mobile and fixed operator) and Rwandatel (incumbent fixed and a third mobile 
operator). With this significant number of operators in the market, Rwanda believes 
promoting fair competition and efficiency will increase telephony penetration enhance 
promoting economic and social developments. It is this reason Rwanda utilities and 
regulatory agency was established and granted authority to enforce fair competition between 
network operators and service operators and to regulate prices where competition was limited 
(RURA, 2004).  
5.2.1 RWANDA UTILITIES REGULATORY AGENCY (RURA)  
RURA is a multi-sector regulatory body in Rwanda which regulates telecommunications 
(networks and services), energy, water and sanitation and transportation (RURA, 2004). It is 
a government institution with 103 employees and four regulatory board members that were 
chosen by the Rwandan parliament after every five years.  Its main key responsibility is 
improving service conditions and protecting consumers of these regulated sectors (RURA, 
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2004). However, due to the overwhelming contribution of the telecommunication sector in 
social and economic growth than any other sector, the government of Rwanda has been 
giving priority the regulation of telecommunication sector than other sectors.   
This has been seen in the fact has issued several standard and individual licences to new 
mobile operators such as TIGO-Rwanda and renewing the mobile and fixed licence of MTN-
Rwandacell and Rwandatel S.A. Unlike other sectors, to promote efficiency and competition 
in the telecoms sector, RURA must ensure and maintain any-to-any connectivity and 
safeguard against any abuse of market power in the provisioning of telecommunication 
services (RURA, 2008). For this to be possible, the Rwandan interconnection policy requires 
all public telecommunication operators in the Rwanda telecommunication sector to 
interconnect their network with those of other operators (RURA, 2004). The figure 4.1 below 
shows Rwanda mobile and fixed operator interconnection.    
Figure 5. 1: Rwanda Mobile and Fixed operators’ interconnection 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
The figure above depicts the interconnection between mobile and fixed operators’ networks; 
MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. 
These undertakings interconnection through Microwave links (MW links) and IP networks.  
5.2.2 MTN-RWANDACELL  
MTN-Rwandacell is a parastatal mobile and fixed telecom company. Its major shareholder is 
the government with 50% and MTN group based in South Africa with 50%. It is a dominant 
mobile operator with 2,586,694 (71% of market share) active mobile subscribers and a 
second fixed operator with 10,995 active fixed subscribers. In order to fulfil its license 
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obligations, since 1998 the company has invested USD 150 millions to increase the number 
of sites and modernizing its billing system. Today it has a mobile coverage of 95% of the 
country.  It is also a major ISP and the provider of Wi-Fi, WiMAX, VoIP, IPTV and mobile 
Data and has deployed 150km of fibre optics in Kigali City and 10.8 km of fibre optics within 
the country (RURA, 2009).      
5.2.3 RWANDATEL  
Rwandatel is a fixed and mobile telecom operator. Libyan African Investment Portfolio 
(LAP) is a major shareholder with 80% and Rwanda Social Security Fund (RSSF) with the 
remaining 20%. It is a dominant fixed operator with 28,653 subscribers and a third mobile 
operator with 345,711 subscribers. It has a backbone ISP with 500km of fibres and has more 
than 300 points of presence in the country. Under the supervision of RURA, it launched GSM 
and UMTS systems for providing 2.5G services, 3G services and MSAN for fixed networks 
services.  
5.2.4 TIGO RWANDA S.A  
TIGO Rwanda S.A is a mobile and fixed telecom operator owned by Millicom Cellular 
International (MIC). In two years of its launch in the market, TIGO-Rwanda, through its 
affordable communication packages such as “TIGO vuga” and “e-Go” surpassed Rwandatel 
to a second mobile market share position with 692,950 active subscribers (RURA, 2010). It is 
also a third fixed operator with 16 subscribers in the market.  
5.3 THE EXISTING INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN RWANDA    
The interconnection process in Rwanda started in I998 when MTN Group from SA launched 
its operations in Rwanda. This was mainly done to allow subscribers of the fixed incumbent, 
Rwandatel, to communicate with the subscribers of MTN-Rwandacell. For this to be done 
transparently, both companies had to enter into an interconnection negotiation for them to 
interconnect at a fair and reasonable access price. However, it has been shown that the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector has experienced several transitions in interconnection 
regimes.  As the main aim of this study was to know the existing interconnection pricing  
regime in Rwanda, therefore the table 5.1 below presents the evolution of interconnection 
regimes in the Rwandan telecommunication sector since 1998.    
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Table 5. 1: The evolution of interconnection Regimes in Rwanda 
Period Call termination on 
the fixed network 
Call 
termination on 
the mobile 
network 
Interconnection Regime 
1998-2003 Rfw.48 Rfw.48 Negotiation Between MTN-
Rwandacell and Rwandatel-
FAC-based rate 
 
2003-2006 
 
Rfw.28 
 
Rfw.28 
Interim Costs set by the 
regulatory agency(Asymmetric 
interconnection regime) 
2006-2011 Rfw.30 Rfw.40 Interconnection rates generated 
by the study of the expert –
TELRIC regime 
Source: RURA 2004 & 2007 
In Rwanda, interconnection negotiation with the intervention of the regulator as a mediator 
has been a preferred means for competitive operators to reach interconnection agreements on 
prices, terms and conditions amicably. According to the table 5.1 during the era of 1998 to 
2003, interconnection negotiation between operators was the only regime to determine 
interconnection rates in Rwanda. In 1998, MTN-Rwandacell after its launch in the market, it 
entered into an interconnection agreement with Rwandatel, which was the sole fixed operator 
and the owner of essential facilities by then. As the table 5.1 demonstrates the two companies 
amicably agreed to pay each other Rfw.48 per call.      
However, towards the end of 2003 MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel broke up into an 
interconnection rate dispute. During this case, MTN-Rwandacell strongly argued that Rfw.48 
was too high and yet more network traffic was going to Rwandatel, the owner of essential 
facilities. It further argued that Rfw.48 was a blockade to competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market.  RURA, which was established two years before this dispute, in 
accordance to its mandate, it intervened and imposed the interim symmetric interconnection 
charges. Hence the table 5.1 depicts that between 2003 to 2006 the interconnection rate was 
Rfw.28 per call on both MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel’s networks. This was, however, 
imposed while RURA was in the process to hire a consultant to carry out a cost-based 
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interconnection review to determine an appropriate regime that can enhance an efficient level 
of interconnection in the Rwandan telecommunication market.  
As it is highlighted from the table 5.1 above the current cost-based interconnection regime in 
Rwanda is TELRIC regime. This was recommended by a consultant who was hired by 
RURA to determine an appropriate cost-based interconnection regime to the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. The rates that were determined by the consultant are Rfw.40 for 
mobile and Rfw.30 for fixed. This was also confirmed by PRI-MTNRwandacell.  He asserted 
that “we [MTN] use TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking approach... even in 2006 the 
consultant determined the mobile interconnection rates of MTN-Rwandacell using TELRIC”.  
He further explained that the consultant and RURA recommended LRIC plus mark-up model 
because they benchmarked and found out that Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania are using LRIC 
plus mark-up models. A respondent from RDB also underpinned that the current mobile and 
fixed termination rates are TELRIC–based.      
However, respondents from RURA asserted that Rwandan interconnection policy advocates 
FAC or COSITU as the current cost-based model in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. 
To affirm this, PR1-RURA asserted that “...RURA adopted COSITU which is the same as 
FAC...the hired consultant proposed that it [FAC] was relevant to the Rwandan market”. He 
further explained that FAC was adopted specifically to incentivise Rwandatel to build the 
network infrastructure. But after its failure to enhance efficiency and effective competition in 
the market, RURA adopted TELRIC as a proxy to address the deficiencies of FAC or 
COSITU regime. He mentioned that FAC-regime was characterized by arbitrary 
interconnection prices, limited innovation and abuse of power by the owner of the essential 
facilities. This regime favoured Rwandatel and this resulted into an interconnection dispute 
with MTN-Rwandacell. To expound this further, PR1-RURA narrated that between 1998 to 
2003 Rwandatel used its market power to argue for high access charge that led to an 
interconnection agreement breakup with its competitor. To affirm that FAC is still being used 
in the sector, PRI-Rwandatel said that the Rwandatel calculated rates using FAC 
methodology and submits it to the consultant.  
Contrary to this, significant respondents from MTN-Rwandacell asserted that TIGO-Rwanda 
(the new mobile operator in the market) neither uses FAC nor TELRIC based interconnection 
rate. PR2-MTNRwandacell asserted that” …we are uncertain about the interconnection 
regime TIGO-Rwanda has been using since its entry in the market”. He further argued that 
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the regulator should always transparently communicate all incentives offered to new entrants 
to all the stakeholders so as to avoid regulatory uncertainty.  This uncertainty has aroused 
intense debate among the operators about the appropriateness of access rate TIGO is charging 
in the market because neither MTN-Rwandacell nor Rwandatel declared to be knowing the 
cost-based model on which its charges are based, he said.  
With respect to the above arguments, the next subsection presents the results attained from 
interview questions that attempted to investigate the impact of the existing interconnection 
pricing regulation in Rwanda.   
5.4 THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT INTERCONNECTION REGIME   
As it has been mentioned in the previous section, the Rwandan telecommunication sector has 
experienced frequent interconnection regimes since telecommunication regulatory reform in 
2001. However, none of these interconnection pricing regimes seem to have managed to 
ensure an efficient interconnection rate that can enhance efficiency and effective competition 
in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. This has been posing a challenge to RURA since 
2003.  The interconnection rate dispute in 2003 between MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel 
exposed the inappropriateness of FAC-based rate (Rfw.48) that was negotiated between the 
respective operators in 1998. In the 2004 hearings, MTN-Rwandacell argued that Rfw.48 was 
too high to encourage competition in the market and make the business to flourish. However 
RURA attributed this dispute to the accounting systems both MTN-Rwandacell and 
Rwandatel used to calculate Rfw.48. Respondents from RURA explained that the accounting 
system was on top-down method, the cost extraction from the operator’s accounting and 
bottom-up method, the computation of total costs based upon network elements individual 
costs.  They further expounded that one of the top-down methods was developed by COSITU 
in Rwanda telecoms sector.   
To underpin this and to concur with MTN-Rwandacell argument in 2003, PRI-RURA 
responded that  
 “…COSITU or FAC-based rate did not enhance efficiency in the  market as RURA 
 had expected”.  
To address these challenges, RURA commissioned a consultant to carry out a cost-based 
interconnection market review on networks of both Rwandatel and MTN-Rwandacell in 
order to determine an appropriate pro-competitive remedy to address the interconnection 
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disputes in the Rwandan telecoms market.  The consultant using a TELRIC bottom-up 
forward-looking cost model came up with call termination Rfw.40 for mobile and Rfw.30 for 
fixed. Therefore since these rates are currently used in Rwanda, it is worthwhile in the next 
subsection to present the impact of TELRIC-based interconnection regime in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.  
5.4.1 COST-BASED MODEL IN RWANDA: TELRIC   
According to MTN-Rwandacell interconnection rate review 2006 report, TELRIC estimates 
additional costs incurred in producing interconnection relative to the costs already incurred 
by producing a portfolio of other services. It further explains that TELRIC includes all the 
costs directly attributable to interconnection, whether these are variables (depending on the 
level of traffic at a given capacity) or fixed (making up the capacity).  
In the light of this, RURA decided to use TELRIC in order to address the traditional 
interconnection regime (FAC or COSITU)’s deficiencies. This was underpinned by PRI-
RDB. He said that  
“...the 2006 consultative review was specifically to determine an appropriate regime 
 that could address the deficiencies of FAC regime”.  
With respect to this assertion, TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking was expected to enhance 
efficiency and an effective level of competition in the Rwandan telecommunication market.  
As a preferred pro-competitive remedy, operators and RURA were hoping that it would 
determine appropriate interconnection rates and safe guard anti-competitive behaviours from 
the incumbents. However, the majority of respondents highlighted that TELRIC-regime 
turned out to be ineffective in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. 
Respondents from RURA and Rwandatel strongly argued that efficiency and competition is 
still far away from effective because of an inappropriate interconnection regime. PR1-RURA 
said that 
“…the current interconnection regime is a bottleneck to the growth of the 
 industry...because telecom operators cannot price lower than the interconnection 
 charge”.  
He further explained that interconnection price is crucial to the new entrants in the 
market and affects the level of competition. The delay of RURA to realise this problem has 
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strongly affected mobile new entrants in the market he said. In conjunction with this, PR1-
RCIP said that  
“...the current interconnection regime has had a strong negative effect on the 
 Rwandan telecommunication level of competition and profitability of 
 telecommunication companies...”.  
He further explained that Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda have been suffering more 
because of the current TELRIC- regime that does not allow them to make profits in the 
market. Since Rwandatel launched GSM, 80% of the traffic has been going to MTN-
Rwandacell he explained. In light with this, respondents from Rwandatel also explain that 
since Rwandatel launched its GSM in 2008 it has been making profits for MTN-Rwandacell.   
To affirm this, PR2-Rwandatel asserted that  
“...it [TELRIC-based rate] has not enabled Rwandatel to upgrade its network...the 
 company is not making profits in the mobile market”.  
He said that this is why Rwandatel has failed to increase its mobile coverage and why 
it was not able to pay $ 3.4 m it owes MTN-Rwandacell for interconnectivity. He further 
explained that the company is on the verge to insolvency. To affirm this, after the researcher 
collected the data, in April 2011 RURA revoked the GSM licence of Rwandatel. The 
argument was that Rwandatel failed to fulfil its licence obligations including upgrading its 
network in the Rwandan telecoms market. Although there are many factors that may have 
affected the profitability of Rwandatel, according to these findings, the current high mobile 
interconnection rate seems to have been the overarching factor.     
TIGO Rwanda, although still new in the market, has also suffered because of the current 
interconnection regime in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. PRI-TIGORwanda 
lamented that  
“...the current regime is unfair because the company [TIGO-Rwanda] is not making 
any profits since its launch in the Rwandan market”.  
He explained that the current TELRIC-based rate is a barrier for them to compete with 
MTN-Rwandacell in the market and to make profits in the market. Like now the promotions 
which TIGO offers are only on net-calls but in the case of off-net calls the company cannot 
go below the current rate he said. This opinion is in line with RURA’s view and Rwandatel’s 
view that the current regime is a bottleneck to the sector’s growth. However, many 
69 
 
respondents asserted the current interconnection regime favours the mobile incumbent in the 
mobile market. Two respondents asserted that:  
      “…Rfw.40 favours MTN-Rwandacell but discourages small mobile operators in the 
market” (PR1-Rwandantel). 
   ”...MTN is a prime beneficiary of the current interconnection fees when compared to the 
other telecoms   operators, Rwandatel and Tigo, with minority market share…” (PR2-
RURA).   
The interconnection consultative review of 2006 was conducted when MTN-Rwandacell was 
the only mobile operator in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. The consultant 
highlighted in the report that the rate was calculated only based on MTN-Rwandacell’s 
accounting information, hence favouring MTN-Rwandacell only.  This confirms with PR2-
RURA and PR1-Rwandatel’s general consensus that the current rate benefits only MTN-
Rwandacell. This was also affirmed by the defensive responses collected from MTN-
Rwandacell on this matter.  
In the interviews, all respondents from MTN-Rwandacell argued for the current 
interconnection regime. They asserted that it has enhanced efficiency and effective 
competition in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  PR3-MTNRwandacell asserted that 
 “It [TELRIC-regime] is appropriate because it has enabled MTN-Rwandacell to 
 upgrade its network and to recoup its investment”.  
He explained that an effective interconnection regime is the one that certainly allows 
operators to recover their costs. He said that TELRIC regime has enabled the company to 
recover its costs invested in building network infrastructures. Respondents from MTN-
Rwandacell further said that it also enabled new entrants to enter the market which was the 
main goal of RURA when it was adopting the current interconnection regime.  PR1-
MTNRwandacell asserted that:   
        “…TELRIC-based regime is effective and it has enabled TIGO-Rwanda to enter the 
market…and RURA is also in the process to license the fourth mobile operator in the 
market”.   
This means that despite small mobile operators’ controversies on the effectiveness of 
TELRIC regime, MTN-Rwandacell strongly perceive TELRIC-regime as a regime relevant 
to the Rwandan telecommunication sector context. In this regard, RURA concurs with small 
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operator’s argument, however, there is no basis of its relevant based on the fact that RURA 
had just hired a consultant to study the appropriateness of the current interconnection regime 
in Rwanda. This presented chance to the researcher to probe the critical question 3 of the 
study extensively by trying to know operators and regulators’ perception on the fairness and 
reasonableness of the current mobile and fixed interconnection rates in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.  This is a key to answering the overarching research question of 
this study because the degree of fairness and reasonableness of interconnection rates is 
crucial for promoting market efficiency in the telecommunication sector. Since the main 
rationale behind the adoption of TELRIC-regime was to enhance a fair and reasonable 
interconnection rates in the Rwandan telecommunication, the researcher finds it worthwhile 
in the next subsection to present results that were obtained from the interview question that 
attempted to probe the opinions of respondents on the appropriateness of the current 
interconnection rates in the Rwandan telecommunication market.   
5.4.3 EFFICIENT LEVEL OF INTERCONNECTION RATES IN THE RWANDAN 
TELECOM MARKET  
The current mobile and fixed interconnection rates have been described as biased because 
they were determined using MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel’s information only.  In 
countries like Rwanda where there is not enough information to allow for the arbitration of 
interconnection rate disputes, the fairness and reasonableness of the level of interconnection 
rate is likely to be compromised.  For instance, in the Rwandatel’s cost-based interconnection 
study report of 2006 the consultant reported that more estimates were made due to lack of 
information about network traffic (ICEA, 2006). In the MTN-Rwandacell’s cost-based 
interconnection study report of 2006 the consultant also reported that the evaluation of 
interconnection costs was complex due lack of correct information from MTN-Rwandacell 
(ICEA, 2006).  
With respect to this, in order to understand the impact of the current interconnection regime 
further, the researcher asked a question to probe whether the current interconnection rates are 
fair and reasonable in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. Therefore the table 5 below 
presents the results obtained from the responses attended to the above interview question. 
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Table 5. 2: Is the current interconnection rate fair and reasonable? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the above Table 5.2, it is apparent that respondents even those from the fixed-
line incumbent were more interested in articulating on the fairness and reasonableness of the 
current mobile interconnection rates than fixed-line rates. The overwhelming majority of the 
respondents 11 out of 16 asserted that the current mobile interconnection rate is unfair and 
unreasonable. Some explained that it is unfair and not reasonable because it is too high to 
encourage competition.  
5.4.3.1 Too high interconnection rate  
Respondents from Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda highlighted that the Rwandan telecom 
sector has grown significantly especially in the mobile market since 2006 and technology has 
greatly evolved, however, interconnection rates are still too high to encourage competition in 
the market. PRI-TIGORwanda argued that 
”…traffic has grown significantly and technologies... It is also strange to notice how 
 much the retail tariff has decreased so much since that time but not the interconnect 
 rate”.  
He explained that the number of operators has increased to 3 and RURA is planning to 
license the fourth operator in 2011. This has substantially increased the number of mobile 
subscribers to 3.6 m and operators have moved from 2G to 3G services and have also 
deployed fiber optics in the whole country. In spite of this achievements and technology 
evolution, the current interconnection rates have been seen as the bottleneck to the sector’s 
growth in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. In the interviews, respondents also 
confirmed that the interconnection consultative review of 2006 turned out effective because 
Rate Fair and Reasonable 
N=16 
Unfair and 
Unreasonable 
N=16 
Mobile 
Interconnection rate 
5 
 
11  
Fixed 
interconnection rate 
 
0 
 
2 
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the consultant and the regulator did not put new technology into consideration. PR2-RURA 
asserted that:  
“…some operators complain that the interconnection rates that prevail today are too 
high…this is because technological evolution and other forms of interconnection (i.e 
termination from fixed network to VoIP, from mobile networks to VoIP or vice versa etc) 
were not taken into consideration during the previous interconnection costing study”.   
As it is explained in this quote, the majority of respondents all lamented that current mobile 
rate is too high to encourage competition in the Rwandan telecommunication market. PR2-
RURA further explained that this could be the reason why small mobile operators in the 
market have failed to fulfil the licence obligations such as upgrading the networks to enhance 
good quality of services in the market. In conjunction with this, PRI-Rwandatel asserted that  
“…Rfw.40 is too high to encourage competition in the market…it is a biased rate 
 because it was determined based only on MTN-Rwandacell’s information”.   
Small operators (TIGO-Rwanda and Rwandatel) strongly argue that the mobile incumbent’s 
incentive is to make sure that the rate is in favour of it. Hence they described the current rate 
as biased based on the ground that it was determined using only MTN-Rwandatel’s 
information.  This is why in the previous section most of the respondents from Rwandetel and 
TIGO Rwanda asserted that the current regime only favours MTN-Rwandacell. Therefore, 
they further said that RURA should always be vigilant with the consultants because they can 
easily be influenced by the incumbent operators during the interconnection market review. To 
share light on this, PR1-RDB explained that 
“…Rfw.40 and Rfw.30 are not fair and not reasonable because they were calculated 
 using an inappropriate cost-based regime”.  
Rwanda development board (RDB) perceives that the current interconnection rate is not fair 
and not reasonable. However, during the interview they highlighted that problem is not the 
incumbent’s influence or lack of information from the incumbent’s per se but also an 
inappropriate current cost-based regime. RURA also concurs with this perception and has 
called for the review on the current interconnection rates. To underpin this, PR2-RURA 
further said that 
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“…RURA has announced to review the current interconnection rates….because the 
 current interconnection fee of Rfw.40 per call is considered too high by operators with 
 small market share.”    
This is evidence to show that the current interconnection rate is not fair and not reasonable to 
enhance efficiency and effective competition in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. 
Most of the pending interconnection disputes can all be attributed to the failure to bring the 
interconnection rates at an efficient level.   
Despite arguments by Rwandatel and TIGO- Rwanda that the current access rate is too high, 
respondents from MTN-Rwandacell seem to contend against this argument. They argue that 
the current mobile interconnection rate (Rfw.40) is fair and reasonable. PR4-
MTNRwandacell highlighted that  
“…it [Frw.40] is a fair and reasonable interconnection rate...recommended by RURA
  and calculated by benchmarking approach”.  
Based on the fact that it was determined under the supervision of RURA and nothing RURA 
has done to address its unfairness since 2006, MTN-Rwandacell believes that it is an efficient 
level of interconnection rate. MTN-Rwandacell further said that the current was determined 
based on the EAC interconnection rates benchmark. Furthermore, PR2- MTN-Rwandacell 
said that  
“…Rfw.40 is Fair and reasonable. MTN-Rwandacell has made significant investment 
 in the network. Therefore the costing model should give incentives to recover its sunk 
 cost”.  
To underpin it further, PR1-MTNRwandacell also explained that:   
              “… the current interconnection fees are based on the investment made and the cost 
 incurred in the transfer of calls from network to another…in otherwords the fee is 
 justified by the level of investment a telecom company puts in the operations”.  
Respondents from MTN-Rwandacell highlighted that the level of interconnection depends on 
how much the operators have invested and the cost incurred to transfer calls to competitor’s 
network. Based on how MTN-Rwandacell has been able to recoup all the money it has 
invested in building networks, they strongly perceive the current rate as an efficient rate in 
the Rwandan telecoms market.   
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In summary, the perception from small operators that Rfw.40 is too high to encourage 
competition answers the critical question 2 which probes how the current interconnection 
regime has affected the Rwandan telecommunication sector. However, MTN-Rwandacell’s 
perception that Rfw.40 is an efficient rate and that it has enabled the company to be efficient 
in the market shows that small operators’ perception per se is not sufficient to address the 
critical research question 2 of the study. Therefore in the subsection this chapter further 
presents the results obtained from the subtheme, too low interconnection rate, which emerged 
during the data collection.   
5.4.3.2 Too low interconnection rate  
In the fixed market, only 2 out of 16 respondents from Rwandatel were able to share their 
views on the fairness and reasonableness of the current fixed interconnection rate.  PRI-
Rwandatel responded that: 
           ...the current fixed rate is unfair and unreasonable…it is too low…this is because RURA 
thinks that building a fixed network is less costly than building a mobile network. But in 
reality building fixed network is as costly as building mobile network.   
Rwandatel argued that it has not been efficient as it had expected in the fixed market because 
of too low fixed interconnection rate, Rfw.30, that was determined by RURA in 2006. PR4-
Rwandatel attributes Rwandatel’s inefficiency to uncertainty of RURA about the dynamics of 
fixed market business. He said that fixed business was the only pivotal business for 
Rwandatel but the company now is on verge to insolvency. PR1-RDB also explained that the 
fact that MTN-Rwandacell and TIGO Rwanda never complain about the fairness of the 
current fixed rate could be the clear evidence to portray that Rfw.30 is as low as possible.   
 
In the mobile market, despite the advocacy of TIGO-Rwanda for reduction of the current 
MTN-Rwandacell’s mobile interconnection rate, respondents from MTN-Rwandacell also 
argue that TIGORwanda’s interconnection rate is too low to encourage investment and delays 
facility based competition. PRI-MTNRwandacell responded that “MTN-Rwandacell reported 
TIGO-Rwanda to RURA that its current interconnection rate is too low to encourage 
investment in the market”.   They further said TIGO Rwanda’s access rate is not based on any 
of the known international interconnection guidelines and that they are uncertain about the 
interconnection regime this rate is based on. Therefore the regulator should take drastic 
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measures before companies become inefficient and fail to meet their license obligations they 
said. However PRI-RDB highlighted that:        
                        “...the fairness of interconnection rates depends on the cost structures and on whether  
                        customers are actually calling and the level of competition . It also depends on the    
                       advances on technology…” .  
He further expounded that the level of investment in technology is now high, therefore it is a 
high time for RURA to call for a change of the existing interconnection regime in order to 
determine efficient interconnection rate that will promote service-based competition in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector.  
In a nutshell, the previous section portrayed the contention between small operators and the 
mobile incumbent due to current exorbitant mobile interconnection rates.   As the result they 
advocate for the reduction of the current interconnection rate to a reasonable and fair level. 
However, MTN-Rwandacell also argues that TIGO Rwanda’s interconnection rate is too low 
to encourage investment and facility-based competition. Therefore it advocates for 
interconnection review on TIGO Rwanda’s wholesale market. In the fixed market, Rwandatel 
also argues that Rfw.30 is too low to encourage investment. It also advocates for an increase 
of the current Rwandan fixed interconnection rate. These results are relevant to the 
understanding of how the current interconnection regime has affected the telecommunication 
market- which is the critical question 2 of this study, however, it is also noteworthy to know 
that the level of interconnection rate is not the only factor that affects the market efficiency 
and effective competition. With respect to this, the researcher was prompted to ask whether 
the current interconnection regime is fair or needs modification. This was specifically to 
know whether the current regime is worth a change. Therefore the next subsection presents 
the results obtained from the above interview question.    
5.4.5 CHANGE OF THE CURRENT INTERCONNECTION REGIME   
The results presented above clearly showcased that the level of interconnection rate depends 
on many factors. The majority of respondents said that it depends on the advanced 
technology, the level of competition and the level of investments in the telecommunication 
sector. As a result PR1-RURA said that   “…RURA cannot only rely on the operator’s 
arguments to change the current interconnection regime”. With repect to this assertion, it was 
worthwhile for the researcher to ask the next interview question to probe whether the current 
76 
 
interconnection regime is fair or needs modification in the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector. The Table 5.3 below depicts results obtained from the above mentioned interview 
question.    
Table 5. 3: Is the current interconnection regime fair or needs modification? 
 
Fair and need 
modification 
N=16 
Not Fair and 
need 
modification 
N=16 
Fair and no need 
for modification 
N=16 
Not Fair and 
no need for 
modification 
N=16 
 
 
Interconn
ection 
Regime 
 
1 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
According to the Table 5.3 above, the data on this particular question were presented based 
on the four categories of responses. Firstly, respondents who asserted that the current 
interconnection pricing regime is fair but needs modification. Secondly, respondents who 
asserted that it is fair and needs not modification. Then, respondents who declared that it is 
not fair therefore it needs modification. Finally, only one respondent, being in the minority, 
said that it is not fair but does not need modification.  
The overwhelming number (11 out of 16) of respondents asserted that the current 
interconnection regime is unfair and needs modification. Most of these respondents are from 
Rwandatel, TIGO Rwanda and RURA.  Several arguments against the appropriateness of the 
current interconnection regime between small mobile operators and the mobile incumbent are 
still echoed in this section.  PR3-Rwandatel responded that  
“…the current regime is unfair and needs modification …because 80% of the 
 company’s mobile traffic goes to MTN-Rwandacell and the company is making 
 profits for MTN-Rwandacell”.  
Respondents from Rwandatel explained that since the launch of GSM the company has never 
been able to make profits as 50% of the operating cost of the company is allocated to 
interconnection fee per year. They further said that because of the delays in changing the 
interconnection regime the company has failed to pay $ 3.4 m to MTN-Rwandacell for 
interconnection fee.  In short, they said that Rwandatel has been doing business for MTN-
Rwandacell. In addition, PR1-TIGORwanda also affirmed that: 
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“…the regime is unfair and need modification because TIGO Rwanda is not making 
 any profits due to exorbitant interconnection charges that cannot make the business 
 flourish”.  
Respondents from TIGO Rwanda also lamented that they are encountering more challenges 
in getting a foothold in the market because of the exorbitant interconnection rate MTN-
Rwandacell is charging them. They further said that the current interconnection regime is a 
deadlock for their business to flourish. One respondent said that for a RURA to level a 
playing field the current interconnection regime should be changed.  In the interviewee 
respondents from RURA also concurred with the perception of respondents from Rwandatel 
and TIGO Rwanda on this matter. PR1-RURA asserted that  
“…the current interconnection regime is unfair and needs to be changed….because it 
 has been a bottleneck to the growth of the Rwandan telecommunication sector”. 
All respondents from the regulator share the same view that the current interconnection is 
supposed to be changed. They said that technology has changed and yet the interconnection 
consultative review of 2006 did not put it into consideration. It is due to this reason why 
RURA with the help of RCIP through the World Bank have hired Pricewaterhouse Cooper 
consultancy firm to carry out a second interconnection cost study on both operators. They 
further explained that based on this study outcome, the Regulator will be able to determine 
whether it can reduce the rates or not. But the majority of RURA’s respondents confirmed 
that there is a more likelihood for the current Rfw.40 to be brought down to Rfw.20.  
Interestingly, one respondent from MTN-Rwandacell also aligned himself with the above 
consensus, however, his main reason was that the current regime does not address 
infrastructure issues 
“…it [current interconnection regime] is not fair and needs modification because 
 MTN was forced to share sites with TIGO-Rwanda and Rwandatel” (PR3-
 Rwandatel).  
However, RURA’s respondents explained that the regulator has to make a wise decision 
because MTN-Rwandacell wants to maintain high interconnection fee in order to recoup its 
previous investments, at the same time TIGO Rwanda and Rwandatel the current to be 
brought down to a lower level that can enable them compete effectively with MTN-
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Rwandacell. They further said that if RURA fails to make right decision operators may get 
discouraged to invest in network infrastructure.      
As it has been highlighted from above, respondents from MTN-Rwandacell their pursuit is to 
maintain the current interconnection rate.  Significant respondents from MTN-Rwandacell 
strongly argued that the current interconnection regime is fair and needs no modification. 
Their explanation was that the regime is enabling them to recover all the investments they 
have made in building network infrastructure and that it has enabled other operators such as 
TIGO Rwanda to join the market and RURA is in a process to license the fourth operator.    
“…An appropriate regime is the one that enables stakeholders to recoup their 
 investment…therefore I find it fair because MTN is been able to recover its sunk 
 cost” (PR3-MTNRwandacell).   
“… It enabled the TIGO-Rwanda, the new entrant, to participate in the market” (PR2-
 MTNRwandacell).  
Respondents from TIGO Rwanda affirmed that the company is sharing infrastructure site 
with MTN-Rwandacell. However, they further said that the regulator should make the 
infrastructure sharing simpler and more cost-effective for all operators in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.  
In sum, a significant number of respondents advocated for the change of the current 
interconnection regime. They argued that it has deterred efficiency and effective competition 
in the market. However, respondents from MTN-Rwandacell contested against this 
perception. They strongly argued that the current regime has enabled the company to recoup 
its sunk cost and enabled new entrants in the mobile market. RURA aligns itself with small 
mobile operators’ perception. However, respondents highlighted that RURA to determine an 
appropriate regime that will ensure efficient level of interconnection that will be acceptable to 
all operators. Based on the results above, MTN-Rwandacell wants to maintain high 
interconnection fee for it to recover its investment, at the same time, TIGO Rwanda and 
Rwandatel want lower interconnection fee for them to effectively compete in the market.  
The argument of the overwhelming (70%) majority that the current interconnection regime is 
not fair and needs to be changed contributes to the answering of the overarching question and 
critical question 2 of this study which probes to know whether the current interconnection 
regime has achieved its intended objectives of market efficiency in the Rwandan 
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telecommunication sector. However to understand why it seem to have failed to achieve its 
intended objective as shown from the above results, the researcher asked the question to 
probe the challenges the current interconnection regime might have faced in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. Therefore the next section presents results obtained from the 
interview questions that probed to determine the challenges the current interconnection 
regime has faced in Rwanda.   
5.5 CHALLENGES FACING THE CURRENT INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN 
RWANDA   
In the previous section it was apparent that focusing on the current interconnection regime 
alone is not the only panacea of the interconnection disputes in Rwanda. Therefore in this 
section the researcher presents the challenges that may have deterred the existing 
interconnection pricing regime and how they have affected its effectiveness in the sector.   
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2 present results obtained from the interview questions that attempted 
to probe the challenges the current interconnection regime have faced in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. 
Table 5.4: Regulatory capacity, information asymmetry, regulatory independence, and 
policy instruments 
CHALLENGES                     RESPONDENTS  
 MTN      RWANDATEL  TIGO RURA Percentage 
(%) 
Policy Instruments  3 3 2 3 91% 
Regulatory 
Capacity  
3 3 2 2 83% 
Regulatory 
Independence  
    2  4 2 1         75%      
Information 
Asymmetry  
1 4 1 1         58% 
  
 
Furthermore the Figure 5.2 below illustrates the frequency of each challenge as raised by the 
interviewees during the interviews.    
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Figure 5. 2: Frequency of each challenge as raised by the Interviewees 
 
 
 
5.5.1 LACK OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
According to the table 5.4 the overwhelming number (91%) of respondents indicated that the 
regulator has no sufficient policy instruments to address interconnection regulation issues. 
Therefore the next subsection presents policy tools that were claimed to be missing in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector.  
5.5.1.1 Dominant player framework  
 The average number of respondents asserted that RURA lacks a dominant player framework. 
PR1-RURA responded that “…lack of the law to determine the dominant operators and non-
dominant operators has also affected the current interconnection regime “. He explained that 
the uncertainty about the dominant player in the market has lead to high cross-network tariffs. 
Respondents from Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda said that they are suffering because of 
policy tools deficit in the sector. They explained that in other countries such as Kenya 
through a clearly and comprehensive dominant player framework, asymmetric 
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interconnection regulation to incentivize new entrants to compete with incumbents or 
dominant operators has been implemented. But in Rwanda this has been not possible due to 
the absence of a clear and comprehensive dominant player framework in place they 
explained.    
5.5.1.2 Infrastructure sharing framework   
As a significant number of respondents stated that the main challenge in Rwanda is lack of a 
clear and comprehensive infrastructure sharing framework. PR1-MTNRwandacell responded 
that “…MTN-Rwandacell was forced by RURA to share its sites with TIGO-Rwanda and 
Rwandatel”. He further said that Rwanda needs an infrastructure sharing framework that is 
simpler and cost-effective to promote facility based competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market. RURA respondents also affirmed that inasmuch as RURA longs 
to licence another fourth operator, infrastructure sharing policy should be drafted beforehand.   
5.5.1.3 Dispute resolution mechanism  
An average number of respondents asserted that RURA lacks a comprehensive and clear 
dispute resolution mechanism. PR2-Rwandatel respondents argued that:  
             “…lack of dispute resolution mechanism has put small telecoms companies in Rwanda on 
the verge to insolvency due to disputes that have taken so long without being solved by 
RURA” 
He explained that Rwandatel at this point is at the edge to collapse in the mobile business 
market due to pending interconnection disputes RURA has been putting on hold.  He said that 
the more the regulator fails to solve disputes on-time the more industries lose and the more 
customers are serviced with poor quality of services.  PRI-MTNRwandacell also lamented 
that “…MTN-Rwandacell reported TIGO-Rwanda to RURA for charging too low 
interconnection charges but RURA has done nothing to solve the matter…”.  He explained 
that if RURA keeps being indecisive about this matter, some operators will collapse due to 
low revenue and lack of funds to fuel network expansion and growth of sector. He further 
said massive job losses and poor quality of services will be inevitable if not otherwise.  
5.5.2 Regulatory capacity  
According to the Table 5.4 above, a significant number (83%) of respondents declared that 
there is lack of regulatory capacity in the Rwandan regulatory environment. They attributed 
the failure of interconnection regimes in Rwanda to RURA’s incapacity. For instance, they 
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asserted that TELRIC-regime did not enhance efficiency because RURA was not capable of 
knowing whether the network access costs are actual or not. Interestingly PRI-
MTNRwandacell explained that operators’ experts are more knowledgeable in the matters 
related to interconnection regulation than RURA’s staff that are still new and have no 
experience in the field of interconnection regulation. In fact most of the staff in the regulator 
are fresh graduates and they are still in a learning process he said. In addition, PR2-
Rwandatel further uttered that:  
             “ …the challenge industries are facing is that consultants when they come up with 
 inappropriate rates… you find that the  regulator is not in a position  to contradict 
 them due to lack of enough regulatory experts to follow-up the cost  interconnection 
 study and examine the relevancy of the decisions  and outcomes of the process”.     
He further explained that RURA should recruit experts with hands-on experience in 
interconnection regulation who can challenge the consultants and experts from the industries. 
5.5.3 RURA’S INDEPENDENCE IN INTERCONNECTION REGULATION  
The results obtained from the interview questions that sought to probe the independence of 
RURA in interconnection regulation were presented based on the responses that attended to 
RURA’s independence from government, RURA’s independence from the 
telecommunication industries and RURA’s independence in decision making. The table 5.4 
below illustrates the results obtained.     
      Table 5. 5: RURA’s Independence in regulating interconnection 
 Independence 
from 
Government 
N=12  
Independence 
from industries. 
N=12 
Independence 
in decision 
making. N=12 
Solving 
interconnection 
rate disputes 
      0=2    
      1=7   
     0=8  
    1= 2  
0=3  
1=7 
1=Higher degree of independence, 0=Lower degree of independence 
According to the table above, a significant number (7 out of 12) of respondents highlighted 
that RURA is free from government’s influence in processes related to solving 
interconnection rate disputes.  These results guarantee independence in decision making. 
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Thus, 7 out of 12 confirmed that RURA is independent in decision making in solving 
interconnection rate disputes. PR2–MTNRwandacell responded that “RURA has been 
independent in the decision making regarding resolving interconnection disputes”. He further 
explained that RURA has been innovative in improving interconnection regulation by 
resolving interconnection disputes. He said, for instance, MTN-Rwandacell had planned to 
disconnect Rwandatel’s switch because of the outstanding interconnectivity fee it owes 
MTN-Rwandacell, however, RURA intervened and shelved the plan.  Conversely, some 
respondents contend against PR2–MTNRwandacell’s view. They argue that a batch of 
interconnection disputes that are still pending in the Rwandan telecommunication sector is an 
example of RURA’s lack of independence in solving disputes. Furthermore, PR1-Rwandatel 
responded that“…RURA is independent but they are influenced by the government in making 
decisions regarding setting interconnection rates…”. He further explained that independence 
of the regulator from the government in setting interconnection is a crucial challenge in most 
of East African countries including Rwanda. He gave an example that the President of Kenya 
Mwai Kibaki halted KCC, the national regulator, from cutting the interconnection rates in 
Kenyan telecommunication sector. This demonstrates how operators have more influence in 
the government than the regulator he said.     
 According to Table 5.5 above, the significant majority (8 out of 12) of respondents 
highlighted that RURA has a lower degree of independence from telecommunication 
industries in solving interconnection disputes. In the interview, Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda 
respondents share the same view that in setting interconnection rates the regulator is not fully 
independent from the influence of the mobile incumbent 
“…MTN still has a strong lobbying in the country” (PRI-TIGORwanda).  
“…Rfw.40 is biased…because MTN lobbied the consultant” (PR3-Rwandatel).  
They said that MTN-Rwandacell as an innovation telecommunication challenger and an 
incumbent in the mobile market has been lobbying for high interconnection rates in the sector 
since 2003. They further asserted that RURA should also be careful when using consultants 
because they can easily be influenced by the industry.  On the other hand, MTN-Rwandacell 
respondents also claimed that TIGO Rwanda has been lobbying for the cutting of 
interconnection rates in the Rwandan interconnection sector.  PR1-MTNRwandecel 
highlighted that  
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“…since TIGO-Rwanda launched its operations in Rwanda it has been lobbying for 
 the reduction of the current interconnection rate in the regulator”.   
He explained that RURA has to be vigilant to new entrants because their main incentive is 
always to advocate for the reduction of rates yet when it causes other operators to incur huge 
losses in the market.  They cited that Kenya Communication Commission (KCC) was taken 
to court by the mobile incumbent due frequent reduction of interconnection rate that was 
always proposed by the new mobile entrants in the market. The responses from operators 
show that lack of regulatory independence from the telecommunication industries contributed 
to the ineffectiveness of the current interconnection regime. This answers sub question three 
of the study.  
5.5.4 LACK OF INFORMATION  
All respondents from RURA asserted that the main challenge is lack of sufficient information 
from the industry operators. In the MTN-Rwandacell cost interconnection study report 2006 
the consultant said that” …lack of information to fill the models has rendered the evaluation 
of interconnection cost difficult” (ICEA, 2006). Furthermore, in Rwandatel’s report he also 
reported that he made a lot of estimations because of lack of information on the detailed 
structure of traffic. As a result, Rwandatel’s respondents strongly argued that RURA is 
uncertain about the dynamics of fixed market. RURA thinks that building a fixed network is 
less expensive than a mobile network. They further said that in reality building fixed network 
is as costly as building mobile networks. Conclusively an average number of respondents 
share the same view that the current interconnection regime TELRIC-regime failed because 
the consultant was not able to get detailed information from Rwandatel and MTN-
Rwandacell.  
5.6 REGULATORY MEASURES TO IMPROVE INTERCONNECTION REGULATION 
IN RWANDA    
The challenges identified in the previous section prompted the researcher to probe what could 
be appropriate approaches or strategies RURA can adopt to improve interconnection 
regulation in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.   This subsection presents approaches 
and strategies that were proposed by operators and researchers in the Rwanda telecoms 
market. This answers sub-question 4 of the study.    
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5.6.1 Reduction of mobile interconnection charge  
Respondents from Rwandatel, TIGO Rwanda and RURA proposed for the reduction of 
mobile interconnection rate in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. PR3-Rwandatel 
asserted that: 
            “...as Rwandatel, we welcome all attempts to lower the mobile interconnection 
 charges… this will allow consumers the flexibility to enjoy the current ‘minute Glut’ 
 [more minutes available than the consumers can consume] in the market”.   
He further explained that if RURA reduces the current mobile interconnection rate, operators 
in the market will not be worrying about the off-net interconnection rate as a bottleneck 
again. He further said that low interconnection rate will be very beneficial to subscribers and 
the general public. To affirm this, RURA also believes that bringing down the current 
interconnection rate will give a room to adjust pricing because at this stage operators are not 
able to charge below Rfw.40 in the market. He further said that RURA should do what 
regulators in Kenya and Uganda did. He said that KCC halved the interconnection to 50% 
and this forced the operators to cut call rates by an average of 60 per cent. In Uganda, UCC 
slashed to Shs131 and this has also forced operators to drop calls to an average of shs.200 per 
minute he said.      
5.6.2 An increase in fixed interconnection charge  
Rwandatel respondents all proposed for an increase on the current fixed interconnection rate. 
They argue that the current interconnection rate has not enabled the company to recover from 
access deficit. Access deficit it means that Rwandatel is not able to recover the average cost 
of servicing a line through its base subscription charges.  PRI-Rwandatel said that RURA 
should set the rate that will not only allow Rwandatel to recover its access deficit but also its 
universal service obligations. Though technology is becoming cheaper, the cost of fixed 
network elements have gone up he said.  
5.6.3 Asymmetric interconnection regulation  
Respondents from TIGO-Rwanda and Rwandatel highlighted that lack of regulatory 
incentives affected their performance in the market. As a result they proposed for an 
asymmetric interconnection regulation.  They explained that under this regulation, dominant 
operators pay highest interconnection call charges while non-dominant operators pay lowest 
charges, hence allowing him to price his cross-network charges much lower than any other 
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operator. This will minimize subsidies, attract serious bidders and increase investment for the 
rural operators in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.    
5.6.4 Mobile number portability  
In the interview respondents from Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda shared the same view that 
establishment of mobile number portability will improve competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market. PR1-Rwandatel responded that“…we [Rwandatel] expect the 
immigration of customers from one operator to another...this will improve competition in the 
market“. He further explained that a good number of subscribers in the Rwandan telecoms 
market are very reluctant to shift from one service provider to another due to the expected 
inconvenience that comes with getting a new phone number and inform all their friends.  He 
said that in Rwanda more people have more than one SIM cards, yet this increases the 
revenue. This will be solved by the implementation of number portability in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector, he said.    
5.7 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
Four themes: the existing interconnection regime, efficiency of the existing interconnection 
regime, challenges facing the current interconnection regime and strategies that can improve 
the interconnection regulation in Rwanda were addressed in this chapter. Results relating to 
the perception on the adoption and implementation of cost-based methodologies; FAC, 
COSITU and TELRIC were presented which revealed the existing interconnection regime in 
principle and practice in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. This answered the sub- 
question 1 of the study: What is the existing interconnection pricing regime in Rwanda?  
Secondly, the results on the effectiveness of level of current TELRIC-rates (Rfw.40 for 
mobile and Rfw.30 for fixed telephony) in ensuring efficiency and effective competition 
related to the second theme of this study were revealed. This showed that the current mobile 
TELRIC-based rate is too high to encourage competition in the market and the current fixed 
TELRIC-rate is too low to encourage efficiency in the Rwanda telecoms market. As a result, 
it was further revealed that the TELRIC-regime is unfair and need to be changed. This 
demonstrated the degree at which the existing interconnection regime has affected the 
Rwandan telecommunication market. Thus, this answered the sub- question 2 of the study: 
How has the current interconnection pricing regulation affected the Rwandan 
telecommunication market?  
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Thirdly, the results related to the third theme of the study, the challenges facing the existing 
interconnection regime; lack of policy instruments, information asymmetry, lack of 
regulatory capacity and lack of RURA’s independence from the telecommunication industries 
in solving interconnection disputes were also presented. It was revealed that operator’s 
experts are more knowledgeable in interconnection regulation than RURA’s employees. 
Furthermore, the results presented that lack of SMP and Infrastructure framework in place, 
and information uncertainty between operators and RURA affected the effectiveness of the 
current interconnection regime. These results answered sub-question 3 of the study: What 
challenges facing the current interconnection pricing regulation in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market?   
Finally approaches and strategies such as  asymmetric interconnection regulation, reduction 
of the current mobile interconnection rate, increase on the fixed current interconnection and 
mobile number portability recommended by the respondents addressed  the fourth theme of 
this study which answer the sub-question 4 of this study: What are approaches and strategies  
can be adopted to improve interconnection pricing regulation in Rwanda? 
In general, the results have revealed that the current interconnection pricing regime is 
characterized by an inappropriate level of interconnection rates that can ensure effective 
competition and innovation. However, the results has shown that this ineffectiveness should 
not be attributed to TELRIC-regime but also other factors such as lack of  RURA’s 
independence from telecoms operator and information asymmetry. Thus, the results revealed 
in whole chapter answered the overarching question of the study: How has interconnection 
pricing regulation impacted the Rwandan telecommunication sector?  The link between these 
findings, the research question and literature theories will be discussed in the next Chapter 6 
of the study.    
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CHAPTER SIX: THE IMPACT OF COST-BASED 
INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN RWANDA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the previous chapter five of this study, the researcher presented the findings by describing 
RURA’s and operators’ perceptions on the regulation of interconnection in Rwanda. Since 
descriptive data do not make sense without interpretation, this chapter draws together results 
from chapter five, relating them to the study research aims and questions and literature 
review in chapter 2 & 3. Section 6.2 focuses on the first theme of the study, the existing 
interconnection regime in Rwanda. Section 6.3 discusses findings relating to the second 
theme, the efficiency of the existing interconnection regime in the Rwandan telecoms market. 
Section 6.4 draws together challenges the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda is 
facing (the third theme of the study). Section 6.5 discusses the findings relating to the fourth 
theme of this study, strategies and approaches RURA can adopt in order to improve the 
interconnection regulation in Rwanda. Section 6.7 is a summary of the chapter.  
6.2 THE EXISTING INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN RWANDA  
After the 1994 genocide the Rwandan telecommunication sector has grown significantly from 
a monopoly to an oligopoly. It is made up of three mobile and fixed operators. These include 
MTN-Rwandacell (incumbent mobile and fixed operator), TIGO-Rwanda S.A (second 
mobile and fixed operator) and Rwandatel(incumbent fixed and a third mobile 
operator).Therefore for us to understand the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda we 
need to first understand the access pricing model that is relevant to the Rwandan 
telecommunication market. In the mobile market, the findings revealed that all three 
operators are interconnected and they all buy inputs from each other’s network. This aligns 
with Armstrong’s (2001) theory of two-way access pricing model. He defines two-way 
access pricing model as a model where operator B (incumbent) and operator A (small 
operator) have to purchase inputs from each other. He further explains that under this model 
for operators to interconnect they have to enter into an interconnection agreement on terms 
and conditions, especially access charges. This means that all mobile interconnection 
regulation issues that will be discussed in this chapter will be categorized under two-way 
access pricing model problems.   
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In the fixed market, it was revealed that TIGO-Rwanda and MTN-Rwandacell buy inputs 
from Rwandatel but not vice versa. This aligns with Armstrong’s (2001) theory of one-way 
access pricing model. He defines one-way access pricing model as a model where an operator 
B buys all inputs from operator B not vice versa. However, except the argument from 
Rwandatel that the current fixed termination rate is not efficient no other issues were raised in 
the findings from its competitors. Therefore this chapter will interpret most of the findings on 
the grounds of two-way access pricing principle.  
Under two-way access pricing model, Armstrong (2001) expounds that the main issue is that 
can free negotiations between operator B and operator A over mutual termination charges 
induce high prices for subscribers. The findings revealed that in Rwanda before telecoms 
reform of 2001, the negotiation of interconnection prices and terms among telecom operators 
without the intervention of the regulator or competition policy institution turned out to be 
ineffective. The findings depicted that in 2003 the interconnection agreement between 
Rwandatel and MTN-Rwandacell failed and resulted into a serious interconnection dispute 
that affected the welfare of their customers.   During the hearings of 2003, MTN-Rwandacell 
argued that the rate (Rfw.48) which they had agreed on amicably was too high to encourage 
competition in the market. This aligns with Wright’s (2000) and Laffont et al.’s (1998) 
arguments. Wright (2000) argues that under unregulated agreements, the incumbent always 
has incentives to charge too high access charges. Laffont et al. (1998) also argue that access 
rate resulted from unregulated negotiations can lead to market failure.  Di Pillo et al. (2009) 
attribute the issues of high interconnection charges in the telecoms market to the caller party 
pay (CPP) scheme that has been taken as a one-size for all in developing countries. In the 
light of this, the finding revealed that Rwanda uses caller party pays (CPP) pricing principle. 
In other words, when subscriber A of MTN-Rwandacell calls another subscriber B of MTN-
Rwandacell or subscriber of Rwandatel or TIGO-Rwanda, subscriber A is the one who will 
pay all the charges. This is predominately used in all East African countries.   
Despite CPP being a one-size for all in East African countries, Di Pillo et al.’s (2009) further 
explain that CPP produces incentives for larger operators to lower the prices on-net calls and 
increase the charges of off-net calls in order to drive the small network operator out of the 
market. In light of this, the finding further revealed that in interconnection negotiation of 
1998, Rwandatel used its monopoly power to bargain too high access charges (Rfw.48) in 
order to drive MTN-Rwandacell, the new operator by then, out of the market. This distorted 
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the market and affected the welfare of their customers. This is a clear evidence to show that 
free interconnection negotiation induced high charges to subscribers and has been accrue to 
interconnection rate dispute in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.    
The findings revealed that the government of Rwanda decided to address the issue of high 
interconnection charges by regulating the Rwandan telecommunication sector. Cave et 
al.(2003) supports  this decision when he explains that many countries such as UK, Australia, 
Uganda, New Zealand to mention a few are using CPP regime and the issue of high 
interconnection charges has been addressed by regulation in the telecommunication industry.  
According to RURA (2004), RURA was granted a mandate to facilitate a successful 
conclusion of interconnection agreements and to impose interconnection terms on both 
parties which are objective, non-discriminatory and transparent in case negotiations fail. 
However, Cave and Crowther (2004) contest against this decision by highlighting that sector 
specific approach requires large flow of information from the regulated entity when it comes 
to imposing interconnection terms. Instead, they campaign for competition policy approach. 
They explain that competition policy requires no information from the operators but just 
relies on the complaints and gathers information only in connection with enforcement 
agencies. However, Spiller and Cardilli (2007) align with Cave et al. (2003) in supporting 
Rwanda’s decision. Taking Australia as an example, they explained that specific regulations 
have been quite successful in delivering both competitive interconnection rates and a smooth 
implementation of equal access.   
The finding further demonstrated that after the break-up of interconnection negotiation 
between MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel in 2003, RURA in accordance to its mandate 
intervened and imposed the interim asymmetric interconnection charges of Rfw.28 per call 
on both networks while it was in the process of hiring a consultant to carry out a cost-based 
interconnection review on both MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel’s networks. The aim of this 
review was to determine an appropriate interconnection regime that can enhance an efficient 
level of interconnection rates in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. This resonates with   
Pietz’s (2003) argument which states that it is not just a matter of intervening that alleviates 
the interconnection pricings issue but the commitment of the regulator to adopt a clear and 
comprehensive interconnection policy that specifies what happens when the interconnection 
negotiations fail.  However, the findings revealed that Rwanda has experienced several 
transitions of interconnection regime since 1998 due to regulatory challenges around 
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determining an appropriate regime that can ensure fair and reasonable interconnection rates.  
This resonates with Jamison’s (1998) argument that the main challenge to the regulatory 
agency is determining the regulatory principle that will not turn out to be inappropriate in the 
light of actual costs and market conditions. Therefore to understand the current existing 
interconnection regime in Rwanda, the next subsection will discuss RURA’s commitment in 
adopting an appropriate interconnection regime.  
6.2.1 COST-BASED INTERCONNECTION REGIME IN RWANDA   
The findings revealed that the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda is a cost-based 
interconnection regime. Lazauskaite (2009:6) explains that cost-based regime is a regime 
where “prices should reflect their costs plus reasonable rate and should reflect the rate of 
return which operators are allowed to earn”.  With this respect, RURA (2004) expounds that 
Rwanda through RURA adopted cost-based access principle in order to determine the level of 
interconnection rate that can ensure efficiency and effective competition in the market 
(RURA, 2004). RURA’s respondents explained that cost-orientation ensures allocative and 
productive efficiency in the telecommunication sector. Cave and Prosperetti (2001) support 
RURA’s choice by arguing for cost-based pricing principle as an effective remedy that can 
enhance efficiency and incentive compatible. Respondents from RURA further highlighted 
that cost-based regime is relevant to Rwanda because there is no enough information 
available. In conjunction with this, Jamison (1998) highlights that cost-based access principle 
is an appropriate pro-competitive remedy relevant to countries where there is no information 
available to the regulatory agency. However, Wright et al. (2006) suggest that for cost-based 
principle to be effective the regulator should choose and implement an appropriate backward-
looking or forward-looking cost-based approach to encourage the incumbent to invest earlier.   
Nevertheless the findings demonstrate that despite RURA’s commitment to adopt appropriate 
backward-looking or forward-looking approaches, cost based principle has failed to ensure 
access of new entrants to incumbents’ network at fair and reasonable interconnection rates. 
However, this was attributed to lack of RURA’s capacity to choose an appropriate cost-based 
model and implement it effectively. This resonates with Salinger’s (1998) assertion that cost-
based models may theoretically be sound, but their implementation in practice is rather 
complex.  Based on the understanding of the existing interconnection approaches in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector, the figure 6.1 shows the analytical framework that 
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explains the contention behind the implementation of cost-based approaches in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.    
Figure 6. 1:Analytical framework of the current interconnection regime 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          In Practice7          In Principle8           Not in Practice 9          Not in Principle10  
Figure 6.1 above shows that RURA adopted FAC cost-based methodology. This is a model 
that was developed by ITU for calculating the costs, rates and taxes relating to telephony 
services. The model is based on the enhanced fully allocated costing (FAC) principle. It also 
illustrates that FAC is the regime which RURA claims to be in principle in the Rwandan 
telecoms sector. However the findings depicted that it is in practice in Rwandatel only.  This 
aligns with Nsengiyumva and Habumuremyi’s (2009) assertion that Rwanda’s current 
interconnection rule is in principle but not in practice.  
Secondly, according to the figure 6.1 above, RURA adopted Total Element Long-Run 
Increment Cost (TELRIC)-regime. The finding revealed that TERLIC-regime was adopted to 
complement FAC. However, TELRIC-regime is not in principle but in practice in MTN-
Rwandacell and Rwandatel.  Lastly, according to the figure 6.1 above neither TERLIC nor 
FAC is in practice or principle in TIGO-Rwanda. These inconsistencies in the 
                                                                 
7 In practice means that the model is being used  
8 In principle means that the model is advocated by the policy   
9 Not in practice means not being used.  
10 Not in principle means not advocated by the policy  
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implementation of the current cost-based regime demonstrate how complex it has been for 
RURA to execute interconnection regime effectively. This is also explained by Salinger 
(1998) that cost-based regime is theoretically sound but its implementation in practice is 
rather complex.  
However, despite inconsistencies that have been showcased above, the findings revealed that 
the current fixed and mobile interconnection rates in Rwanda are based on Total Element 
Long-Run Increment Cost (TELRIC) bottom up forward-looking approach. However, 
Magonyozi (2008) in his study on the interconnection harmonization of EAC highlighted that 
lack of effective interconnection framework has resulted into interconnection rate disputes 
between dominant operators and new entrants in the Rwandan telecommunication market. 
Therefore since this study attend to investigate whether the current interconnection regime 
has achieved its intended objectives. The next sub sections will discuss the implementation of 
TELRIC-regime in Rwanda and its impact on the Rwandan telecommunication sector.   
6.2.1.1 Implementation of TELRIC-regime in Rwanda.    
According to Falch (2004), TELRIC estimates additional costs incurred in producing 
interconnection relative to the costs already incurred by producing a portfolio of other 
services. The findings revealed that RURA implemented TELRIC approach to address FAC- 
regime’s deficiencies in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. To embrace this, Noumba et 
al.(2004) suggest that in countries where FAC has been a traditional regime, one can move to 
LRIC step by step by removing the layers of cost inefficiencies. In the light of this 
suggestion, the findings demonstrate that the consultant also decided to base on FAC 
historical costs in order to move to LRIC step by step.  The figure 6.2 below depicts the 
TELRIC methodology that was used by the consultant to calculate the current interconnection 
rates.  
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Figure 6. 2: TELRIC Methodology used to determine the current access rates 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ICEA, 2006   
According to the figure 6.2 above it appears that MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel prior the 
cost interconnection review of 2006, their accounts were based on fully allocated costs.  
RURA explained that the accounting system was on top-down method, the cost extraction 
from the operator’s accounting and bottom-up method, the computation of total costs based 
upon network elements individual costs.  Noumba et al. (2004) highlight that the difference 
between FAC and TELRIC resides in the removal of non-relevant common costs. For a clear 
explanation see the figure 6.3 below.  
Figure 6. 3: Cost elements of different cost models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Coetzee(2010)  
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According to figure 6.3, it is apparent that fully allocated cost (FAC) involves all costs or 
overhead costs. However, TELRIC, which is a type of LRIC plus mark-up, only involves 
network related joint and common costs. Joint costs are those costs generated by a family of 
services or products (e.g building costs for a telephone firm) (Noumba et al., 2004). Common 
costs are those costs that are shared by all services or products (Noumba et al., 2004). With 
respect to this, the consultant and the regulator to enhance effective interconnection 
regulation introduced a concept of pertinence of cost as illustrated in figure 6.3 above. Here 
non-pertinent costs mean those that are not related to network joints and common costs, while 
as pertinent joints and common costs mean those that are related to networks costs as the 
figure 6.3 depicts. To adjust to TELRIC historical top-down rates, the consultant removed 
non relevant costs (e.g marketing, commercial costs, financial costs for bad debts). 
Furthermore, he considered the investment costs, their economic life and not accounting life 
as shown in the figure 6.3. This aligns with Noumba et al. (2004)’s argument that one can 
move to LRIC step by step by removing cost inefficiencies.  
With respect to difficulties such as lack of detailed information from the incumbents and lack 
of enough capacity that were experienced in the course of determining TELRIC top-down 
historical, RURA with the support of ICEA consultancy firm decided to implement a 
TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking. This concurs with Noumba et al.’s (2004) suggestion 
that in countries where the regulator has no good knowledge of the industry cost structure, 
TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking should be implemented. They further underpinned that   
TELRIC bottom-up method represents a decision-making instrument that enhances 
improvements on procedures and processes implemented by regulators to collect and retrieve 
cost information.  
RURA’s decision to adopt a TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking approach is supported by a 
many scholars.  Geradin and Kerf (2003) underpin that forward-looking approach enables the 
incumbent to be efficient and reduces the actual cost that it incurs in providing 
interconnection. While as backward-looking approach gives no guarantee that an incumbent 
will recoup costs it incurs in providing interconnection. This shades light on the reason why 
Rwandatel used its market power to negotiate exorbitant access charge (Rfw.48 per call) in 
2003.  Furthermore, Falch (2005) also underpins that bottom-up approach is more preferred 
than top-down because it involves less assumptions. Lastly, ITU also supports RURA’s 
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decision by recommending bottom-up approach as the most “accurate” of measuring unit 
costs in countries where sufficient data are not available (ITU, 2003:50).  
However, the findings revealed that the interconnection evaluation process was very difficult 
due to lack of detailed information from Rwandatel and MTN-Rwandacell about network 
joints and common costs. For instance the consultant reported that he made more estimates or 
assumptions in calculating the current fixed access rate due to lack of information about the 
network traffic (ICEA, 2006). The consultant also asserted that lack of information from 
MTN-Rwandacell to fill the models rendered the evaluation of interconnection cost difficult 
(ICEA, 2006). This resonates with Noumba et al. (2004)’s argument that the concept of 
pertinence affects the handling of joints and common costs. They further highlight that when 
this concept in not effectively applied there is always a risk of overestimating the common 
fixed costs because the incumbent always has incentives to argue for high common costs to 
squeeze out its competitors by reporting non-relevant costs. In conjunction with this, Xavier 
(1997) also argues that calculating forward-looking cost often becomes challenging and time 
consuming due to the absence of reliable cost information from the incumbent.  Therefore it 
is always necessary to ensure that common costs attributed to the increment are sound. 
The findings and discussion above reveal that there are inconsistencies and controversial 
issues in the implementation of the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda. These align 
with Salinger’s (1998:28) assertion that “the use of LRIC is theoretically sound, but its 
implementation in practice is rather complex and could undermine the profitability of the 
incumbent’s investment if poorly executed”. In the light of this argument and issues 
showcased above in the implementation of the current interconnection regime, it is 
worthwhile in the next section to discuss the impact of TELRIC-regime on the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.   
6.3 IMPACT OF TELRIC REGIME ON RWANDAN TELECOM MARKET  
The findings revealed that the consultant recommended TELRIC as the approach that is 
relevant to the Rwandan telecommunication sector since all the pro-competitive regulations 
had turned out to be ineffective by then. This resonates with Melody’s (1997) assertion which 
states that TELRIC facilitates the implementation of pro-competitive policy for local 
exchange interconnection and network access for LEC competitors.  
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Although RURA had more hope in TELRIC bottom-up forward-looking approach that it 
would enhance efficiency and effective level of competition in the Rwandan telecoms 
market, the majority of the respondents highlighted that TELRIC-regime has turned out to be 
ineffective. A substantial majority (66%) of the interviewees asserted that the current 
interconnection regime is unfair and needs modification. PR3-Rwandatel lamented that the 
current interconnection costs are arbitrary. This concurs with Noumba et al.’s (2004) 
argument that selecting a specific TELRIC-regime leads to arbitrary exercise. This leads to 
the determination of inappropriate interconnection rates. However, this is contrary to Falch’s 
(2005) and ITU’s (2003) argument that bottom-up based approaches entails less estimation 
and ensure correct cost units where there is no information available.  Consequently, the 
findings revealed that the current regime has been a bottleneck to the growth of the sector.  
RURA highlighted that current interconnection regime has had a strong negative effect on the 
Rwandan level of competition and profitability of telecommunication companies. Rwandatel 
respondents lamented that 80% of the mobile traffic goes to MTN-Rwandacell. TIGO 
Rwanda further said that 50% of the company’s profit is paid to MTN-Rwandacell for 
interconnectivity.  
 
As the result, TIGO Rwanda and Rwandatel declared that they are suffering in the market 
because they are making profits for MTN-Rwandacell only. This explains why Rwandatel 
has failed to increase its mobile coverage and why it was not able to pay $ 3.4 m it owes 
MTN-Rwandacell for interconnectivity. This affirms Salinger’s (1998) argument that poor 
execution of the access regime could undermine profitability of operators’ investment. It also 
concurs with the argument of Magonyozi (2008) and Nsengiyumva and Habumuremyi 
(2009). Magonyozi (2008) argued that efficiency in the Rwandan telecoms is affected by lack 
of a comprehensive and clear interconnection framework. Nsengiyumva and Habumuremyi 
(2009) also said that competition is far from effective in the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector due to pending interconnection disputes.   
 
Respondents from RURA and RDB strongly argued that TELRIC-regime did not address 
FAC-regime’s deficiencies in the Rwandan telecommunication. They said that the current 
regime is inappropriate because the consultant that carried out the interconnection review of 
2006 did not consider technology evolution. To shade light on these arguments, Melody 
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(1997) further argues that TELRIC-regime is characterized by high termination revenue that 
provides little incentives for operators to upgrade their networks to the most efficient 
technology. In other words, this means that RURA should not have chosen TELRIC in such a 
case.   This also shared light on the reason why Rwandatel’s mobile license was revoked by 
RURA in April 2011 due to its failure to fulfil licence obligations particularly upgrading 
networks.  
However, MTN-Rwandacell’s respondents argued for the current interconnection regime as 
an effective regime. They explained that TELRIC-regime is fair because it enabled MTN-
Rwandacell to retrieve its sunk cost and TIGO-Rwanda to enter into the market. This is a 
clear evidence to show that the current interconnection regime has been favouring MTN-
Rwandacell. This aligns with Armstrong’s (2001) argument that due to incumbent’s 
incentives to ensure productivity efficiency, to maximize profits and to extract industry’s 
profits for itself most regulatory principle tend to favour the incumbent more than the small 
operators in the market.  
Nevertheless, at this stage of discussion the researcher it would be irrational to conclude that 
the current TELRIC-rates are not efficient.  The findings revealed that the efficiency of the 
level of interconnection rates does not depend on the pricing principle only but also on other 
factors. For instance, PRI-RDB said that the efficiency of the level of interconnection rate 
depends on the level of competition, cost structures and advances in technology. This concurs 
with Laffont et al.‘s (1998) argument that focusing on the cost-based on pricing principle 
alone cannot lead to positive results. 
Based on the argument above, the researcher found it worthwhile in the next subsection to 
discuss the operator’s and regulatory agency’s perception on the fairness and reasonableness 
of the current interconnection rates in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  
6.3.1 EFFICIENT LEVEL OF INTERCONNECTION RATE IN RWANDA  
Jamison (1998) and Armstrong (2001) argue that the main rationale behind adoption of 
access pricing principle is to determine a fair and reasonable interconnection charge that can 
enhance efficiency and competition in the market.  However, in the findings a substantial 
number (66%) of interviewees asserted that the current mobile interconnection rate is unfair 
and unreasonable.  Substantial respondents (PR1-Rwandatel, PR1-RCIP and PR2-
TIGORwanda) asserted that the current interconnection regime is too high. On the other 
hand, PR2-MTNRwandacell lamented that interconnection rate for TIGO Rwanda is too low.  
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Either ways have a direct bearing on the efficiency and level of competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication market.  
 6.3.2.1 TOO HIGH INTERCONNECTION RATE  
The findings revealed that the current mobile interconnection rate (Rfw.40) MTN-
Rwandacell charges its competitors are too high to encourage competition. Rwandatel and 
TIGO Rwanda respondents argued that the sector has grown significantly especially mobile 
market and technology has evolved but the interconnection rate is still too high to make 
business flourish. Respondents from small operators attributed their failure to become 
efficient and competitive in market to this exorbitant access charges. To affirm this, Laffont 
et al. (1998) argue that high interconnection charges prevent effective competition in a 
mature market and erect barrier to entry in transition towards competition. It also resonates 
with Falch (2005)’s and Armstrong’s (2001) argument which states that too high 
interconnection charges discourage competition in the market.   
Nevertheless, respondents from MTN-Rwandacell share the same view that the current 
interconnection rate is fair and reasonable. They explain that the current rate has enabled 
MTN-Rwandacell to recoup its sunk costs and enabled TIGO-Rwanda to enter into the 
market. In conjunction with this, Noumba et al. (2004) expound that in most cases TELRIC 
regime rates favours. It also informs RURA’s and small operator’s perception that the current 
interconnection regime is biased and favours MTN-Rwandacell only.  To support this 
perception, Cave and Volsgang (2003:54) contest against MTN-Rwandacell’s view by saying 
that “there is no evidence to support that high interconnection price is a means to encourage 
infrastructure competition”. 
6.3.2.2 Too low interconnection rate  
In the mobile market, the findings revealed that too low interconnection rates charged by 
TIGO -Rwanda that are not based on any known international interconnection guidelines 
have deterred investment in the Rwandan telecommunication market. This has resulted into 
interconnection disputes among the mobile operators. For instance, MTN-Rwandacell 
reported TIGO-Rwanda to RURA arguing its rates are too low to encourage innovation in the 
mobile market.  
In the fixed market, respondents from Rwandatel also argue that the current fixed 
interconnection rate is too low to encourage efficiency in the market. In fact, most of the 
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respondents lamented that Rwandatel charges less fixed termination charges because RURA 
perceives that upgrading fixed network in Rwanda is less costly than mobile network.  This 
aligns with the argument of LittleChild (2006) and Falch (2005) which states that too low 
access rates discourage investment and facility-based competition.  
In accordance to the above discussions the findings found out that RURA’s main challenge is 
to reduce the current interconnection rate to a level that is efficient. The majority of 
respondents highlighted that the main challenge is to determine an efficient interconnection 
rate that is acceptable by all stakeholders. They explained that Kenya Communication 
Commission (KCC) was taken to court by the mobile operators due to the failure to 
determine the rates that are acceptable by all stakeholders.  
The findings revealed that TIGO Rwanda and Rwandatel advocate for the reduction of the 
current mobile interconnection rate but MTN-Rwandacell advocates for the increase of the 
current mobile interconnection rate. Therefore RURA is expected to determine the 
interconnection rate that is not too high and not too low-the rate that is accepted by all 
stakeholders.  This aligns with Noumba et al.’s(2004:46) argument that regulators should be 
careful in determining where to move the cursor because “access rate(high value) which are 
supposed to be favourable to the incumbent will be at extreme; at the other extreme will be 
the cost value that favours the new entrant”. As a result RURA declared that the main 
challenge is to determine an appropriate level of the termination rate.   This further resonates 
with Falch’s (2004:50) argument that regulators have a challenge to determine this “delicate 
balance”.  
Furthermore, respondents (PR1-RURA and PR2-RURA) from RURA declared that the 
reason why RURA commissioned for a second cost interconnection study review is to 
implement a new interconnection regime that will reduce the current interconnection rates by 
50% (e.g. Rfw.40 to Rfw.20).They further explained that reduction on the current mobile 
interconnection rate, will stop operators from worrying  about the off-net interconnection rate 
as a bottleneck and will be very beneficial to subscribers and the general public. This 
resonates with Cave and Volsgang’s (2003) argument which states that a lower 
interconnection rate encourages entry and enables the new entrant to compete with the 
incumbent.  
However, scholars (Geneko and Vallette, 2009; Frontier economics, 2008) argue that lower 
termination rates do not imply lower retail prices in the mobile market. With an example, 
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Geneko and Vallette (2009) explain that because of “waterbed” effect, 10% reduction of 
mobile termination rate leads to an increase of 10% in mobile out going prices on average. 
This means that for RURA to ensure an efficient level of interconnection rates that can 
enhance efficiency and competition has to be aware of the degree of the “waterbed” effect in 
the Rwandan telecommunication sector.     
 
Conversely, the findings found out that the failure of the current cost-based interconnection 
regime in Rwanda to ensure efficient level of interconnection rate cannot only be attributed to 
its poor implementation and poor choice of the cost-methodologies. This aligns with Laffont 
et al.’s (1998) argument which states that focusing on the access principle regime alone 
cannot give positive results in the telecommunication market. To resonate with the above 
arguments, Falch (2005) also argues that determining an efficient level of interconnection 
rate is a complex task to the regulatory agency because it entails political and economical 
interests. Herewith the findings revealed that the effectiveness of current interconnection 
regime was deterred by other external factors. Therefore the next section discusses the 
challenges that affected the current interconnection regime from determining an efficient 
level of interconnection rate in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.   
6.4 CHALLENGES   
According to the findings there are two facets of challenges that appeared to have hindered 
the effectiveness of current interconnection regime in Rwanda manifested. These include lack 
of enough regulatory capacity to choose appropriate cost-based methodologies and to 
implement it effectively, lack of information, lack of independence and lack of policy 
instruments. This finding clearly aligns with the argument of some scholars (Armstrong, 
2001; Jamison, 1998; Falch, 2005)  which states that cost-based access principle will 
determine an efficient interconnection rate if it is managed by the regulator with higher 
degree of independence, skills, sufficient policy instruments and information at its disposal. 
With respect to this argument the next section discusses both challenges that have deterred 
the current interconnection regime from achieving its intended objectives in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.    
6.4.1 LACK OF REGULATORY INDEPENDENCE IN INTERCONNECTION 
REGULATION  
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In the findings an overwhelming number (75%) of respondents asserted that RURA has 
higher degree of independence from the government and in decision making in solving 
interconnection disputes. These findings align with Edward and Waverman’s (2006) 
argument which underpins that for the government or the industry to influence a regulatory 
outcome is an indicative that the national regulatory agency (NRA) lacks independence. 
Moreover, to shade light on these findings, Jain (2003) in his study on interconnection 
regulation in India, he argued that TRAI could not manage interconnectivity in a smooth 
manner due to lack of independence. However, in the findings a substantial number (63%) of 
respondents declared that RURA has a lower degree of independence from the industries 
when it comes to solving interconnection disputes. Falch (2005) argues that LRIC determines 
an appropriate level of interconnection rate accepted by all parties if the interconnection 
regulation is managed by a strong regulator which is able to stay independent from the huge 
political and economic interests related to interconnection rates. In summary, the findings 
revealed that for the new interconnection regime RURA is yet to be implemented to achieve 
its intended objectives of market efficiency, RURA should be able to stay independent from 
the influence of the industries in solving interconnection disputes.  
6.4.2 LACK OF REGULATORY CAPACITY  
Despite RURA’s commitment in increasing the number of staff to 103 with an outstanding 
salary structure to avoid any regulatory capture and sponsoring more than 8 staff for masters’ 
degree attending to regulatory issues. The overwhelming number (83%) of the respondents 
however revealed that RURA lacks sufficient capacity to regulate interconnection in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector.  This resonates with Falch (2005)’s argument which 
states that LRIC determines the level of interconnection if the regulation process is managed 
by the regulatory agency with sufficient skills.  
The findings revealed that lack of sufficient capacity to choose and implement the 
appropriate cost-based methodologies affected the level of interconnection rates in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector. To affirm this point, PRI-Rwandatel said that FAC-
regime failed to achieve its intended objectives because of RURA’s incapacity to know 
whether the costs are clear or not.  In the interview, PR2-Rwandatel  expressed his concern 
by responding that the challenge industries are facing is that consultants when they came up 
with inappropriate models and rates the regulator is not able to evaluate and critic the 
outcome in the favour of customers and operators. This aligns with Jain (2003) and Noumba 
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et al.’s (2009) argument which states  that in developing countries where the regulatory 
agency has no capacity to calculate the costs involved in determining the interconnection 
rates the regulatory principle has turned out ineffective.  
 
6.4.3 LACK OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS   
Amongst the issues affecting the current interconnection regime in Rwanda is lack of 
sufficient policy instruments or tools, with issues of lack of criteria to determine the SMP 
operators or dominant player framework, lack of infrastructure sharing framework and lack 
of dispute resolution mechanism being raised by many respondents as barriers to an effective 
interconnection regulation in Rwanda. The overwhelming majority (91%) of the interviewees 
asserted that RURA lacks policy instruments that can complement the current interconnection 
regime to calculate an appropriate level of interconnection in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.  
6.4.3.1 Dominant player framework  
The average number of respondents asserted that RURA lacks a dominant player framework. 
They explained that uncertainty about the dominant player in the market has led to high 
cross-network tariffs. Pietz (2003) suggests that market share and market definition 
computations are the starting point of determining the market dominance position. They 
explained that in other countries such as Kenya through a clearly and comprehensive 
dominant player framework, asymmetric interconnection regulation to incentivise new 
entrants to compete with the incumbent has been implemented. To align with this, Pietz 
(2003) explains dominant player framework is crucial because it helps the regulator to 
identify relevant markets in which it intends to impose pro-competitive measures in case 
where such markets are found to have ineffective competition. To underpin this, Noumba et 
al. (2009) highlighted that when the regulator fails to determine the dominant operators 
remedies adopted are likely to turn out inappropriate in addressing the abuse of market 
power. This could be one of the reasons why small mobile operators in Rwanda have failed to 
meet their license obligations to the extent of being revoked by the regulator.    
6.4.3.2 Lack of infrastructure sharing framework   
Amongst policy instruments that are lacking in the Rwandan telecommunication sector, lack 
of infrastructure sharing framework was the second most frequently mentioned issue by the 
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interviewees. MTN-Rwandacell and TIGO Rwanda said Rwanda lacks a cost-effective site 
sharing framework that can enable operators to be effective. Respondents from TIGO 
Rwanda lamented that its good MTN-Rwandacell allowed it to share the sites, however, the 
sharing fee is charging is too high to compete or to make profit to build its own network. 
Respondents from MTN-Rwandacell said that they have been forced by the regulator to share 
sites with new entrants in the market. In the light of this, Jamison (1998) explains that 
infrastructure sharing encourages network deployment and coverage improvement in un-
served areas. He further says that infrastructure sharing controls anti-competitive practices in 
the telecommunication sectors.   
6.4.3.3 Lack of dispute resolution mechanism  
The findings revealed that a huge number of pending unsolved interconnection disputes has 
affected the efficiency and competition in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. They 
explained that small companies are on the verge to insolvency due to disputes that have taken 
so long without being solved. They further said if RURA keeps being reluctant massive job 
losses and poor quality of services will be inevitable.  This resonates with, Magonyozi‘s 
(2008) findings in his research on harmonization of interconnection regulation in EAC. He 
said that poor quality of customer services and inefficiency in the Rwandan telecoms sector 
are associated with lack of dispute resolution mechanism. 
6.4.4 LACK OF INFORMATION  
The findings revealed that lack of detailed information by RURA from the operators has 
turned out adopted regulatory principles ineffective. In the MTN-Rwandacell’s cost 
interconnection study report for 2006 the consultant states that lack of information to fill the 
models rendered the evaluation of interconnection cost difficult (ICEA, 2006). In conjunction 
with this, Xavier (1997) also argues that calculating forward-looking cost often becomes 
challenging and time consuming due to the absence of reliable cost information from the 
incumbent. Furthermore, In Rwandatel’s report the consultant also revealed that the 
consultant made more assumptions due to lack of detailed information on network traffic 
(ICEA, 2006). This aligns with Melody’s (1997) argument that a lot of estimation may lead 
to an arbitrage exercise.  Furthermore, respondents (PR1-RURA and PR2-RURA) asserted 
that the failure of the current interconnection regime is due to the fact that consultant did not 
get detailed information from the incumbent. Melody (1997) and Noumba et al. (2004) 
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highlight that in countries where the regulator lacks enough information from the operators, 
cost-study approaches have turned out ineffective. 
6.5 REGULATORY MEASURES TO IMPROVE INTERCONNECTION REGULATION 
IN RWANDA    
The findings revealed that employees from the industry have more knowledge in regulating 
interconnection than employees from the regulator. This created a premise to probe from the 
industry and other stakeholders the approaches and strategies RURA can adopt to improve 
the effectiveness of interconnection regulation in the Rwandan telecommunication section. 
Therefore in this subsection the researcher will discuss regulatory measures that were 
proposed by operators and researchers in the Rwandan telecoms market.  
6.5.1 Asymmetric interconnection regulation  
All respondents from TIGO-Rwanda and Rwandatel highlighted that as new entrant in the 
mobile market, RURA did not give the company a regulatory incentive for them to be able to 
compete with the mobile incumbent, MTN-Rwandacell. This has become a competitive 
strategy for the incumbent to maintain its dominant position in rural and urban areas. This 
resonates with Dymond’s (2004) argument that unfair interconnection practices plagues and 
hinders the emergence of competitive markets.   As a result, small mobile operators proposed 
that RURA should adopt an asymmetric interconnection regime. This aligns with Di Pillo et 
al.’s (2009) argument. They argue that the rationale behind asymmetric interconnection 
regulation is to readdress the consequences of market power. Furthermore, Dymond (2004) 
also underpins that this regime ensure rural communication developments.  As a result, many 
countries such as South Africa, have implemented asymmetric interconnection regulation in 
order to incentivize new entrants in the telecom market.   
6.5.2 Reduction of mobile interconnection charge  
An overwhelming number of respondents argued that the current mobile interconnection rate 
is too high to encourage effective competition in the Rwandan telecoms market. They argued 
that bringing down the current interconnection rate will be beneficial to subscribers and the 
general public. They explained that this has been viable in Kenya, the reduction of the access 
rate by 50% forced the operators to cut down their retail prices to a fair and reasonable level. 
This resonates with Cave and Volsgang’s (2003) argument which states that a lower 
interconnection rate encourages entry and enables the new entrant to compete with the 
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incumbent. However in order this to be effective the regulator has to be vigilant. With Kenya 
being an exceptional, in other countries the reduction of interconnection rates does not 
necessary imply reduction in the retail prices. In fact, Geneko and Vallette (2009:20) argue 
that because of “waterbed” effect 10% reduction of mobile termination rate leads to an 
increase of 10% in mobile out going prices on average.  This means that RURA should be 
aware of the degree of “waterbed” effect in the Rwandan telecommunication sector in order 
to make sure that the reduction in the mobile interconnection has ensured effective 
competition and viability of customer benefits.      
6.5.3 Increase of fixed interconnection charge  
The findings revealed that there is a huge difference in interconnection charges between fixed 
and mobile networks, with the mobile receiving a higher termination rates. Rwandatel argues 
that the current interconnection rate has not enabled the company to recover from access 
deficit. They further argue that though technology is becoming cheaper, the cost of fixed 
network elements have gone up. As a result they proposed for an increase on the current fixed 
interconnection rate.  
  
6.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER     
This chapter discussed results presented in chapter five by relating them to the study research 
aims and questions and literature review in chapter 2 & 3. Firstly, the finding revealed that 
RURA adopted cost-based access pricing which is arguably underpinned by a range of 
scholars (Armstrong, 2001; Jamison, 1998; Pietz, 2003) as the best pro-competitive remedy 
to address market issues in developing countries. The findings revealed that the choice and 
implementation of cost-based pricing models in Rwanda was rather complex in accordance 
with the findings of Salinger (1998) and Jamison (1998). Despite this, the findings revealed 
that TELRIC-regime is the existing interconnection regime that is in practice in the Rwandan 
telecoms sector. This answers critical question 1 of the study: what is the existing 
interconnection regime in the Rwandan telecommunication sector?.  Secondly, the findings 
revealed that the current level of TELRIC-based rates discourages efficiency and effective 
competition. It was apparent that the current mobile interconnection rate (Rfw.40) is too high 
to encourage Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda to compete with MTN-Rwandacell as it was 
been revealed by Falch (2005) and Armstrong (2001). Furthermore, it was revealed that the 
current fixed interconnection rate (Rfw.30) is too low to encourage innovation according to 
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Falch (2005). This answers sub-question 2 of the study: how has the existing current 
interconnection regime affected the Rwandan telecommunication market?.  
Fourthly, the findings further demonstrated that ineffectiveness of the level of the current 
interconnection rates should not be attributed to TELRIC-regime per se but also on other 
factors. It was revealed that lack of sufficient regulatory capacity, lack of policy instruments 
and information asymmetry one way or the other affected the effectiveness of the current 
cost-based interconnection regime in Rwanda. This resonates with the argument of 
Armstrong (2001), Jamison (1998) and Falch (2005).   
This answers question 3 of the study: What are challenges facing the existing interconnection 
regime in the Rwandan telecommunication sector?.  However, with the adoption of 
asymmetric interconnection regulation, reduction of the current mobile interconnection rate, 
increase of the current fixed interconnection rates,  mobile number portability, and 
establishment of the new interconnection regime based on forward-looking approach 
Rwandan telecommunication industries believe that interconnection regulation will be 
effective in Rwanda. This answers sub-question 4 of the study: What are approaches and 
strategies can be adopted by RURA to improve interconnection regulation in Rwanda?    
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CHAPTER SEVEN: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE 
INTERCONNECTION REGULATION IN RWANDA 
7.1   THE SUMMARY OF THE STUDY   
The aim of this study was to investigate the regulation of interconnection in Rwanda. 
Specifically the study was investigating the existing interconnection regime and how it has 
affected the Rwandan telecommunication sector. The conclusion highlights all the overall 
observations regarding the core research questions stated below: 
a) What is the existing interconnection pricing regime in Rwanda?  
b) How has the existing interconnection pricing regulation affected the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector?  
c) What are the challenges facing the current interconnection pricing regime in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector? 
d) What can be done to improve the regulation of interconnection pricing regulation in Rwanda?   
To do this, the literature that had a direct bearing on the purpose of this study was reviewed. 
Under Chapter 2, the literature on the definition of interconnection, the nature of 
telecommunication network, the interconnection regulation in the telecoms was thoroughly 
reviewed. However, Peitz (2003) argues that efficiency and competition in the 
telecommunication sector hinge on the interconnection pricing regulation. In light of this 
argument in Chapter 3 of this study the literature on interconnection price regulation in 
telecommunication sector and techniques to calculate interconnection rates was extensively 
reviewed.     
In this study, a mixed approach (both qualitative and quantitative approaches) was used 
through a number of research instruments including; semi- structured interviews and 
documentary analysis.    
The study revealed that the Rwanda telecommunication sector has grown significantly after 
the genocide of 1994. However, the study has shown that granting access to incumbent’s 
network at a fair and reasonable access rate has been the biggest controversial issue in all the 
regimes.  Armstrong (2001) and Wright (2000) argue that the main issue under two-way 
access pricing model is to under free interconnection negotiation incumbent always have 
incentives to charge high access charges.  Between 1998 and 2006 free interconnection 
negotiation between MTN-Rwandacell and Rwandatel induced too high interconnection 
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charges that led to market distortion and affected their customers.  However, the study found 
out that the issue of high interconnection rates and interconnection disputes are linked to the 
current caller party pays (CPP) regime that is being used in all East African Countries 
including Rwanda. Di Pillo et al.’s (2009) explain that CPP produces incentives for larger 
operators to lower the prices on-net calls and increase the charges of off-net calls in order to 
drive the small network operator out of the market. 
The study further revealed that the government of Rwanda established RURA in order to 
address issues of high interconnection charges in the telecommunication sector. Proponents 
of sector specific approach argue that it has been quite successful in delivering both 
competitive interconnection rates and a smooth implementation of equal access.  The study 
revealed that to address the interconnection negotiation break-up between MTN-Rwandacell 
and Rwandatel, RURA commissioned a consultant to conduct cost-based interconnection 
market review. The rationale behind was to determine an appropriate interconnection regime 
in the telecoms market. In this aligns on Pietz’s (2003) argument that intervention per se 
cannot alleviate interconnection pricings issue commitment of the regulator to adopt a clear 
and comprehensive interconnection policy that specifies what happens when the 
interconnection negotiations fail.  
RURA adopted cost-based interconnection principle as the panacea to ensure fair and 
reasonable interconnection rate in Rwanda. Nevertheless, efficiency and competition are still 
far from effective in the Rwandan telecommunication sector due to inconsistencies in the 
existing cost-based methodology and its practices.   
The study demonstrated that the adoption of TELRIC bottom up forward-looking regime to 
address the FAC or COSITU-regime deficiencies was an appropriate choice but its poor 
implementation in practice has deterred efficiency and competition in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector.   The study found out that the current mobile interconnection rate 
(Rfw.40) is too high to encourage Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda to compete with the mobile 
incumbent, MTN-Rwandacell. Consequently, it was revealed that the current access rate has 
become a bottleneck to growth of the Rwandan telecoms market. On the other hand, too low 
current fixed interconnection rate (Rfw.30) charged by Rwandatel has discouraged 
investment. Furthermore the study revealed that TIGO Rwanda’s mobile rates are neither 
based on TELRIC nor FAC and are also too low to encourage competition and facility-based 
competition.  As the result, Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda asserted that the current 
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interconnection regime is unfair and needs modification, however, MTN-Rwandacell 
strongly argue that the current interconnection regime has enabled the company to recoup its 
investments and has enabled new entrants to enter the market. Therefore the main challenge 
to RURA is how to determine an appropriate level of interconnection that can enhance 
efficiency and effective competition in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  However, 
RURA has to be vigilant while deciding the level of the interconnection rate that will be 
acceptable by all the stakeholders. Rwandatel and TIGO Rwanda argue that low mobile rate 
will be very beneficial to subscribers and the general public. RURA also believes that 
bringing down the rates will give a room to adjust pricing because Rwandatel and TIGO 
Rwanda cannot charge below the current interconnection rate. However, MTN-Rwandacell 
argues that if RURA brings the current termination rate some operators will collapse due to 
low revenue and lack of funds to fuel network expansion and growth of sector. He further 
explained that massive job losses and poor quality of services might be inevitable if not 
otherwise. Nevertheless, Cave and Volsgang (2003) argue that high interconnection price is 
not the sole means to encourage infrastructure competition. Instead they argue that lower 
interconnection rate encourages entry and enables the new entrant to compete with the 
incumbent.  
However, despite the argument from small operators and the RURA for the reduction current 
mobile interconnection rate, literature has highlighted that in other jurisdiction regulatory 
measures have turned out ineffective due the presence of “waterbed” effect. Therefore RURA 
is required to be aware of the magnitude of “waterbed” effect if a fair and reasonable level of 
interconnection rate is to be attained.  
Despite the inappropriateness of the current cost-based methodologies, the study revealed that 
RURA’s incapacity and lack of enough information to effectively implement TELRIC 
bottom up forward-looking approach also affected the level of interconnection rates in 
Rwanda.   Furthermore, the study revealed that regulatory external challenges such as lack of 
sufficient policy instruments; infrastructure sharing framework and dominant player 
framework, lack of independence from the government and industries from setting and 
solving interconnection rates also have one way or the other deterred the effectiveness of the 
current interconnection regime in Rwanda.  
In a nutshell, operators, researchers and regulatory staff strongly believe that the reduction of 
the current mobile interconnection rate, the adoption of the asymmetric interconnection 
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regulation, number portability and establishment of the new interconnection regime based on 
forward-looking will ensure the viability of interconnection regulation in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. The table 7.1 below shows the summary of the findings of the 
study.   
Table 7.1: Summary of the findings  
Research Questions  Findings  
What is the existing interconnection 
regime in Rwanda?  
 
 
Cost-based pricing model: TELRIC forward-looking 
bottom-up model.   
            Mobile ICX rate: Rfw.40  
            Fixed ICX rate:Rfw.30 
How has the existing interconnection 
regime affected the Rwandan 
telecommunication market?   
 
• Cost-based pricing methodology was poorly 
implemented.  
• Mobile ICX rate (Rfw.40) is too high to enable 
small operators’ (Rwandatel and TIGO-
Rwanda) to compete with MTN-Rwandacell 
and this has affected the profitability of TIGO-
Rwanda and Rwandatel because they cannot 
charge below this ICX rate.  
• TIGO-Rwanda’s interconnection rate is not 
based on TELRIC. It is too low to encourage 
efficiency.  
• Fixed ICX rate (Rfw.30) is too low to 
encourage investment and facility-based 
competition in the Rwandan telecommunication 
market.  
• TELRIC-regime is unfair and needs to be 
modified or changed.  
What are the challenges facing the 
existing interconnection regime in 
Rwanda?  
• Lack of sufficient regulatory capacity to 
regulate interconnection in Rwanda. Employees 
from operators are more knowledgeable in 
interconnection than employees in RURA.   
• Lack of dominant prayer framework. This has 
led to cross-network tariffs.   
• Lacks of a cost-effective site sharing framework 
that can enable the operators to be effective.   
• Lack of RURA’s independence from industries 
in solving interconnection disputes. MTN has 
more lobbying power than Rwandatel and 
TIGO-Rwanda.  
• Information asymmetry. MTN-Rwandacell and 
Rwandatel did not give correct information for 
their network actual costs and traffic as the 
result it became difficult for the consultant to 
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7.2 CONCLUSION    
First and foremost this study concludes that the current cost-based interconnection regime in 
Rwanda was poorly implemented. As a result, the current TELRIC-regime has not been able 
to determine the level of interconnection rates that can enhance efficiency and effective 
competition in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  Salinger (1998:28) puts it clearly that 
“the use of LRIC is theoretically sound, but its implementation in practice is rather complex   
and could undermine the profitability of the incumbent’s investment if poorly executed”. It 
was apparent that although the current fixed and mobile interconnection rates were calculated 
using TELRIC-regime, FAC is also being used by Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda neither uses 
TELRIC-regime nor FAC-regime. This regulatory uncertainty in implementing TELRIC-
regime has been a competitive advantage for MTN-Rwandacell, the prime beneficiary of 
TELRIC-regime and undermining the profitability of the fixed incumbent, Rwandatel. The 
study found out that the current cost-based regime does not give incentives to operators to 
deploy new technology and it was clearly evident that RURA in proposing the 
implementation of the current regime, it did not recognize the adverse effect on the Rwandan 
telecoms market of moving too quickly to the new regime.   
Secondly, the study concludes that the current mobile interconnection rate is too high to 
encourage small mobile operators, Rwandatel and TIGO-Rwanda to compete with MTN-
Rwandacell and to upgrade their networks to the most efficient technology in the Rwandan 
mobile telecommunication sector.  In 2001, FCC argued that TELRIC distorts investments 
and competition because of high interconnection revenue that provides little incentives for 
operators to upgrade their network (Melody, 1997). It was apparent that the current 
interconnection regime is a bottleneck to the telecoms sector’s growth.  Rwandatel and 
calculate TELRIC rates.    
What can be done to improve 
interconnection regulation in 
Rwanda? 
• Adoption of the new interconnection regime. 
• Reduction of the current mobile interconnection 
rate(Rfw.40) 
• Adoption of Mobile Number Portability  
• Regulatory Capacity building  
• Strategies to mitigate Information asymmetry; 
improve public consultation process and new 
regulatory framework based on competition 
analysis principle.   
• Adopting technology neutrality  
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TIGO-Rwanda are suffering in the mobile business because they cannot charge below the 
current mobile interconnection rate which is too exorbitant.   
Thirdly, this study concludes that the current fixed interconnection rate is too low to 
encourage Rwandatel to recoup its access deficit. Falch (2004) puts it clear that too low 
access rate deters investments and delays facility-based competition in the telecommunication 
market. It was clear that RURA was uncertain about the fact that fixed network elements are 
as costly as mobile network elements hence setting the rate that does not enable Rwandatel to 
recover its access deficit and also to achieve its universal obligations.   
Fourthly, this study concludes that the complexity of interconnection regulation process in 
Rwanda is somehow linked to the weaknesses that are pertaining to the Rwanda’s nature of 
intervention to address interconnection disputes. Buiges (2006) puts it clearly that the nature 
of public intervention in controlling interconnection prices should not be undermined if 
market efficiency objectives are to be achieved in telecommunication networks. Although 
Rwanda adopted sector specific regulation approach as the panacea of interconnection 
disputes, in this study it was apparent that all pro-competitive remedies turned out ineffective 
due to lack of detailed information from the incumbent’s network.  Cave and Crowther 
(2004) highlights that sector specific approach requires large flow of information from the 
regulated entity.  
Fifthly the study concludes that the current interconnection regime failed to deliver its 
intended objectives due to regulatory uncertainty that is resulted from lack of clear and 
comprehensive interconnection negotiations processes in the Rwandan telecommunication 
sector. Armstrong (2001) highlights that under two-way access pricing models the main 
challenge is to ensure fair and reasonable access charges through free interconnection 
negotiations among the operators. The study found out that the pending interconnection rate 
disputes that were identified in the sector are the result of lack of clear interconnection 
negotiations guidelines in place. This has been also attributed to the failure of the current 
cost-based interconnection regime. Jamison (1998) says that if there are clear and 
comprehensive interconnection negotiation guidelines, the regulatory principles also tend to 
turn out ineffective the light of actual cost and market conditions.   
Finally, this study concludes that the current level of mobile and fixed interconnection rates 
in Rwanda was not only affected by the poor implementation of TELRIC-regime by RURA 
and the consultant but also lower degree of regulatory independence from the government 
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and industry in setting interconnection rates, lack of a comprehensive infrastructure 
framework and dominant player framework, lack of enough regulatory capacity and 
information asymmetry. Jain(2003) expounds that setting up a regulatory agency and 
adopting regulatory policies is not sufficient to ensure efficient level of interconnection rates 
in the telecommunication industry. Scholars (Armstrong, 2002; Jamison 1998; Jain, 2003; 
Edward & Waverman, 2006; Falch, 2005) argue that an optimal level of interconnection rate 
can be determined only if the regulator has high degree of independence, skills, enough 
information from the incumbent and enough policy instruments at its disposal.     
7.2 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
According to the findings and discussions in this study it was revealed that the failure of the 
current interconnection regime in Rwanda was associated with its challenges discussed in 
Chapter five of this Study. Therefore the researcher developed a set of recommendations in 
line with the challenges and suggestions that were showcased by respondents on what could 
be done by RURA to improve the interconnection regulation in Rwanda. Considering the 
findings of this research, the following recommendations can be made:    
7.2.1 CAPACITY BUILDING  
Capacity building in a regulatory agency refers to the identification and implementation of 
institutional and management process that make the regulation “effective”11 and efficient”12. 
RURA should increase the technical and administrative skills especially in interconnection 
regulations. RURA should not target to reach the threshold size of staff but to focus on 
experts who will enhance competence in the regulatory environment. This will address the 
problem of information asymmetry and regulatory capture that have been showcased to 
prevail in the Rwandan telecommunication sector. Therefore before RURA adopts a new 
interconnection regime, there is a need for RURA to train its staff how to use cost-based 
models effectively and efficiently and how to be in the position to convince the operators 
about the determined interconnection rates in case the consultant comes up with contradictory 
interconnection rates. For instance consultants should always provide in-house trainings to 
RURA employees especially interconnection and economic regulators on how to use and 
regulate interconnection using the established regime effectively.  
                                                                 
11
 Effective refers to the ability to deliver regulation as per intentions set for it 
12
 Efficient refers to the minimization of scarce resources in delivering regulations 
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7.2.2 DOMINANT PLAYER FRAMEWORK  
Many developing countries have embarked on safe guarding against any abuse of market 
power by conducting wholesale or retail interconnection market review. These include 
Kenya, Uganda and South Africa to mention a few. Therefore RURA should benchmark and 
implement a clear and comprehensive dominant player framework. This will enable RURA to 
define and identify the market segments in which to impose pro-competitive measures-such 
as asymmetric interconnection regime- in case where such markets are found to have 
ineffective competition. Furthermore, this framework will also stop the dominant prayers in 
the market to charge cross-network exorbitant tariffs.  
7.2.3 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM  
RURA should update the regulation on interconnection by adding the dispute resolution 
mechanism to resolve issues of interconnection in timely basis for the benefit of consumers. 
A lot of disputes have taken more than expected time and this must be resolved with time 
frame set and if possible intervention as per regulatory procedure. The customers are the ones 
affected with any delay on resolving the disputes issues. This will resolve the pending 
interconnection issues in the Rwandan telecommunication sector for the benefit of costumers 
and operators.  
7.2.4 QUALITY OF SERVICE ON INTERCONNECTION LEVEL 
In order to improve interconnection regulation in Rwanda, quality of service has to be taken 
as a key factor in IP-based Networks. RURA should be equipped with the test gears 
investigating the network quality of Rwanda for MTN-Rwandacell, Rwandatel and TIGO-
Rwanda. Customers are not satisfied with this service especially those from outside as they 
feel the difference with their network. 
7.2.5 INFRASTRUCTURE SHARING FRAMEWORK 
Infrastructure sharing is a tool which RURA can use to encourage network deployment and 
coverage improvement in un-served or underserved areas. Rwanda should implement an 
infrastructure sharing framework. Infrastructure sharing is used to control anti-competitive 
practices such as high interconnection pricing of essential facilities and services. It will 
reduce the capital expenditure and operating cost of the operators in the industry and also 
improve Rwandan economic efficiency.  
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7.2.6 TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY   
Technology neutrality means that different technologies offering essentially similar services 
should be regulated in similar manner. Technology neutrality has been hailed as the 
appropriate approach to proceed in the ICT arena. Countries neighboring Rwanda, such as 
Tanzania and Kenya have embarked on technology neutrality license in order to encourage 
operators to invest in new technology without any regulatory hindrance. With respect to these 
assertions and on the ground that lack of sufficient information from the stakeholders led to 
ineffectiveness of the current interconnection regime, the researcher recommends RURA to 
adopt technology neutrality regulations. This will encourage telecom operators in Rwanda to 
invest in new technology without any regulatory hindrance.  
7.2.8 STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY    
7.2. 8.1 Improvement of public consultation process  
Information asymmetry has been identified in this study as the most challenging issue in the 
Rwandan interconnection regulation. Adopted cost-based interconnection approaches have 
turned out to be ineffective due to lack of detailed information from dominant operators. 
Improving public consultation process will increase the information hence quickening the 
decision-making process. It will further improve the transparency efficiency and 
effectiveness of interconnection regulation. 
7.2.8.2 Improvement of interconnection negotiation process   
Firstly RURA should establish guidelines in advance of any interconnection negotiations. 
These guidelines assist policy makers, customers, regulatory authorities and operators. The 
finding delays in solving interconnection disputes are due to lack of clear and comprehensive 
interconnection guidelines in place.  Secondly, RURA should publish default interconnection 
arrangements together with the guidelines in advance of negotiations. This strategy will 
alleviate the degree of information asymmetry in the Rwandan regulatory environment.   
Last but not the least, RURA should set deadlines at the beginning of negotiations for the 
completion of various steps. For instance, MTN-Rwandacell may be demanded to produce a 
proposed interconnection agreement in 15 days. Failure to do this, dispute resolution 
mechanism or regulatory intervention may be applied.   
7.2.8.3 A new regulatory framework based on competition analysis 
principle   
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In order the degree of information asymmetry to be mitigated in the Rwandan 
telecommunication sector. The study recommends RURA to implement a new regulatory 
framework based on competition analysis principle. Based on the regulatory uncertainty that 
was identified in this study in the Rwandan regulatory environment, this strategy is the 
appropriate ex ante regulation in the absence of detailed information.  
7.3 AREA OF FURTHER RESEARCH  
This study provides a basis on which further research needs to be done in the regulation of 
interconnection in Rwanda, given the fact that 16 people who participated in this study do not 
warrant the generalization of findings. However this study underlines that information 
asymmetry and lack of sufficient regulatory capacity have been the main challenges that 
affected the current interconnection regime from delivering its expected objectives in the 
Rwandan telecommunication sector. Moreover, the rate at which Rwanda has reached 
building next generation infrastructure networks in order to enhance convergence-the 
merging of telecommunication technologies-shows the speed at which interconnection 
services are evolving on in the Rwandan telecommunication sector.  Consequently, the 
limited scope of this study in terms of interconnection services cannot portray a clear picture 
of interconnection regulatory issues in the Rwandan telecommunication sector of today. 
Therefore the future research could be the interconnection challenges in a converging 
environment specifically on the policy implications on the Rwandan telecommunication 
regulators.       
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                                                          Appendix 1 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: RURA 
1) Can you please tell us about the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda? 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
2) Please also share a little of the history of interconnection regulation in 
Rwanda? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………….... 
3) What is your view on interconnection regulation in Rwanda with respect to the 
following issues: 
(a) How does the regulator work to resolve interconnection disputes between 
operators? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
4) Which cost-based models, for example, FAC or LRAIC do you use to 
calculate interconnection rates?  And Why? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
i) Do you believe that the current interconnection regime has enhanced market 
efficiency in the Rwandan telecommunication sector? If no give reasons. If 
yes give an example………………………………................. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
ii) In your view, what are the challenges the current interconnection regime is 
facing? 
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….... 
 
iii) Would you please tell us what has been done by RURA to address these 
challenges?..............................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
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iv) As a regulator, what do you think can be done to improve interconnection rate 
regulation in the Rwandan telecommunication sector? 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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Appendix 2 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE /GUIDE: Researchers in the Rwandan Telecommunication 
sector 
1. What is your opinion or view on the interconnection regulation in Rwanda?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….. 
 
1) Is the current interconnection rate fair and reasonable to enhance market efficiency?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………… 
2) In your opinion, what are the challenges facing the current interconnection costing 
regime in Rwanda?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
 
3) Is the current interconnection costing regime fair or needs modification?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………..………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………..……………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
4) In your view, what could be done to improve interconnection regulation in Rwanda?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………….………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………. 
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Appendix 3 
                                       
INTERVIEW GUIDE: MTN-RWANDACELL and RWANDATEL 
1) Can you please tell us about the existing interconnection regime in Rwanda? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2) Please also share a little of the history of interconnection regulation in Rwanda.  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
      3)What is your view on interconnection regulation in Rwanda?  
a) In your opinion, is the current interconnection (mobile and fixed) rate fair and 
reasonable?  
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
b) What are the challenges the current interconnection regime is facing?  
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
c) Is RURA fair and independent in resolving interconnection rate disputes? Give 
examples 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
d) Is the current interconnection regime fair or needs modification?  
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
            4) What type of cost-based models, for example, FAC or LRAIC or benchmarking do 
you use to calculate interconnection rates?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………..........................................................................................................................................
................................................. 
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a) Is it encouraging efficiency in your business?  If yes or no, Give Reasons.   
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………… 
5) In your view, what can be done to improve interconnection rate regulation in 
Rwanda?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
